Glossary entries plus JMC PR of them:wq
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@ -675,6 +675,8 @@ It would mean having to consider combinations of internal component failures
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as separate failure modes. This concept is discussed in sections~\ref{ch4:mutex}
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and~\ref{ch7:mutex}.
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%
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\fmmdglossMUTEX
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%
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In general, failure modes
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for simple components are mutually exclusive,
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but large and complex components (such as integrated circuits), especially where they contain separate modules,
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@ -63,6 +63,7 @@ data structures required using UML class models.
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% This chapter defines the FMMD process and related concepts and calculations.
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FMMD is in essence a modularised variant of traditional FMEA~\cite{sccs}[pp.34-38].
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\fmmdgloss
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%
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%FMEA is a bottom-up, or forward search failure mode technique starting with
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%base component failure modes~\cite{safeware}[p.341].
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@ -73,6 +74,8 @@ In order to analyse from the bottom-up and apply a modular methodology, we need
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small groups of components that naturally
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work together to perform a simple function: we term these groups `{\fgs}'.
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%
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\fmmdglossFG
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%
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The components to include in a {\fg} are chosen by hand.
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%a human, the analyst.
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%We can represent the `Functional~Group' as a class.
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@ -117,12 +120,15 @@ Once we have the failure mode behaviour of the {\fg}, we can determine its sympt
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We view these symptoms as the %derived
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failure modes of the {\fg}.
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%
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\fmmdglossFG
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\fmmdglossSYMPTOM
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%Or in other words
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That is, we can determine how the {\fg} can fail.
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As we now have a set of failure modes for the {\fg} we can treat it as a component.
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We can now consider the {\fg} as a `{\dc}' % sort of super component
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with its own set of failure modes.
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%
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\fmmdglossDC
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% Rather than taking each component failure mode
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% and extrapolating top level or system failure symptoms from it,
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% small groups of components are collected into {\fgs} and analysed.
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@ -158,6 +164,8 @@ That is, we take the traditional FMEA process and modularise it from the bottom-
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%into small manageable groups, and use the failure mode behaviour from them to create {\dcs}
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%to build higher level groups.
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In this way we can incrementally apply FMEA to an entire system. %, with documented reasoning stages.
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\fmmdglossDC
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\fmmdgloss
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%
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This has advantages of concentrating
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effort in where modules interact (interfaces), of
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@ -617,6 +625,7 @@ Notice the many to one mapping from {\bc} failure modes to {\dc} failure mode;
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this is a typical effect of an FMMD analysis stage, and means that with each analysis stage we reduce
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the number of failure modes to consider.
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%
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%\fmmdglossDC
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%This means that we can take multiple failure modes from {\fgs} components and resolve them
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%to failure modes of the {\fg}.
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%
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@ -676,6 +685,7 @@ we represent the analysis with the DAG in figure \ref{fig:fg1adag}.
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We now have % can now create % formulate
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a {\dc} to represent this potential divider:
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we name this \textbf{PD}.
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\fmmdglossDC
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This {\dc} will have two failure modes, $HighPD$ and $LowPD$.
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% HTR 05SEP2012 We use the symbol $\derivec$ to represent the process of taking the analysed
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% HTR 05SEP2012 {\fg} and creating from it a {\dc}.
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@ -737,6 +747,7 @@ and low~slew~rate (lowslew) where the op-amp cannot react quickly to changes on
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%
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%\ifthenelse {\boolean{dag}}
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%{
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\fmodegloss
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%
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%\clearpage
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We can represent these failure modes on a DAG (see figure~\ref{fig:op1dag}).
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@ -1015,8 +1026,11 @@ That is, we can trace failure mode effects
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from base component level to the top and vice versa.
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\fmodegloss
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\fmmdgloss
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\fmmdglossFG
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\fmmdglossDC
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\fmmdglossSYMPTOM
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% \paragraph{Worked example. Effect on State explosion.}
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@ -1137,6 +1151,7 @@ Using traditional FMEA methods~\cite{sccs}[p.34] we would consider each op-amp
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as a separate building block for a circuit. For FMMD each of these four op-amps
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in the chip would be considered to be a separate {\bc}.
