OK sending circuit 2 to C Garrett
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@ -70,11 +70,16 @@ We can express the failure modes of a component using the function $fm$, thus fo
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We have two resistors in this circuit and therefore four component failure modes to consider for the potential divider.
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We have two resistors in this circuit and therefore four component failure modes to consider for the potential divider.
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We can now examine what effect each of these failures will have on the {\fg}.
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We can now examine what effect each of these failures will have on the {\fg} (see table~\ref{tbl:pd}).
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\subsection{Analysing a potential divider in terms of failure modes}
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\subsection{Analysing a potential divider in terms of failure modes}
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\label{potdivfmmd}
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\label{potdivfmmd}
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\begin{figure}[h+]
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\begin{figure}[h+]
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\centering
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\centering
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\includegraphics[width=100pt,keepaspectratio=true]{./pd.png}
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\includegraphics[width=100pt,keepaspectratio=true]{./pd.png}
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@ -85,6 +90,7 @@ We can now examine what effect each of these failures will have on the {\fg}.
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\begin{table}[h+]
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\begin{table}[h+]
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\caption{Potential Divider: Sinlge failure analysis}
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\begin{tabular}{|| l | l | c | c | l ||} \hline
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\begin{tabular}{|| l | l | c | c | l ||} \hline
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\textbf{Failure Scenario} & & \textbf{Pot Div Effect} & & \textbf{Symptom} \\
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\textbf{Failure Scenario} & & \textbf{Pot Div Effect} & & \textbf{Symptom} \\
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\hline
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\hline
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@ -94,6 +100,7 @@ We can now examine what effect each of these failures will have on the {\fg}.
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FS4: R2 OPEN & & $LOW$ & & $PDLow$ \\ \hline
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FS4: R2 OPEN & & $LOW$ & & $PDLow$ \\ \hline
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\hline
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\hline
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\end{tabular}
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\end{tabular}
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\label{tbl:pd}
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\end{table}
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\end{table}
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We can now create a {\dc} for the potential divider, $PD$.
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We can now create a {\dc} for the potential divider, $PD$.
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@ -152,9 +159,10 @@ Re-using the $PD$ - potential divider works only if the input voltage is negativ
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We want if possible to have detectable errors, HIGH and LOW are better than OUTOFRANGE.
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We want if possible to have detectable errors, HIGH and LOW are better than OUTOFRANGE.
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If we can refine the operational states of the fungional group, we can obtain clearer
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If we can refine the operational states of the fungional group, we can obtain clearer
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symptoms.
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symptoms.
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If we consider the input will only be positive, we can invert the potential divider.
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If we consider the input will only be positive, we can invert the potential divider (see table~\ref{tbl:pdneg}).
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\begin{table}[h+]
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\begin{table}[h+]
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\caption{Inverted Potential divider: Single failure analysis}
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\begin{tabular}{|| l | l | c | c | l ||} \hline
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\begin{tabular}{|| l | l | c | c | l ||} \hline
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\textbf{Failure Scenario} & & \textbf{Inverted Pot Div Effect} & & \textbf{Symptom} \\
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\textbf{Failure Scenario} & & \textbf{Inverted Pot Div Effect} & & \textbf{Symptom} \\
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\hline
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\hline
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@ -164,6 +172,7 @@ If we consider the input will only be positive, we can invert the potential divi
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FS4: R2 OPEN & & $HIGH$ & & $PDHigh$ \\ \hline
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FS4: R2 OPEN & & $HIGH$ & & $PDHigh$ \\ \hline
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\hline
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\hline
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\end{tabular}
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\end{tabular}
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\label{tbl:pdneg}
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\end{table}
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\end{table}
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We can form a {\dc} from this, and call it an inverted potential divider $INVPD$.
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We can form a {\dc} from this, and call it an inverted potential divider $INVPD$.
