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@ -1180,7 +1180,7 @@ An example PFMEA report is presented in table~\ref{tbl:pfmeareport}.
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\section{FMECA - Failure Modes Effects and Criticality Analysis}
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\fmmdglossFMECA
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\label{sec:FMECA}
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\paragraph{ FMECA - Failure Modes Effects and Criticality Analysis.}
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%\paragraph{ FMECA - Failure Modes Effects and Criticality Analysis.}
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% \begin{figure}
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% \centering
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% %\includegraphics[width=100pt]{./military-aircraft-desktop-computer-wallpaper-missile-launch.jpg}
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@ -1224,9 +1224,9 @@ determined, to become part of the failure mode model.
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A history of the usage and development of FMECA may be found in~\cite{FMECAresearch}.
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\fmmdglossFMECA
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\paragraph{ FMECA - Failure Modes Effects and Criticality Analysis.}
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\paragraph{FMECA - Statistical variables.}
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%
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Very similar to PFMEA, but instead of cost, a criticality or
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An extension of PFMEA, but instead of cost, a criticality or
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seriousness factor is ascribed to putative top level incidents.
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FMECA has three probability factors for component failures, a system operational time and a severity factor.
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@ -281,7 +281,7 @@ This is becoming apparent in a dilemma now faced
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by organisations dealing with highly safety critical systems and having to rely on `smart~instruments'~\cite{justifysmartnuke}
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that can no longer be validated using FMEA.
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%
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Smart instruments are dealt with in the section below.
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Smart instruments are discussed in the section below.
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Distributed real time systems, which rely on micro-controllers connected in a network
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using a communications protocol, similarly are difficult to meaningfully analyse using FMEA (see section~\ref{sec:distributed}).
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@ -424,7 +424,7 @@ it is necessary to consider all three components as one larger {\fg}.
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\centering
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\includegraphics[width=400pt]{CH5_Examples/circuit1001.png}
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% circuit1001.png: 420x300 pixel, 72dpi, 14.82x10.58 cm, bb=0 0 420 300
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\caption{Circuit 1}
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\caption{Differencing Amplifier using two op-amps.}
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\label{fig:circuit1}
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\end{figure}
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\fmmdglossOPAMP
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@ -629,7 +629,7 @@ one symptom set, enforces this, for the derived
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component created in the next stage.
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}
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{
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Ensuring that no result belongs to more than one symptom
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Ensuring that no result is linked to more than one symptom
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%set <-------------------------------------------- HOW did the word set get in here!!!!!!!! Totally screwed up the meaning 26SEP2013
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enforces the `unitary state failure mode constraint' for derived components (see section~\ref{sec:unitarystate}).
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}
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@ -23,7 +23,7 @@ its members will always remain dear to me. %, and I am sure, a strong influence
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%%%% IS THIS BIT A BIT MAD???? YES! 27AUG2013
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% % % Like an army recruits training Sergeant Major I found them
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% % % hard task masters at first, and then, as with realising the rationale behind training and
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% % % {\em even} parade drill, respected and grew to like them.
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% % % {\em even} parade drill, respected and grew to like them. well one of them anyway, the one who actually helped. the one with the motorbike.
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% % % %
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%
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My first debt of gratitude must go to my supervisors,
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