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% CAN WE FIND SUPPORT FOR THIS IN LITERATURE???
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\fmmdglossBC
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%
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We need to go further than the above definition of a part, and define % defining
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an atomic entity. % used as a building block.
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@ -1179,7 +1194,9 @@ For instance a stereo amplifier separate/slave is a component.
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%The
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A whole sound system consists perhaps of the following components:
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CD-player, tuner, amplifier~separate, loudspeakers and ipod~interface.
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\fmmdglossSYS
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\fmmdglossSS
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%Thinking like this is a top~down analysis approach
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%and is the way in which FTA\cite{nucfta} analyses a System
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%and breaks it down.
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@ -1187,6 +1204,9 @@ CD-player, tuner, amplifier~separate, loudspeakers and ipod~interface.
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Components can be composed of components, recursively down to
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the {\bcs}.
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%
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\fmmdglossFG
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\fmmdglossBC
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%
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However each component
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will have a fault/failure behaviour and it should
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always be possible to obtain a set of failure modes
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@ -1208,6 +1228,7 @@ a massive list of base~components, resistors, motors, user~switches, laser~diode
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Working from the bottom~up, we need to pick small
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collections of components that work together in some way.
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These collections are termed `{\fgs}'.
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\fmmdglossFG
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%
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For instance, the circuitry that powers the laser diode
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to illuminate the CD might contain a handful of components, and as such would make a good candidate
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@ -1223,6 +1244,10 @@ to perform a specific function.
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%
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When we have analysed the fault behaviour of a {\fg}, we can treat it as a `black~box'.
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%
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\fmmdglossFG
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\fmmdglossDC
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%
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%
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The {\fgs} fault behaviour will consist of a set of %
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failure modes caused by combinations
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of its component's failure modes.
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@ -1240,6 +1265,10 @@ An outline of the FMMD process is itemised below:
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\item Create and name a derived component for the {\fg},
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\item Assign the common failure modes from the {\fg} as the failure modes of the {\dc}.
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\end{itemize}
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\fmmdglossFG
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\fmmdglossDC
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\fmmdgloss
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\fmmdglossBC
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%
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The FMMD process is described in using formal definitions and algorithms in section~\ref{sec:symptomabs}.
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@ -1290,12 +1319,16 @@ there is established literature for the failure modes for the system designer to
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(often with accompanying statistical
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failure rates)~\cite{mil1991,en298,fmd91}.
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%
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\fmmdglossBC
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%
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For instance, a simple resistor is generally considered
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to fail in two ways, it can go open circuit or it can short.
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%
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Electrical components have data-sheets associated with them. The data sheets
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supply detailed information on the component as supplied by the manufacturer.
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%
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\fmodegloss
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%
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Because they are written for system designers, and to an extent advertise the product,
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they rarely give %show %clearly detail the
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failure modes of the component.
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@ -1337,6 +1370,8 @@ From this diagram we see that each component must have at least one failure mode
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To clearly show that the failure modes are mutually exclusive states, or unitary states associated with one component,
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each failure mode is referenced back to only one component.
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%
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\fmmdglossMUTEX
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%
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This constraint is discussed in detail in section~\ref{sec:unitarystate}.
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%%-%% MTTF STATS CHAPTER MAYBE ??
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@ -1383,9 +1418,13 @@ By `modularising a system' we mean recursively breaking it into smaller sections
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When modularising a system from the top~down, as in Fault Tree Analysis (FTA)~\cite{nasafta}\cite{nucfta} ,
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it is common to term the modules identified as sub-systems.
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%
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\fmmdglossFTA
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\fmmdglossSS
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%
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When modularising failure mode behaviour from the bottom up, it is more meaningful to call them `derived~components'.
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%
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\fmmdglossDC
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%
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\section{Failure Modes in depth}
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@ -1400,6 +1439,9 @@ We are not usually concerned with how the component has failed
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internally.
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%
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What we need to know are the symptoms of failure.
