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Robin Clark 2013-03-16 12:19:01 +00:00
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7
submission_thesis/CH2_FMEA/copy.tex
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@ -544,6 +544,8 @@ there is usually a clear afferent to transform to efferent path.
%
That is, there is an input, some processing and an output.
%
We define the signal path as the components used to process the signal.
%
Some circuits have feedback loops or even circular signal paths, but it
is normal for a signal path to exist.
%
@ -584,7 +586,10 @@ of the component exhibiting the {\fm} under investigation.
%
Also, whether following the effects through the signal path {\em only} is acceptable, and instead
looking at its effect on all other components in the system is necessary,
is a matter for debate, and is examined in section~\ref{sec:xfmea}.
is a matter for debate.
In practise, it is a compromise between the amount of time/money that can be spent
on analysis relative to the criticality of the project.
Metrics from measuring the amount of work to undertake for FMEA are examined in section~\ref{sec:xfmea}.
\paragraph{Single component failure mode to system failure relation.}

13
submission_thesis/CH6_Software_Examples/software.tex
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@ -7,6 +7,7 @@
\label{sec:elecsw}
In this chapter we show that FMMD can be applied to both software and electronics enabling us to build complete failure models
of typical modern safety critical systems.
%
With modular FMEA i.e. FMMD %(FMMD)
we have the concepts of failure~modes
of components, {\fgs} and symptoms of failure. % for a functional group.
@ -244,7 +245,8 @@ is therefore
$$(V \ge 0.88) \wedge (V \le 4.4) \; .$$
This voltage range forms our input requirement and can be considered as an invariant condition (i.e. both a pre-condition and a postcondition
This voltage range forms our input requirement and can be considered as an invariant condition
(i.e. both a pre-condition and a postcondition;
for the system to be operating correctly the voltage should be within the above bounds).
%
We can now examine a software function that performs a conversion from the voltage read to
@ -915,7 +917,7 @@ The internal timer in use is a register which when read
returns an incremented time value.
Using two's complement mathematics, by subtracting
the time we last read it, we can calculate the interval
between readings (assuming the timer has not wrapped around more then once).
between readings (assuming the timer has not wrapped around more than once).
We can say that a timer can fail by
incrementing its value at an incorrect rate, or can stop incrementing.
$$ fm(TIMER) = \{ STOPPED, INCORRECT\_INTERVAL \}$$
@ -961,7 +963,7 @@ Identified Software Components:
\item --- output\_control (which sets the PWM hardware according to the PID demand value)
\end{itemize}
With the call tree structure defined (see figure~\ref{fig:context_calltree}), we can now analyse these
components from the bottom-up, starting with the afferent flow, the reading in of the temperature and its conversion
components from the bottom-up, starting with the afferent flow, the reading of the temperature and its conversion
to a PID calculated heater output demand.
\subsubsection{Afferent flow FMMD analysis, Pt100, temperature, set point error, PID output demand.}
@ -970,7 +972,8 @@ We start with the afferent flow from the Pt100.
%used (if any) by each software function.
Starting at the bottom, we form a {\fg} with
the function read\_ADC and the Pt100.
This gives us a {\dc} which we call ReadPt100.
This gives us a {\dc} which we call
$ReadPt100$.
%
%
@ -1068,7 +1071,7 @@ $$ fm(PID) = \{ KnownControlValueErrorV, IncorrectControlErrorV \} .$$
We have now modelled the the software call tree for the afferent flow, we represent this as an Euler diagram in figure~\ref{fig:euler_afferent_PID}.
We have now modelled the software call tree for the afferent flow; we represent this as an Euler diagram in figure~\ref{fig:euler_afferent_PID}.
Two call tree branches remain. The LED indication branch and the
PWM/heater output.

13
submission_thesis/CH7_Evaluation/copy.tex
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@ -177,7 +177,7 @@ Comparison complexity, $CC$ for a group of components $G$, is given by
% J Howse requires justification for the CC equation above 10MAR2013.
%
Equation~\ref{eqn:CC} says that for every failure mode in the group $G$, we must check it against all other
components in the group (except its-self). This gives us a count of the number of reasoning paths to perform {\XFMEA}.
components in the group (except itself). This gives us a count of the number of reasoning paths to perform {\XFMEA}.
These reasoning distance concepts are discussed in section~\ref{sec:reasoningdistance}. % from CH3
%
Equation~\ref{eqn:CC} can be simplified if we can determine the total number of
@ -206,7 +206,7 @@ $i$ for identification and a superscript for the $\alpha$~level (see section~\r
%
%---
%o identify the hierarchy.
For example the first {\fg} in a hierarchy, containing base components only
For example the first {\fg} in a hierarchy containing base components only
i.e. at the zeroth level of an FMMD hierarchy where $\alpha=0$, would have the superscript 0 and a subscript of 1: $FG^{0}_{1}$.
%
The {\fg} representing the potential divider in section~\ref{sec:pd}
@ -282,7 +282,7 @@ Using traditional FMEA employing exhaustive checking ({\XFMEA})
we obtain $ 2 \times (3-1) + 2 \times (3-1) + 4 \times (3-1)$ = 16.
Even with this very trivial example, we begin to see benefits of taking a modular approach to FMEA.
\paragraph{Complexity Comparison for an hypothetical 81 component system.}
\paragraph{Complexity Comparison for a hypothetical 81 component system.}
%Even considering a $example$
A system, $example$, with just 81 components (with these components
having 3 failure modes each) would, using equation~\ref{eqn:rd2} have an $CC$ of
@ -766,7 +766,8 @@ However, where a complex component is used, for instance a microcontroller
with several modules that could all fail simultaneously, a process
of reduction into smaller theoretical components will have to be made.
We can term this `heuristic~de-composition'.
A modern micro-controller will typically have several modules, which are configured to operate on
%
A modern micro-controller will typically have several modules which are configured to operate on
pre-assigned pins on the device. Typically voltage inputs (\adcten / \adctw), digital input and outputs,
PWM (pulse width modulation), UARTs and other modules will be found on simple cheap microcontrollers~\cite{pic18f2523}.
%
@ -782,7 +783,7 @@ is then applied to it.}.
\paragraph{Reason for FMMD unitary failure mode constraint.} Were this constraint not to be applied
\paragraph{Reason for FMMD unitary failure mode constraint.} Were this constraint not to be applied,
each component would not contribute $N$ failure modes, % to consider
but potentially
$2^N$.
@ -897,7 +898,7 @@ For example, say
the cardinality constraint was 3, we would need to subtract both
$|{n \choose 2}|$ and $|{n \choose 3}|$ for each component in the functional~group.
\subsubsection{Example: Two Component functional group cardinality Constraint of 2}
\subsubsection{Example: Two Component functional group Cardinality Constraint of 2}
For example: suppose we have a simple functional group with two components R and T, of which
$$fm(R) = \{R_o, R_s\}$$ and $$fm(T) = \{T_o, T_s, T_h\}.$$