polish polish polish

mybib.bib

@@ -243,8 +243,7 @@ ISSN={Doi:10.1145/2330667.2330683},}
 
 @BOOK{boffin,
   AUTHOR =       "R Hanbury Brown",
-  TITLE =         "Boffin: A Personal Story of the Early Days of Radar, Radio Astronomy and Quantum Optics: 
-  Personal Story of the Early Days of Radar and Radio Astronomy and Quantum Optics ",
+  TITLE =         "Boffin: A Personal Story of the Early Days of Radar, Radio Astronomy and Quantum Optics",
   PUBLISHER =       " Adam Hilger: ISBN 0-85274-317-3",
   YEAR =         "1991"
 }
@@ -420,7 +419,7 @@ doi={10.1109/HASE.2004.1281774},
 ISSN={1530-2059},}
 
 @book{stranks2007human,
-  title={Human Factors and Behavioural Safety},
+  title={Human Factors and Behavioural Safety ISBN 978-0-7506-5510-1},
   author={Stranks, J.},
   isbn={978-0-7506-6542-1},
   url={http://books.google.co.uk/books?id=7RXYN2CIphMC},
@@ -465,7 +464,7 @@ year={2001},
 month={},
 volume={7},
 number={},
-pages={7 -3458 vol.7},
+pages={vol.7},
 keywords={Analytical models;Design automation;Design engineering;Discrete event simulation;Failure analysis;Hybrid power systems;Performance analysis;Production;Propulsion;Steady-state;aerospace computing;aerospace simulation;discrete event simulation;engineering computing;failure analysis;production engineering computing;CONFIG hybrid discrete event simulator;EPOCH Simulation for Failure Analysis software;EPOCH algorithm;automated incremental design FMEA;automatic generation;design models;engineering product/operations cross-cutting hybrid simulation ;failure modes;failure modes/effects analysis;functional labels;propellant production plant;scenario scripts;scenario-based analyses;space systems;timestep modeling;},
 doi={10.1109/AERO.2001.931423},
 ISSN={}}
@@ -540,7 +539,7 @@ ISSN={2166-563X},}
 @ARTICLE{fmd91,
   AUTHOR =       "Reliability Analysis Center",
   TITLE =        "Failure Mode/Mechanisms Distributions 1991",
-  JOURNAL =      "United States Department of Commerce",
+  JOURNAL =      "United States Department of Commerce: F30602-91-C-0002",
   YEAR =         "1991"
 }
 
@@ -802,7 +801,7 @@ year = {2012},
 
 @BOOK{dbcbe,
   AUTHOR =       "R. Mitchel",
-  TITLE =        "Design By Contract by Example",
+  TITLE =        "Design By Contract by Example ISBN-13: 978-0201634600",
   PUBLISHER =      "Adisson-Wesley",
   YEAR =         "2002"
 }
@@ -889,7 +888,7 @@ strength of materials, the causes of boiler explosions",
   pages = {I-XII, 1-645},
   publisher = {Pearson / Prentice Hall},
   timestamp = {2011-03-24T00:00:00.000+0100},
-  title = {Electronics - a systems approach (4. ed.).},
+  title = {Electronics - a systems approach (4. ed.). ISBN 978-0-13-129396-0},
   year = 2009
 }
 
@@ -1346,7 +1345,7 @@ OPTissn = {},
 }
 
 @Book{aoe,
- title = {The Art of Electronics, 2nd Edition},
+ title = {The Art of Electronics, 2nd Edition ISBN 0-521-37095-7},
  publisher = {Cambridge},
  year = {1989},
  author = {Paul Horowitz, Winfield Hill},

submission_thesis/appendixes/algorithmic.tex

@@ -368,7 +368,7 @@ only use {\fms} that are mutually exclusive within components.
 %
 The $dtc$ function enforces completeness in the model
 by ensuring that %for 
-all failure modes in components in the {\fg} are included in at least one test~case.
+all failure modes of the components in the {\fg} are included in at least one test~case.
 %
 %
 %%
@@ -616,7 +616,7 @@ $$ fcs(R) = SP .$$
 This raises the failure~mode abstraction level, $\abslev$ (see section~\ref{sec:alpha}).
 The failures have now been considered not from the component level, but from the sub-system or
 functional~group level.
-A set $SP$, the symptoms of failure is obtained.
+A set $SP$, the symptoms of failure, is obtained.
 %
 \ifthenelse {\boolean{paper}}
 {
@@ -699,7 +699,8 @@ components, where $\abslev$ is a natural number, ($\abslev \in \mathbb{N}_0$).
 %
 For a base component, let the abstraction level be zero.
 %
-The symptom abstraction process is applied giving  a $\dc$,
+The symptom abstraction process %is applied giving 
+gives a $\dc$,
 this derived~component will have an $\abslev$ value
 one higher than the highest $\abslev$ value of any of the components
 in the {\fg} used to derive it.

submission_thesis/appendixes/detailed_analysis.tex

@@ -104,10 +104,7 @@ gives three failure modes:
 %
 $$ fm(BubbaOscillator) = \{ NO_{osc}, HI_{fosc}\} . $$ %, LO_{fosc} \} . $$
 
-%\clearpage
-
-
-
+\clearpage
 \subsection{BUFF45: Detailed Analysis}
 \label{detail:BUFF45}
 
@@ -262,7 +259,7 @@ $$
 %
 Collecting symptoms from table~\ref{tbl:bubba2}, a derived component $BUBBAOSC$ is created  which has the following failure modes:
 $$
-fm (BUBBAOSC) = \{  HI_{osc}, NO\_signal .\} %  LO_{fosc},
+fm (BUBBAOSC) = \{  HI_{osc}, NO\_signal \} . %  LO_{fosc},
 $$
 \clearpage
 

submission_thesis/style.tex

@@ -125,8 +125,8 @@ reveal safety weakness and improve built in safety}}}
 
 \newcommand{\fmmdglossOPAMP}{\glossary{name={Op-Amp},description={
 An Operational Amplifier is a differential input high gain voltage
-amplifier typically implemented in an integrated circuit and is 
-commonly used as a building block in analogue circuit design
+amplifier typically implemented in an integrated circuit and is a
+commonly used element in analogue circuit design
 }}}
 
 \newcommand{\fmmdglossPFMEA}{\glossary{name={PFMEA},description={
@@ -155,7 +155,7 @@ for practical consideration, and when this happens `state~explosion' can be said
 \newcommand{\fmmdglossFTA}{\glossary{name={FTA},description={
 Fault Tree Analysis (FTA). 
 A top down failure analysis technique which starts with undesirable 
-top level events, and using symbols from digital logic builds
+top level events, and using symbols from digital logic/electronics builds
 a tree, working downwards to putative causes}}}
 
 \newcommand{\fmmdglossFMEDA}{\glossary{name={FMEDA},description={
@@ -183,8 +183,8 @@ A guard on a process such that if a condition is not met, the process may not co
 The components (software or hardware) and connections from which a particular signal or value is derived}}}
 
 \newcommand{\fmmdglossRD}{\glossary{name={reasoning~distance},description={
-A reasoning distance is the number of stages of logic and reasoning, 
-counted by the number of components examined, used to map a failure cause to its potential outcomes}}}
+A reasoning distance is the number of components examined against failure scenarios, used to map a failure causes to potential outcomes
+for a given system}}}
 
 \newcommand{\fmmdglossOBS}{\glossary{name={observability}, description={
 If a failure mode cannot be detected it is termed unobservable or undetectable}}}