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@ -181,7 +190,7 @@ lead to the symptoms (i.e. the symptoms are the same but causation tree will be
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We can use this for a more general case, because we can examine the
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We can use this for a more general case, because we can examine the
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effects on the circuit for each operational case (i.e. input +ve
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effects on the circuit for each operational case (i.e. input +ve
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or input -ve). Because symptom collection is defined as surjective (from component failure modes
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or input -ve), see table~\ref{tbl:invamp}. Because symptom collection is defined as surjective (from component failure modes
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to symptoms) we cannot have a component failure mode that maps to two different symptoms (within a functional group).
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to symptoms) we cannot have a component failure mode that maps to two different symptoms (within a functional group).
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Note that here we have a more general symptom $ OUT OF RANGE $ which could mean either
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Note that here we have a more general symptom $ OUT OF RANGE $ which could mean either
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$HIGH$ or $LOW$ output.
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$HIGH$ or $LOW$ output.
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@ -189,6 +198,7 @@ $HIGH$ or $LOW$ output.
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\begin{table}[h+]
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\begin{table}[h+]
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\caption{Inverting Amplifier: Single failure analysis}
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\begin{tabular}{|| l | l | c | c | l ||} \hline
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\begin{tabular}{|| l | l | c | c | l ||} \hline
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\textbf{Failure Scenario} & & \textbf{Inverted Amp Effect} & & \textbf{Symptom} \\ \hline
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\textbf{Failure Scenario} & & \textbf{Inverted Amp Effect} & & \textbf{Symptom} \\ \hline
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\hline
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\hline
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@ -213,23 +223,25 @@ $HIGH$ or $LOW$ output.
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FS4: AMP LowSlew & & $ slow output \frac{\delta V}{\delta t} $ & & $ LOW PASS $ \\ \hline
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FS4: AMP LowSlew & & $ slow output \frac{\delta V}{\delta t} $ & & $ LOW PASS $ \\ \hline
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\hline
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\hline
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\end{tabular}
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\end{tabular}
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\label{tbl:invamp}
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\end{table}
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\end{table}
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$$ fm(INVAMP) = \{ OUT OF RANGE, ZERO OUTPUT, NO GAIN, LOW PASS \} $$
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$$ fm(INVAMP) = \{ OUT OF RANGE, ZERO OUTPUT, NO GAIN, LOW PASS \} $$
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Much more general. OUT OF RANGE symptom maps to many component failure modes.
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%Much more general. OUT OF RANGE symptom maps to many component failure modes.
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Observability problem... system. In fact can we get a metric of how observable
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%Observability problem... system. In fact can we get a metric of how observable
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a system is using the ratio of component failure modes X op states to a symptom ????
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%a system is using the ratio of component failure modes X op states to a symptom ????
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Could further refine this if MTTF stats available for each component failure.
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%Could further refine this if MTTF stats available for each component failure.
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\subsection{Comparison between the two approaches}
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\subsection{Comparison between the two approaches}
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If the input voltage can be negative the potential divider
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If the input voltage can be negative the potential divider
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becomes reversed in polarity.
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becomes reversed in polarity.
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This means that detecting which failure mode has occurred from knowing the symptom, has become a more difficult task.
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This means that detecting which failure mode has occurred from knowing the symptom, has become a more difficult task; or in other words
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the observability of the causes of failure are reduced.
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\clearpage
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\clearpage
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\section{Op-Amp circuit 1}
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\section{Op-Amp circuit 1}
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@ -474,8 +486,8 @@ wihen it becomes a V2 follower).
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The circuit in figure~\ref{fig:circuit2} shows a five pole low pass filter.
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The circuit in figure~\ref{fig:circuit2} shows a five pole low pass filter.
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Starting at the input, we have a first order low pass filter buffered by an op-amp,
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Starting at the input, we have a first order low pass filter buffered by an op-amp,
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the output of this is passed to a Sallen~Key~\cite{aoe}[p.267] second order lowpass filter.
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the output of this is passed to a Sallen~Key~\cite{aoe}[p.267] second order lowpass filter.
