Notes and skeleton chapters.
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@ -86,7 +86,7 @@ defines a `part' thus
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The term component, in American English, can mean a building block or a part.
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The term component, in American English, can mean a building block or a part.
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In British-English a component generally is given to mean the definition for part above.
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In British-English a component generally is given to mean the definition for part above.
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For this study, we will use {\bc} to mean a `part', and component
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For this study, we will use {\bc} to mean a `part', and component
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to mean a part or sub-assembly.
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to mean a part or a sub-assembly.
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What components all have in common is that they can fail, and fail in
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What components all have in common is that they can fail, and fail in
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a number of well defined ways. For common base-components
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a number of well defined ways. For common base-components
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@ -146,9 +146,9 @@ When building from the bottom up, it is more meaningful to call them `derived~co
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\section{Failure Modes in depth: A detailed look at the op-amp and the resistor}
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\section{Failure Modes in depth: A detailed look at the op-amp and the resistor}
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We look in detail at two common electrication components in this section and examine how
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We look in detail at two common electrical components in this section and examine how
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two sources of information on failure modes view their failure mode behaviour.
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two sources of information on failure modes view their failure mode behaviour.
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We look at the reasons why some known failure modes are ommitted, or presented in
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We look at the reasons why some known failure modes are omitted, or presented in
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specific but unintuitive ways.
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specific but unintuitive ways.
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- Failure modes. Prescribed failure modes EN298 - FMD91
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- Failure modes. Prescribed failure modes EN298 - FMD91
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@ -156,14 +156,28 @@ specific but unintuitive ways.
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\subsection{resistor}
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\subsection{resistor}
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EN298 says......
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EN298 says......
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Parameter change not considereed for EN298 because the resistors are downrated from
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Parameter change not considered for EN298 because the resistors are down-rated from
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maximum possible voltage exposure -- find refs.
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maximum possible voltage exposure -- find refs.
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FMD-91 gives the following percentatges for failure rates in
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\label{downrate}
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The parameter change, is usually a failure mode associated with over stressing the component.
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In a system designed to typical safety critical constraints (as in EN298)
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these environmentally induced failure modes need not be considered.
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\subsection{op-amp}
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\subsection{op-amp}
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Literature suggests, latch up, latch down and oscillation.
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Literature suggests, latch up, latch down and oscillation.
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FMD-91 states, V+ disconnected, V- V+ shorted, NOOP and Low slew.
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FMD-91 states, V+ disconnected, V- V+ shorted, NOOP and Low slew.
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EN298 does not specifgically include OP_AMPS and these would fall under
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table \cite{en298}[A.1 note e].
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This demands that all open connections, and shorts between adjacent pins be considered.
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We can examine these failure modes by taking our 358 op-amp and examining
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looking at
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Discuss why. Determine more user friendly terms from FMD91 definition.
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Discuss why. Determine more user friendly terms from FMD91 definition.
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@ -887,6 +901,9 @@ levels of electrical interference, high voltage contamination on supply
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lines, radiation levels etc.
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lines, radiation levels etc.
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Environmental influences will affect specific components in specific ways.
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Environmental influences will affect specific components in specific ways.
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Environmental analysis is thus applicable to components.
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Environmental analysis is thus applicable to components.
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Environmental influences, such as over stress due to voltage
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can be eliminated by down-rating of components as discussed in section~\ref{downrate}.
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With given environmental constraints, we can therefore eliminate some failure modes from the model.
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\paragraph{Operational states.}
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\paragraph{Operational states.}
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Within the field of safety critical engineering we often encounter
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Within the field of safety critical engineering we often encounter
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sub-system that include test facilities. We also encounter degraded performance
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sub-system that include test facilities. We also encounter degraded performance
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@ -97,12 +97,12 @@ When all test cases have been analysed, we switch our attention to a higher abst
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% Each `test case' is labelled from the perspective of the failure as seen at sub-system level.
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% Each `test case' is labelled from the perspective of the failure as seen at sub-system level.
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%
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%
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We can now try to simplfy by determining common symptoms.
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We can now try to simplify by determining common symptoms.
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A common symptom, in this context, is defined as faults caused by different
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A common symptom, in this context, is defined as faults caused by different
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component failure modes that have the same effect from the perspective
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component failure modes that have the same effect from the perspective
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of a `user' of the sub-system.
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of a `user' of the sub-system.
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Test case results can now viewed as failure modes of the sub-sytem or `black box', and grouped together
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Test case results can now viewed as failure modes of the sub-system or `black box', and grouped together
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where there are common symptoms.
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where there are common symptoms.
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These are grouped together by joining them with lines. These lines form collected groups (or `spiders').
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These are grouped together by joining them with lines. These lines form collected groups (or `spiders').
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See figure \ref{fig:gensubsys3}.
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See figure \ref{fig:gensubsys3}.
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@ -320,7 +320,7 @@ In other words we have derived failure modes for this sub-system.
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% is represented as a contour. These contours represent the failure modes of the sub-system.
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% is represented as a contour. These contours represent the failure modes of the sub-system.
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% \end{itemize}
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% \end{itemize}
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This sub-system may now therfore, be represented as three separate failure modes.
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This sub-system may now therefore, be represented as three separate failure modes.
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We may now treat this sub-system as we would a component with a known set of failure modes.
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We may now treat this sub-system as we would a component with a known set of failure modes.
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The failure modes of the Sub-system $SS$ are now the set $SS_{fm} = \{ SP1, SP2, SP_3 \}$.
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The failure modes of the Sub-system $SS$ are now the set $SS_{fm} = \{ SP1, SP2, SP_3 \}$.
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@ -365,7 +365,9 @@ with known failure modes.
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\section{Boolean definition of a symptom}
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Need to explain why its XOR not OR here.
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\section{To conclude}
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\section{To conclude}
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