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15
mybib.bib
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@ -243,8 +243,7 @@ ISSN={Doi:10.1145/2330667.2330683},}
@BOOK{boffin, @BOOK{boffin,
AUTHOR = "R Hanbury Brown", AUTHOR = "R Hanbury Brown",
TITLE = "Boffin: A Personal Story of the Early Days of Radar, Radio Astronomy and Quantum Optics: TITLE = "Boffin: A Personal Story of the Early Days of Radar, Radio Astronomy and Quantum Optics",
Personal Story of the Early Days of Radar and Radio Astronomy and Quantum Optics ",
PUBLISHER = " Adam Hilger: ISBN 0-85274-317-3", PUBLISHER = " Adam Hilger: ISBN 0-85274-317-3",
YEAR = "1991" YEAR = "1991"
} }
@ -420,7 +419,7 @@ doi={10.1109/HASE.2004.1281774},
ISSN={1530-2059},} ISSN={1530-2059},}
@book{stranks2007human, @book{stranks2007human,
title={Human Factors and Behavioural Safety}, title={Human Factors and Behavioural Safety ISBN 978-0-7506-5510-1},
author={Stranks, J.}, author={Stranks, J.},
isbn={978-0-7506-6542-1}, isbn={978-0-7506-6542-1},
url={http://books.google.co.uk/books?id=7RXYN2CIphMC}, url={http://books.google.co.uk/books?id=7RXYN2CIphMC},
@ -465,7 +464,7 @@ year={2001},
month={}, month={},
volume={7}, volume={7},
number={}, number={},
pages={7 -3458 vol.7}, pages={vol.7},
keywords={Analytical models;Design automation;Design engineering;Discrete event simulation;Failure analysis;Hybrid power systems;Performance analysis;Production;Propulsion;Steady-state;aerospace computing;aerospace simulation;discrete event simulation;engineering computing;failure analysis;production engineering computing;CONFIG hybrid discrete event simulator;EPOCH Simulation for Failure Analysis software;EPOCH algorithm;automated incremental design FMEA;automatic generation;design models;engineering product/operations cross-cutting hybrid simulation ;failure modes;failure modes/effects analysis;functional labels;propellant production plant;scenario scripts;scenario-based analyses;space systems;timestep modeling;}, keywords={Analytical models;Design automation;Design engineering;Discrete event simulation;Failure analysis;Hybrid power systems;Performance analysis;Production;Propulsion;Steady-state;aerospace computing;aerospace simulation;discrete event simulation;engineering computing;failure analysis;production engineering computing;CONFIG hybrid discrete event simulator;EPOCH Simulation for Failure Analysis software;EPOCH algorithm;automated incremental design FMEA;automatic generation;design models;engineering product/operations cross-cutting hybrid simulation ;failure modes;failure modes/effects analysis;functional labels;propellant production plant;scenario scripts;scenario-based analyses;space systems;timestep modeling;},
doi={10.1109/AERO.2001.931423}, doi={10.1109/AERO.2001.931423},
ISSN={}} ISSN={}}
@ -540,7 +539,7 @@ ISSN={2166-563X},}
@ARTICLE{fmd91, @ARTICLE{fmd91,
AUTHOR = "Reliability Analysis Center", AUTHOR = "Reliability Analysis Center",
TITLE = "Failure Mode/Mechanisms Distributions 1991", TITLE = "Failure Mode/Mechanisms Distributions 1991",
JOURNAL = "United States Department of Commerce", JOURNAL = "United States Department of Commerce: F30602-91-C-0002",
YEAR = "1991" YEAR = "1991"
} }
@ -802,7 +801,7 @@ year = {2012},
@BOOK{dbcbe, @BOOK{dbcbe,
AUTHOR = "R. Mitchel", AUTHOR = "R. Mitchel",
TITLE = "Design By Contract by Example", TITLE = "Design By Contract by Example ISBN-13: 978-0201634600",
PUBLISHER = "Adisson-Wesley", PUBLISHER = "Adisson-Wesley",
YEAR = "2002" YEAR = "2002"
} }
@ -889,7 +888,7 @@ strength of materials, the causes of boiler explosions",
pages = {I-XII, 1-645}, pages = {I-XII, 1-645},
publisher = {Pearson / Prentice Hall}, publisher = {Pearson / Prentice Hall},
timestamp = {2011-03-24T00:00:00.000+0100}, timestamp = {2011-03-24T00:00:00.000+0100},
title = {Electronics - a systems approach (4. ed.).}, title = {Electronics - a systems approach (4. ed.). ISBN 978-0-13-129396-0},
year = 2009 year = 2009
} }
@ -1346,7 +1345,7 @@ OPTissn = {},
} }
@Book{aoe, @Book{aoe,
title = {The Art of Electronics, 2nd Edition}, title = {The Art of Electronics, 2nd Edition ISBN 0-521-37095-7},
publisher = {Cambridge}, publisher = {Cambridge},
year = {1989}, year = {1989},
author = {Paul Horowitz, Winfield Hill}, author = {Paul Horowitz, Winfield Hill},