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The output of this is passed into another Sallen~Key filter (which although it may have different values
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The output of this is passed into another Sallen~Key filter -- which although it may have different values
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for its resistors/capacitors and thus a different frequency response) is idential from a failure mode perspective.
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for its resistors/capacitors and thus have a different frequency response -- is idential from a failure mode perspective.
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Thus we can analyse the first Sallen~Key low pass filter and re-use the results.
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Thus we can analyse the first Sallen~Key low pass filter and re-use the results.
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@ -501,13 +513,16 @@ that the impedance of the capacitor is lower for higher frequencies.
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Thus higher frquencies are attenuated at the point that we
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Thus higher frquencies are attenuated at the point that we
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read its output signal.
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read its output signal.
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However, from a failure mode perspective we can analyse it in a very similar way
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However, from a failure mode perspective we can analyse it in a very similar way
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to a potential divider.
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to a potential divider (see section~\ref{potdivfmmd}).
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Capacitors generally fail OPEN but some types fail OPEN and SHORT.
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Capacitors generally fail OPEN but some types fail OPEN and SHORT.
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We will consider the latter type for this analysis.
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We will consider the latter type for this analysis.
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We analyse the first order low pass filter in table~\ref{tbl:firstorderlp}.\\
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\begin{table}[h+]
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\begin{table}[h+]
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\caption{FirstOrderLP: Failure Mode Effects Analysis: Single Faults} % title of Table
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\label{tbl:firstorderlp}
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\begin{tabular}{|| l | l | c | c | l ||} \hline
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\begin{tabular}{|| l | l | c | c | l ||} \hline
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\textbf{Failure Scenario} & & \textbf{First Order} & & \textbf{Symptom} \\
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\textbf{Failure Scenario} & & \textbf{First Order} & & \textbf{Symptom} \\
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& & \textbf{Low Pass Filter} & & \\
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& & \textbf{Low Pass Filter} & & \\
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@ -526,7 +541,7 @@ We will consider the latter type for this analysis.
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We can collect the symptoms $\{ LPnofilter,LPnosignal \}$ and create a derived component
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We can collect the symptoms $\{ LPnofilter,LPnosignal \}$ and create a derived component
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called $FirstOrderLP$. Applying the $fm$ function yields $$ fm(FirstOrderLP) = \{ LPnofilter,LPnosignal \}.$$
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called $FirstOrderLP$. Applying the $fm$ function yields $$ fm(FirstOrderLP) = \{ LPnofilter,LPnosignal \}.$$
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\paragraph{Addition of Buffer Amplifier: first stage.}
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\paragraph{Addition of Buffer Amplifier: First stage.}
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The opamp IC1 is being used simply as a buffer. By placing it between the next stages
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The opamp IC1 is being used simply as a buffer. By placing it between the next stages
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on the signal path we remove the possibility of unwanted signal feedback.
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on the signal path we remove the possibility of unwanted signal feedback.
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@ -536,6 +551,7 @@ from the $FirstOrderLP$ and the OPAMP component.
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\begin{table}[ht]
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\begin{table}[ht]
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\caption{First Stage LP1: Failure Mode Effects Analysis: Single Faults} % title of Table
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\caption{First Stage LP1: Failure Mode Effects Analysis: Single Faults} % title of Table
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\label{tbl:firststage}
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\centering % used for centering table
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\centering % used for centering table
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\begin{tabular}{||l|c|c|l|l||}
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\begin{tabular}{||l|c|c|l|l||}
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\hline \hline
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\hline \hline
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@ -554,7 +570,7 @@ from the $FirstOrderLP$ and the OPAMP component.
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\hline
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\hline
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\end{tabular}
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\end{tabular}
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\label{tbl:firststage}
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\end{table}
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\end{table}
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From the table~\ref{tbl:firststage} we can see three symptoms of failure of
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From the table~\ref{tbl:firststage} we can see three symptoms of failure of
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@ -580,7 +596,7 @@ on the schematic as in figure~\ref{fig:circuit2002_LP1}.