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%
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\fmmdglossSYMPTOM
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%
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With these symptoms, we can trace their effects through the system under investigation
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and finally determine top-level failure events. % outcomes.
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%
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@ -1432,9 +1474,13 @@ causing specific system level errors.
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For example the FMEA variant FMECA, uses
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Bayes theorem~\cite{probstat}[p.170]~\cite{nucfta}[p.74] (the relation between a conditional probability and its reverse)
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and is applied to specific failure modes in components and their probability of causing given system level errors.
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\fmmdglossFMECA
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Another top down methodology is to apply cost benefit analysis
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to determine which faults are the highest priority to fix~\cite{bfmea}.
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%
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%\fmmdglossFMEA
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\fmeagloss
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%
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The aim of FMMD analysis is to produce complete\footnote{Completeness dependent upon the completeness/correctness of the {\fms} supplied by the germane standard
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for our {\bcs}.} failure
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models of safety critical systems from the bottom-up,
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@ -1445,10 +1491,12 @@ starting where possible with known base~component failure~modes.
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An advantage of working from the bottom up is that we can ensure that
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all component failure modes must be considered.
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%
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A top down approach
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A top down approach (such as FTA)
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can miss individual failure modes of components~\cite{faa}[Ch.~9],
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especially where there are non-obvious top-level faults.
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%
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\fmmdglossFTA
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%
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\subsection{From functional group to newly derived component}
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@ -1458,8 +1506,8 @@ all the failure modes of all the components in the group
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and collecting symptoms of failure, is termed `symptom abstraction'.
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%
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This is dealt with in detail using an algorithmic description, in appendix \ref{sec:algorithmfmmd}.
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\fmmdglossFG
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\fmmdglossDC
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% % define difference between a \fg and a \dc
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% A {\fg} is a collection of components. A {\dc} is a new `theoretical'
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% component which has a set of failure modes,
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@ -2228,6 +2276,8 @@ by a symptom within a {\fg}, and therefore the failure modes of a {\dc} are mutu
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%
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Thus FMMD naturally produces {\dcs} with failure modes that are mutually exclusive.
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%
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\fmmdglossMUTEX
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%
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This property is examined in more detail in section~\ref{ch7:mutex}.
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\paragraph{Objective and contextual/subjective failure symptoms.}
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@ -2246,6 +2296,7 @@ mode could be considered in the context of all other components in the system---
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With FMMD, because the {\fgs} have small numbers of components in them, we can easily apply XFMEA within the {\fgs}.
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%
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This issue addressed formally in section~\ref{sec:cc}.
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\fmmdgloss
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\paragraph{Uses of the FMMD failure mode model.}
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%
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@ -2263,4 +2314,10 @@ described in greater detail in section~\ref{sec:determine_fms}).
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We can also use the FMMD model to derive information
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to assist in creating related models such as FTA~\cite{nucfta,nasafta},
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traditional FMEA, FMECA~\cite{safeware}[p.344], FMEDA~\cite{scsh}, diagnostics schemas~\cite{dbamafta}
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and other failure mode analysis methodologies.
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and other failure mode analysis methodologies.
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\fmmdglossFTA
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\fmmdglossFMECA
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\fmmdglossFMEDA
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\fmmdgloss
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%\fmmdglossFMEA
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\fmeagloss
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@ -738,6 +738,9 @@ are level shifted, adding to the complication of analysing it for failures.
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\paragraph{Design Decision/Constraint}
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An important factor in defining a set of failure modes is that they
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should represent the failure modes as simply and minimally as possible.
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%
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\fmmdglossMUTEX
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%
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It should not be possible, for instance, for
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a component to have two or more failure modes active at once.
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Were this to be the case, we would have to consider additional combinations of
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@ -798,7 +801,7 @@ Because of this, the failure mode set $F=fm(R)$ is `unitary~state'.
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%therefore
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%$ fm(R) \in \mathcal{U} $.
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These concepts are expanded in section~\ref{sec:usprob}.
