diff --git a/mybib.bib b/mybib.bib
index f6ade6f..f1b5a7e 100644
--- a/mybib.bib
+++ b/mybib.bib
@@ -2,6 +2,12 @@
 
 % my bib file.
 
+@ARTICLE{fmd91,
+  AUTHOR =       "Reliability Analysis Center",
+  TITLE =        "Failure Mode/Mechanisms Distributions 1991",
+  JOURNAL =      "United States Department of Commerce",
+  YEAR =         "1991"
+}
 
 % $Id: mybib.bib,v 1.3 2009/11/28 20:05:52 robin Exp $
 @article{Clark200519,
diff --git a/pt100/pt100.tex b/pt100/pt100.tex
index 29fb246..fe1e76c 100644
--- a/pt100/pt100.tex
+++ b/pt100/pt100.tex
@@ -156,7 +156,7 @@ for the effects of component failures.
 All components have a set of known `failure modes'.
 In other words we know that a given component can fail in several distinct ways.
 Studies have been published which list common component types 
-and their sets of failure modes, often with MTTF statistics \cite{mil1991}.
+and their sets of failure modes~\cite{fmd91}, often with MTTF statistics~\cite{mil1991}.
 Thus for each component, an analysis is made for each of its failure modes,
 with respect to its effect on the 
 circuit. Each one of these scenarios is termed a `test case'.
@@ -170,9 +170,10 @@ Where this occurs a circuit re-design is probably the only sensible course of ac
 \subsection{Single Fault FMEA Analysis \\ of PT100 Four wire circuit}
 
 \label{fmea}
-This circuit simply consists of three resistors.
-Resistors according to the DOD Electronic component fault handbook
-1991, fail by either going OPEN or SHORT circuit \cite{mil1991}.
+The PT100 circuit consists of three resistors, two `current~supply'
+wires and two `sensor' wires.
+Resistors according to the European Standard EN298:2003~\cite{en298}[App.A]
+, are considered to fail by either going OPEN or SHORT circuit.
 %Should wires become disconnected these will have the same effect as
 %given resistors going open. 
 For the purpose of this analyis;
diff --git a/survey/survey.tex b/survey/survey.tex
index 8cca48e..b596e1b 100644
--- a/survey/survey.tex
+++ b/survey/survey.tex
@@ -104,10 +104,10 @@ failsafes meant that the objective was to iron out common failures
 not to rigorously detect all possible failures.
 Consequently it was not designed to guarantee to covering all component failure modes, 
 and has no rigorous in-built safeguards to ensure coverage of all possible
-system level outcomes.
+system level outcomes~\cite{nasafta}[Section 1.2].
 
 FTA, like all top~down methodologies introduces the very serious problem
-of missing component failure modes \cite{faa}[Ch.9].
+of missing component failure modes~\cite{faa}[Ch.9].
 
 \paragraph{Outline of FTA Methodology}
 FTA works by taking an undesireable event 
@@ -277,7 +277,7 @@ FMEA described in this section (\ref{pfmea}) is sometimes called `production FME
 
 \subsection{FMECA}
 
-Failure mode, effects, and criticality analysis (FMECA)~\cite{FMD-91} extends FMEA
+Failure mode, effects, and criticality analysis (FMECA)~\cite{fmd91} extends FMEA
 by associaing failure probabilities with component failure modes.
 Essentially this adds a failure outcome criticallity factor to FMEA.
 This is a bottom up methodology, which builds on an existing FMEA
@@ -326,7 +326,7 @@ this can be the number of  operating cycles or demands expected.
 
 \paragraph{Severity `s' value}
 Component failure modes can cause failures that have levels of severity or seriousness.
-Typical classifications are as follows:~\cite{FMD-91}
+Typical classifications are as follows:~\cite{fmd91}
 \begin{itemize}
  \item Category I - Catastrophic
 \item Category II - Critical
@@ -364,7 +364,7 @@ $s$ thus:
 %%-WIKI- FMECA tends to be preferred over FMEA in space and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) military applications, 
 %%-WIKI- while various forms of FMEA predominate in other industries.
 
-A second result, representing the overall reliability and safety of a component or item\cite{FMD-91}[2-17] $C$, 
+A second result, representing the overall reliability and safety of a component or item~\cite{fmd91}[2-17] $C$, 
 termed a criticallity number $C_r$ for the component.
 We can consider $C$ to be a flat set of component failure modes, using $cfm$ as a variable to represent them.
 % where $f \in F$)