Added SIF description to CH2
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@ -1221,7 +1221,6 @@ comply with a given SIL level} % title of Table
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FMEDA is a modern extension of FMEA, in that it recognises the effect of
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FMEDA is a modern extension of FMEA, in that it recognises the effect of
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self checking features on safety, and provides detailed recommendations for computer/software architecture.
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self checking features on safety, and provides detailed recommendations for computer/software architecture.
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It has a simple final result, a Safety Integrity Level (SIL) from 1 to 4 (where 4 is safest).
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These SIL levels are broadly linked to the concept of an
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These SIL levels are broadly linked to the concept of an
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acceptance of probability of dangerous failures against time, as shown in table~\ref{tbl:sil_levels}.
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acceptance of probability of dangerous failures against time, as shown in table~\ref{tbl:sil_levels}.
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@ -1231,13 +1230,29 @@ type standards (EN61508/IOC5108).
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The end result of an EN61508 analysis is an % provides a statistical
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The end result of an EN61508 analysis is an % provides a statistical
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overall `level~of~safety' known as a Safety Integrity level (SIL), for a system.
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overall `level~of~safety' known as a Safety Integrity level (SIL), for a system.
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It has a simple final result, a Safety Integrity Level (SIL) from 1 to 4 (where 4 is safest).
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%
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%There are currently four SIL `levels', one to four, with four being the highest level.
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%There are currently four SIL `levels', one to four, with four being the highest level.
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It allows diagnostic mitigation for self checking circuitry.
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It allows diagnostic mitigation for self checking circuitry.
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SIL levels are intended to
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SIL levels are intended to
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classify the statistical safety of installed and commissioned plant:
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classify the statistical safety of installed plant:
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salesmen’s terms such as a `SIL~3~sensor' or other `device' given a SIL level, are meaningless.
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salesmen’s terms such as a `SIL~3~sensor' or other `device' given a SIL level, are meaningless.
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SIL analysis is concerned with `safety~loops', not individual modules.
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In control engineering terms, the safety~loop is the complete
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path from sensors to signal~processing to actuators for a given function
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in the plant.
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This entire loop must be designed to detect and deal with any hazards
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and have measures in place to reduce their affects.
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In EN61508 terminology, a safety~loop is known as a safety instrumented function (SIF).
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% for four levels of
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% for four levels of
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%safety integrity, referred to as Safety Integrity Levels (SIL).
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%safety integrity, referred to as Safety Integrity Levels (SIL).
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@ -1247,7 +1262,7 @@ FMEDA requires %does force
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the analyst to consider all hardware components in a system
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the analyst to consider all hardware components in a system
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by requiring that an MTTF value is assigned for each base component failure~mode;
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by requiring that an MTTF value is assigned for each base component failure~mode;
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the MTTF may be statistically mitigated (improved)
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the MTTF may be statistically mitigated (improved)
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if it can be shown that self-checking will detect failure modes.
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if it can be shown that self-checking will detect its failure modes.
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The MTTF value for each component {\fm} is denoted using the symbol `$\lambda$'.
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The MTTF value for each component {\fm} is denoted using the symbol `$\lambda$'.
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@ -59,15 +59,15 @@ loop topology---using a `Bubba' oscillator---demonstrating how FMMD differs from
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Two analysis strategies are employed, one using
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Two analysis strategies are employed, one using
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initially identified {\fgs} and the second using a more complex hierarchy of %{\fgs} and
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initially identified {\fgs} and the second using a more complex hierarchy of %{\fgs} and
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{\dcs} showing
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{\dcs} showing
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that a finer grained/more decomposed approach offers more re-use possibilities in future analysis tasks.
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that a finer grained/more decomposed approach offers greater efficiency and re-use possibilities in future analysis tasks.
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\item Section~\ref{sec:sigmadelta} demonstrates FMMD can be applied to mixed analogue and digital circuitry
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\item Section~\ref{sec:sigmadelta} demonstrates that FMMD can be applied to mixed analogue and digital circuitry
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by applying FMMD to a sigma delta ADC.
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by applying FMMD to a sigma delta ADC.
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%shows FMMD analysing the sigma delta
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%shows FMMD analysing the sigma delta
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%analogue to digital converter---again with a circular signal path---which operates on both
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%analogue to digital converter---again with a circular signal path---which operates on both
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%analogue and digital signals.
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%analogue and digital signals.
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\item Section~\ref{sec:Pt100} demonstrates FMMD being applied to a commonly used Pt100
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\item Section~\ref{sec:Pt100} demonstrates FMMD being applied to a commonly used Pt100
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safety critical temperature sensor circuit, this is analysed for single and double failure modes.
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safety critical temperature sensor circuit, this is analysed for single and then double failure modes.
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\end{itemize}
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\end{itemize}
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