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\fmmdglossMUTEX
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We can make this a general case by taking a set $F$ (with $f_1, f_2 \in F$) representing a collection
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@ -854,6 +857,8 @@ For instance, the voltage reading functions which consist
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of a multiplexer and ADC---which must work together to channel readings--- could be considered to be components
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inside the micro-controller package.
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%
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\fmmdglossMUTEX
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%
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The micro-controller thus becomes a collection of smaller components
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that can be analysed separately~\footnote{It is common for the signal paths
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in a safety critical product to be traced, and when entering a complex
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@ -78,41 +78,95 @@
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%\fmodegloss
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\newcommand{\fmmdglossSYS}{\glossary{name={system}, description={A product designed to work as a coherent entity}}}
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\newcommand{\fmmdglossSS}{\glossary{name={sub-system}, description={A part of a system, sub-systems may contain sub-systems and so-on}}}
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\newcommand{\fmmdglossDC}{\glossary{name={{\dc}}, description={A theoretical component, derived from a collection of components (which may be derived components themselves)}}}
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\newcommand{\fmmdglossFG}{\glossary{name={{\fg}}, description={A collection of sub-systems and/or components that interact to perform a specific function}}}
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\newcommand{\fmmdglossSYMPTOM}{\glossary{name={symptom}, description={A failure mode of a {\fg}, caused by a combination of its component failure modes}}}
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\newcommand{\fmmdglossBC}{\glossary{name={base component}, description={Any bought in component, or lowest level module/or part}}}
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\newcommand{\fmmdglossSYS}{\glossary{name={system}, description={
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A product designed to work as a coherent entity}}}
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\newcommand{\fmmdglossSS}{\glossary{name={sub-system}, description={
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A part of a system, sub-systems may contain sub-systems and so-on}}}
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\newcommand{\fmmdglossDC}{\glossary{name={{\dc}}, description={
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A theoretical component, derived from a collection of components (which may be derived components themselves)}}}
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\newcommand{\fmmdglossFG}{\glossary{name={{\fg}}, description={
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A collection of sub-systems and/or components that interact to perform a specific function}}}
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\newcommand{\fmmdglossSYMPTOM}{\glossary{name={symptom}, description={
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A failure mode of a {\fg}, caused by a combination of its component failure modes}}}
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\newcommand{\fmmdglossBC}{\glossary{name={{\bc}}, description={
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Any bought in component, or lowest level module/or part}}}
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%\newcommand{\fmmdglossFIT}{\glossary{name={FIT},description={Failure in Time (FIT). The statistical likelihood of failure mode occurring within a $10^9$ hour period.}}
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\newcommand{\fmmdglossFIT}{\glossary{name={FIT}, description={Failure in Time (FIT). The number of times a particular
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failure is expected to occur within a $10^{9}$ hour time period.}}}
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\newcommand{\fmmdglossFIT}{\glossary{name={FIT}, description={
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Failure in Time (FIT). The number of times a particular
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failure is expected to occur within a $10^{9}$ hour time period}}}
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\newcommand{\fmmdglossHFMEA}{\glossary{name={HFMEA},description={
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Hardware FMEA. FMEA applied to hardware i.e. mechanical or electrical equipment.}}}
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Hardware FMEA. FMEA applied to hardware i.e. mechanical or electrical equipment}}}
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\newcommand{\fmmdglossSFMEA}{\glossary{name={SFMEA},description={
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Software FMEA. FMEA techniques applied to software. }}}
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Software FMEA (SFMEA). FMEA techniques applied to software}}}
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\newcommand{\fmmdglossXFMEA}{\glossary{name={XFMEA},description={
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Exhaustive FMEA. Applying FMEA exhaustively means checking each failure mode
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Exhaustive FMEA (XFMEA). Applying FMEA exhaustively means checking each failure mode