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\paragraph{Second order Sallen Key Low Pass Filter.}
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\paragraph{Second order Sallen Key Low Pass Filter.}
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The next two filters in the signal path are R1,R2,C2,C1,IC2 and R3,R4,C4,C3,IC3.
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The next two filters in the signal path are R1,R2,C2,C1,IC2 and R3,R4,C4,C3,IC3.
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From a failure mode perspective these are identical.
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From a failure mode perspective these are identical.
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We can analyse one and re-use the results for the second.
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We can analyse the first one and then re-use these results for the second.
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\begin{table}[ht]
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\begin{table}[ht]
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\caption{Sallen Key Low Pass Filter SKLP: Failure Mode Effects Analysis: Single Faults} % title of Table
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\caption{Sallen Key Low Pass Filter SKLP: Failure Mode Effects Analysis: Single Faults} % title of Table
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@ -613,6 +629,11 @@ We can analyse one and re-use the results for the second.
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\label{tbl:sallenkeylp}
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\label{tbl:sallenkeylp}
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\end{table}
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\end{table}
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We now can create a derived component to represent the Sallen Key low pass filter, which we can call $SKLP$.
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We now can create a derived component to represent the Sallen Key low pass filter, which we can call $SKLP$.
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@ -763,7 +784,9 @@ could be easily detected; the failure symptom $FilterIncorrect$ may be less obs
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\paragraph{ Creating a fault hierarchy.}
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\paragraph{ Creating a fault hierarchy.}
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The main concept of FMMD is to build a hierarchy of failure behaviour from the {\bc}
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The main concept of FMMD is to build a hierarchy of failure behaviour from the {\bc}
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level up to the top, or system level, with analysis stages between each
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level up to the top, or system level, with analysis stages between each
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transition to a higher level in the hierarchy. $$ fm(LP1) = \{ LP1High, LP1Low, LP1ExtraLowPass, LP1NoLowPass \} $$
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transition to a higher level in the hierarchy.
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The first stage is to choose
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The first stage is to choose
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{\bcs} that interact and naturally form {\fgs}. The initial {\fgs} are collections of base components.
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{\bcs} that interact and naturally form {\fgs}. The initial {\fgs} are collections of base components.
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@ -943,7 +966,7 @@ This is a natural process. When we have a complicated systems
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they always have a small number of system failure modes.
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they always have a small number of system failure modes.
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\section{The Case for Derived Components}
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\section{Examples of Derived Component like concepts in safety literature}
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Idea stage on this section
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Idea stage on this section
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\begin{itemize}
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\begin{itemize}
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@ -1118,7 +1141,7 @@ Rigorous FMEA (RFMEA).
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\centering
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\centering
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\includegraphics[width=400pt,keepaspectratio=true]{./three_tree.png}
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\includegraphics[width=400pt,keepaspectratio=true]{./three_tree.png}
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% three_tree.png: 851x385 pixel, 72dpi, 30.02x13.58 cm, bb=0 0 851 385
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% three_tree.png: 851x385 pixel, 72dpi, 30.02x13.58 cm, bb=0 0 851 385
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\caption{FMMD Hierarchy with $(|fg| = 3) \wedge (|fm(c)| = 3)$}
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\caption{FMMD Hierarchy with $(|fg| = 3)$ } % \wedge (|fm(c)| = 3)$}
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\label{fig:three_tree}
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\label{fig:three_tree}
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\end{figure}
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\end{figure}
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@ -1214,9 +1237,11 @@ $$
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%\end{equation}
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%\end{equation}
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$$
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$$
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\subsection{Exponential squared to Exponential}
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% \subsection{Exponential squared to Exponential}
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%
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can I say that ?
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% can I say that ?
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\bibliographystyle{plain}
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\bibliography{../vmgbibliography,../mybib}
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\end{document}
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\end{document}
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related_papers_books/3A.SILs.pdf
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