.

fmmd_concept/fmmd_concept.tex

@@ -1200,12 +1200,13 @@ chosing {\fg}s and working bottom-up this hierarchical trait will occur as a nat
 \item It is possible to model multiple failure modes.
 \end{itemize}
 
-\section{Re-Factoring the UML Model}
 
-The UML models thus far in this 
 \ifthenelse {\boolean{paper}}
 {
 %paper
+\pagebreak[4]
+\section{Re-Factoring the UML Model}
+The UML models thus far in this 
 have been used to develop the data relationships required to perform FMMD analysis.
 This section re-organises and rationalises the UML model.
 We want to be able to use {\dcs} in functional groups.
@@ -1225,6 +1226,7 @@ The re-factored UML diagram is shown in figure \ref{fig:refactored_uml}.
 }
 {
 % chapter
+\section{Re-Factoring the UML Model}
 The terms used in FMMD and the UML data model are refined in the 
 chapter \ref{defs}.
 }
@@ -1243,5 +1245,4 @@ provides the background for the need for a new methodology for
 static analysis that can span the mechanical electrical and software domains
 using a common notation.
 The author believes it addresses many short comings in current static failure mode analysis methodologies.
-\vspace{60pt}
-\today
+%\today

fmmd_design_aide/fmmd_design_aide.tex

@@ -77,7 +77,7 @@ The `undetectable' failure modes undertsandably, are the most worrying for the s
 EN61058, the statistically based European Norm, using ratios
 of detected and undetected system failure modes to
 classify the sytems safety levels and describes sub-clasifications
-for detected and undetected failure modes \cite{en61508}.
+for detected and undetected failure modes~\cite{en61508}.
 
 %It is these that are, generally the ones that stand out as single 
 %failure modes. 
@@ -231,7 +231,7 @@ and this error symptom, `low\_reading' would mean our plant could
 beleive that the temperature reading is lower than it actually is.
 To take an example from a K type thermocouple, the offset of 1.86mV
 %from the potential divider represents amplified to 
-would represent  $\approx \; 46\,^{\circ}{\rm C}$ \cite{eurothermtables} \cite{aoe}.
+would represent  $\approx \; 46\,^{\circ}{\rm C}$~\cite{eurothermtables}~\cite{aoe}.
 
 %\clearpage
 \subsection{Undetected Failure Mode: Incorrect Reading}
@@ -500,7 +500,7 @@ We can surmise the symptoms in a list.
 %\clearpage
 \subsection{OP-AMP FIT Calculations}
 The DOD electronic reliability of components
-document  MIL-HDBK-217F\cite{mil1992}[5.1] gives formulae for calculating
+document  MIL-HDBK-217F~\cite{mil1991}[5.1] gives formulae for calculating
 the 
 %$\frac{failures}{{10}^6}$ 
 ${failures}/{{10}^6}$ % looks better
@@ -553,7 +553,7 @@ failures per Billion (${10}^9$) hours of operation} of 1.
 
 The switching transistor will be operating at a low frequency
 and well within  50\% of it maximum voltage.
-MIL-HDBK-217F\cite{mil1992}[6-25]  gives an exmaple
+MIL-HDBK-217F~\cite{mil1991}[6-25]  gives an exmaple
 transistor in these environmental conditions, and assigns an FIT value of 11.
 
 \section{Conclusions}

sw_as_plds/sw_as_plds.tex

@@ -42,11 +42,15 @@ Transitioning between one stage and another depends on decisions made from
 variable states. This corresponds to the standard software structures, if-then-else
  do-while etc.
 
-At a program flow stage, the software may initiate actions. Typically, in an embedded
-system, a micro controller will read from external sensors, and then apply
+Generally the flow of data follows a pattern of afferent, transform and efferent. 
+That is to say data is input, processed and data is output.
+ 
+%At a program flow stage, the software may initiate actions. 
+In a safety critical control system
+typically, an embedded
+electro-mechanical system, a micro controller will read from external sensors, and then apply
 outputs to control the equipment under supervision. 
 
-More generally the flow of data follows a pattern of afferent, transform and efferent. 
 
 \subsection{Afferent, Transform and Afferent Data Flow}