Added SIF description to CH2

This commit is contained in:
Robin Clark 2013-08-10 11:46:21 +01:00
parent 2190240e52
commit 6f5578dffa
2 changed files with 21 additions and 6 deletions

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@ -1221,7 +1221,6 @@ comply with a given SIL level} % title of Table
FMEDA is a modern extension of FMEA, in that it recognises the effect of
self checking features on safety, and provides detailed recommendations for computer/software architecture.
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It has a simple final result, a Safety Integrity Level (SIL) from 1 to 4 (where 4 is safest).
%
These SIL levels are broadly linked to the concept of an
acceptance of probability of dangerous failures against time, as shown in table~\ref{tbl:sil_levels}.
@ -1231,13 +1230,29 @@ type standards (EN61508/IOC5108).
The end result of an EN61508 analysis is an % provides a statistical
overall `level~of~safety' known as a Safety Integrity level (SIL), for a system.
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It has a simple final result, a Safety Integrity Level (SIL) from 1 to 4 (where 4 is safest).
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%There are currently four SIL `levels', one to four, with four being the highest level.
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It allows diagnostic mitigation for self checking circuitry.
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SIL levels are intended to
classify the statistical safety of installed and commissioned plant:
classify the statistical safety of installed plant:
salesmens terms such as a `SIL~3~sensor' or other `device' given a SIL level, are meaningless.
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SIL analysis is concerned with `safety~loops', not individual modules.
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In control engineering terms, the safety~loop is the complete
path from sensors to signal~processing to actuators for a given function
in the plant.
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This entire loop must be designed to detect and deal with any hazards
and have measures in place to reduce their affects.
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In EN61508 terminology, a safety~loop is known as a safety instrumented function (SIF).
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% for four levels of
%safety integrity, referred to as Safety Integrity Levels (SIL).
@ -1247,7 +1262,7 @@ FMEDA requires %does force
the analyst to consider all hardware components in a system
by requiring that an MTTF value is assigned for each base component failure~mode;
the MTTF may be statistically mitigated (improved)
if it can be shown that self-checking will detect failure modes.
if it can be shown that self-checking will detect its failure modes.
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The MTTF value for each component {\fm} is denoted using the symbol `$\lambda$'.
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@ -59,15 +59,15 @@ loop topology---using a `Bubba' oscillator---demonstrating how FMMD differs from
Two analysis strategies are employed, one using
initially identified {\fgs} and the second using a more complex hierarchy of %{\fgs} and
{\dcs} showing
that a finer grained/more decomposed approach offers more re-use possibilities in future analysis tasks.
that a finer grained/more decomposed approach offers greater efficiency and re-use possibilities in future analysis tasks.
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\item Section~\ref{sec:sigmadelta} demonstrates FMMD can be applied to mixed analogue and digital circuitry
\item Section~\ref{sec:sigmadelta} demonstrates that FMMD can be applied to mixed analogue and digital circuitry
by applying FMMD to a sigma delta ADC.
%shows FMMD analysing the sigma delta
%analogue to digital converter---again with a circular signal path---which operates on both
%analogue and digital signals.
\item Section~\ref{sec:Pt100} demonstrates FMMD being applied to a commonly used Pt100
safety critical temperature sensor circuit, this is analysed for single and double failure modes.
safety critical temperature sensor circuit, this is analysed for single and then double failure modes.
\end{itemize}