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for effects on all components in a given system. }}}
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\newcommand{\fmmdglossDFMEA}{\glossary{name={DFMEA},description={Design FMEA. FMEA applied in design stages of a product. Used as a discussion method to reveal safety weakness and improve built in safety.}}}
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\newcommand{\fmmdglossPFMEA}{\glossary{name={PFMEA},description={Production FMEA. FMEA applied applied for cost benefit analysis typically used in mass production.}}}
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\newcommand{\fmmdglossSFTA}{\glossary{name={SFTA},description={Software Fault Tree Analysis (SFTA): top down failure investigation applied to software.}}}
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\newcommand{\fmmdglossFTA}{\glossary{name={FTA},description={Fault Tree Analysis (FTA). A top down failure analysis technique which starts with undesirable top level events and works downwards to putative causes.}}}
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\newcommand{\fmmdglossFMEDA}{\glossary{name={FMEDA},description={Failure Mode Effects and Diagnostic Analysis (FMEDA). An extended FMEA technique which provides for diagnostic mitigation and has a final statistical safety level as a result.}}}
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\newcommand{\fmmdglossFMECA}{\glossary{name={FMECA},description={Failure Mode Effects and Criticality Analysis (FMECA). An extended FMEA technique which is used to order the severity or criticality of top level events/symptoms.}}}
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\newcommand{\fmmdglossFS}{\glossary{name={forward~search},description={Failure analysis where the start points are base component failure modes and the result is system level failure/symptom.}}}
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\newcommand{\fmmdglossBS}{\glossary{name={backward~search},description={Failure analysis where the start points are system level failure/symptom and the results are lower level putative causes.}}}
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\newcommand{\fmmdglossINHIBIT}{\glossary{name={inhibit},description={A guard on a process such that if a condition is not met, the process may not continue.}}}
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\newcommand{\fmmdglossSIGPATH}{\glossary{name={signal~path},description={The components (software or hardware) and connections that a particular signal or value is derived from in a system.}}}
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\newcommand{\fmmdglossRD}{\glossary{name={reasoning~distance},description={A reasoning distance is the number of stages of logic and reasoning, counted by the number of components examined, used to map a failure cause to its potential outcomes.}}}
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\newcommand{\fmmdglossOBS}{\glossary{name={observability}, description={If it cannot be detected that a failure has occurred it is termed unobservable or undetectable.}}}
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\newcommand{\fmmdglossDFMEA}{\glossary{name={DFMEA},description={
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Design FMEA. FMEA applied in design stages of a product.
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Can be used as a discussion/brain~storming method to
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reveal safety weakness and improve built in safety}}}
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\newcommand{\fmmdglossPFMEA}{\glossary{name={PFMEA},description={
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Production FMEA (PFMEA).
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FMEA applied for cost benefit analysis typically used in mass production}}}
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\newcommand{\fmmdglossSFTA}{\glossary{name={SFTA},description={
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Software Fault Tree Analysis (SFTA):
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top down failure investigation applied to software}}}
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\newcommand{\fmmdglossMUTEX}{\glossary{name={mutually~exclusive},description={
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Mutual exclusivity applied to component failure modes
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means that for each component it is ensured that
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only one of its failure modes may be active at any given time}}}
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\newcommand{\fmmdglossFTA}{\glossary{name={FTA},description={
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Fault Tree Analysis (FTA).
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A top down failure analysis technique which starts with undesirable
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top level events, and using symbols from digital logic builds
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a tree, working downwards to putative causes.}}}
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|
||||
\newcommand{\fmmdglossFMEDA}{\glossary{name={FMEDA},description={
|
||||
Failure Mode Effects and Diagnostic Analysis (FMEDA).
|
||||
An extended FMEA technique which provides for diagnostic
|
||||
mitigation and has a final statistical safety level as a result}}}
|
||||
|
||||
\newcommand{\fmmdglossFMECA}{\glossary{name={FMECA},description={
|
||||
Failure Mode Effects and Criticality Analysis (FMECA).
|
||||
An extended FMEA technique, based on Bayesian statistics,
|
||||
which is used to order the severity or criticality of top level events/symptoms}}}
|
||||
|
||||
\newcommand{\fmmdglossFS}{\glossary{name={forward~search},description={
|
||||
Failure analysis where the start points are base component failure modes and the result is system level failure/symptom.