7
submission_thesis/appendixes/algorithmic.tex
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@ -368,7 +368,7 @@ only use {\fms} that are mutually exclusive within components.
% %
The $dtc$ function enforces completeness in the model The $dtc$ function enforces completeness in the model
by ensuring that %for by ensuring that %for
all failure modes in components in the {\fg} are included in at least one test~case. all failure modes of the components in the {\fg} are included in at least one test~case.
% %
% %
%% %%
@ -616,7 +616,7 @@ $$ fcs(R) = SP .$$
This raises the failure~mode abstraction level, $\abslev$ (see section~\ref{sec:alpha}). This raises the failure~mode abstraction level, $\abslev$ (see section~\ref{sec:alpha}).
The failures have now been considered not from the component level, but from the sub-system or The failures have now been considered not from the component level, but from the sub-system or
functional~group level. functional~group level.
A set $SP$, the symptoms of failure is obtained. A set $SP$, the symptoms of failure, is obtained.
% %
\ifthenelse {\boolean{paper}} \ifthenelse {\boolean{paper}}
{ {
@ -699,7 +699,8 @@ components, where $\abslev$ is a natural number, ($\abslev \in \mathbb{N}_0$).
% %
For a base component, let the abstraction level be zero. For a base component, let the abstraction level be zero.
% %
The symptom abstraction process is applied giving a $\dc$, The symptom abstraction process %is applied giving
gives a $\dc$,
this derived~component will have an $\abslev$ value this derived~component will have an $\abslev$ value
one higher than the highest $\abslev$ value of any of the components one higher than the highest $\abslev$ value of any of the components
in the {\fg} used to derive it. in the {\fg} used to derive it.

7
submission_thesis/appendixes/detailed_analysis.tex
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@ -104,10 +104,7 @@ gives three failure modes:
% %
$$ fm(BubbaOscillator) = \{ NO_{osc}, HI_{fosc}\} . $$ %, LO_{fosc} \} . $$ $$ fm(BubbaOscillator) = \{ NO_{osc}, HI_{fosc}\} . $$ %, LO_{fosc} \} . $$
%\clearpage \clearpage
\subsection{BUFF45: Detailed Analysis} \subsection{BUFF45: Detailed Analysis}
\label{detail:BUFF45} \label{detail:BUFF45}
@ -262,7 +259,7 @@ $$
% %
Collecting symptoms from table~\ref{tbl:bubba2}, a derived component $BUBBAOSC$ is created which has the following failure modes: Collecting symptoms from table~\ref{tbl:bubba2}, a derived component $BUBBAOSC$ is created which has the following failure modes:
$$ $$
fm (BUBBAOSC) = \{ HI_{osc}, NO\_signal .\} % LO_{fosc}, fm (BUBBAOSC) = \{ HI_{osc}, NO\_signal \} . % LO_{fosc},
$$ $$
\clearpage \clearpage

10
submission_thesis/style.tex
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@ -125,8 +125,8 @@ reveal safety weakness and improve built in safety}}}
\newcommand{\fmmdglossOPAMP}{\glossary{name={Op-Amp},description={ \newcommand{\fmmdglossOPAMP}{\glossary{name={Op-Amp},description={
An Operational Amplifier is a differential input high gain voltage An Operational Amplifier is a differential input high gain voltage
amplifier typically implemented in an integrated circuit and is amplifier typically implemented in an integrated circuit and is a
commonly used as a building block in analogue circuit design commonly used element in analogue circuit design
}}} }}}
\newcommand{\fmmdglossPFMEA}{\glossary{name={PFMEA},description={ \newcommand{\fmmdglossPFMEA}{\glossary{name={PFMEA},description={
@ -155,7 +155,7 @@ for practical consideration, and when this happens `state~explosion' can be said
\newcommand{\fmmdglossFTA}{\glossary{name={FTA},description={ \newcommand{\fmmdglossFTA}{\glossary{name={FTA},description={
Fault Tree Analysis (FTA). Fault Tree Analysis (FTA).
A top down failure analysis technique which starts with undesirable A top down failure analysis technique which starts with undesirable
top level events, and using symbols from digital logic builds top level events, and using symbols from digital logic/electronics builds
a tree, working downwards to putative causes}}} a tree, working downwards to putative causes}}}
\newcommand{\fmmdglossFMEDA}{\glossary{name={FMEDA},description={ \newcommand{\fmmdglossFMEDA}{\glossary{name={FMEDA},description={
@ -183,8 +183,8 @@ A guard on a process such that if a condition is not met, the process may not co
The components (software or hardware) and connections from which a particular signal or value is derived}}} The components (software or hardware) and connections from which a particular signal or value is derived}}}
\newcommand{\fmmdglossRD}{\glossary{name={reasoning~distance},description={ \newcommand{\fmmdglossRD}{\glossary{name={reasoning~distance},description={
A reasoning distance is the number of stages of logic and reasoning, A reasoning distance is the number of components examined against failure scenarios, used to map a failure causes to potential outcomes
counted by the number of components examined, used to map a failure cause to its potential outcomes}}} for a given system}}}
\newcommand{\fmmdglossOBS}{\glossary{name={observability}, description={ \newcommand{\fmmdglossOBS}{\glossary{name={observability}, description={
If a failure mode cannot be detected it is termed unobservable or undetectable}}} If a failure mode cannot be detected it is termed unobservable or undetectable}}}