|
||||
Sometimes termed `bottom~up'}}}
|
||||
|
||||
\newcommand{\fmmdglossBS}{\glossary{name={backward~search},description={
|
||||
Failure analysis where the start points are system level failure/symptom and the results are lower level putative causes.
|
||||
Sometimes termed `top~down'}}}
|
||||
|
||||
\newcommand{\fmmdglossINHIBIT}{\glossary{name={inhibit},description={
|
||||
A guard on a process such that if a condition is not met, the process may not continue}}}
|
||||
|
||||
\newcommand{\fmmdglossSIGPATH}{\glossary{name={signal~path},description={
|
||||
The components (software or hardware) and connections from whi particular signal or value is derived from in a system}}}
|
||||
|
||||
\newcommand{\fmmdglossRD}{\glossary{name={reasoning~distance},description={
|
||||
A reasoning distance is the number of stages of logic and reasoning,
|
||||
counted by the number of components examined, used to map a failure cause to its potential outcomes}}}
|
||||
|
||||
\newcommand{\fmmdglossOBS}{\glossary{name={observability}, description={
|
||||
If a failure mode cannot be detected it is termed unobservable or undetectable}}}
|
||||
|
||||
\newcommand{\fmmdglossSMARTINSTRUMENT}{\glossary{name={smart~instrument}, description={
|
||||
A smart instrument is one that uses software
|
||||
@ -121,7 +175,7 @@ analogue electronics only~\cite{smart_instruments_1514209}.}}}
|
||||
|
||||
\newcommand{\fmmdglossCONTRACTPROG}{\glossary{name={contract~programming}, description={
|
||||
A software discipline whereby each function is assigned strict pre and post conditions
|
||||
which define a formalised `contract' for how the function should behave.}}}
|
||||
which define a formalised `contract' the function's behaviour}}}
|
||||
|
||||
%
|
||||
%\newcommand{\fmmdglossRD}{\glossary{name={reasoning~distance}{yahda yahda ya}}}
|
||||
@ -131,21 +185,27 @@ Failure Mode Modular De-Composition (FMMD). A bottom-up methodology for incremen
|
||||
failure mode models, using a procedure taking functional groups of components and creating
|
||||
derived components representing them, and in turn using the
|
||||
derived components to create higher level functional groups, and so on,
|
||||
that are used to build a hierarchical failure mode model of a system}}}
|
||||
%that are used to build a
|
||||
building a hierarchical failure mode model}}} % of a system}}}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
\newcommand{\fmodegloss}{\glossary{name={failure mode},description={The way in which a failure occurs.
|
||||
\newcommand{\fmodegloss}{\glossary{name={failure mode},description={ % The way in which a failure occurs.
|
||||
A component or sub-system may fail in a number of ways, and each of these is a
|
||||
failure mode of the component or sub-system.}}}
|
||||
failure mode of that particular component type}}}
|
||||
|
||||
\newcommand{\fmeagloss}{\glossary{name={FMEA}, description={
|
||||
Failure Mode and Effects analysis (FMEA) is a process where each failure mode of components in a given system,
|
||||
is analysed to determine system level failures/symptoms.}}}
|
||||
Failure Mode and Effects analysis (FMEA) is a process where each
|
||||
{\bc} failure mode in a given system
|
||||
is analysed to determine system level failures/symptoms}}}
|
||||
|
||||
\newcommand{\frategloss}{\glossary{name={failure rate}, description={
|
||||
The number of failures within a population (of size N), divided by N over a given time interval}}}
|
||||
\newcommand{\pecgloss}{\glossary{name={PEC},description={A Programmable Electronic controller,
|
||||
will typically consist of sensors and actuators interfaced electronically, with some firmware/software component in overall control}}}
|
||||
The number of failures expected over a given time interval}}}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
\newcommand{\pecgloss}{\glossary{name={PEC},description={
|
||||
A Programmable Electronic controller,
|
||||
will typically consist of sensors and actuators interfaced electronically,
|
||||
with some firmware/software component in overall control}}}
|
||||
|
||||
\usepackage{amsthm}
|
||||
|
||||
|
Loading…
Reference in New Issue
Block a user