Added a very important condition for each state tc
Each test case must be examined in the light of any applied states or environmental conditions applied to it. For instance a test circuit that has two positions has two states. Each one must be applied to all the test cases. In the case of the NASA O ring this could have been the environmental temperature range behaviour etc
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@ -165,7 +165,8 @@ Typically this type of circuit would be used to read a thermocouple
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and this erro symptom, "LOW READING" would mean our plant could
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and this erro symptom, "LOW READING" would mean our plant could
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beleive that the temperature reading is lower than it actually is.
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beleive that the temperature reading is lower than it actually is.
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To take an example from a K type thermocouple, the offset of 1.86mV
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To take an example from a K type thermocouple, the offset of 1.86mV
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from the potential divider represents amplified to $\approx \, 342mV$ would represent $\approx \; 46\,^{\circ}{\rm C}$.
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from the potential divider represents amplified to
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$\approx \, 342mV$ would represent $\approx \; 46\,^{\circ}{\rm C}$.
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\clearpage
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\clearpage
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\subsection{Undetected Failure Mode: Incorrect Reading}
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\subsection{Undetected Failure Mode: Incorrect Reading}
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@ -181,14 +182,51 @@ allowance according to EN61508.
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\section{Proposed Checking Method}
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\section{Proposed Checking Method}
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Were we to switch in a a second resistor in parrallel with the
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Were we to able to switch a second resistor in parrallel with the
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safety resistor $R_{safety}$, using a switch (or transistor)
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safety resistor and switch it out again, we could tet
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we could detect the effect on the reading with the potential divider
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that it is still functioning correctly.
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With the new resistor switched in we would expect
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the voltage added by the potential divider
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to increase.
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The circuit in figure \ref{fig:mvamp2} shows an NPN transistor
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controlled by the `test line' connection, which can switch in the resitor R30
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also with a value of \ohms{2.2M}.
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We could detect the effect on the reading with the potential divider
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according to the following formula.
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according to the following formula.
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\vspace{10pt}
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The potential divider is now $\frac{820R}{1M1+820R}$ over 5V this gives
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Work out a pot div formula, and some typical values
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3.724mV, amplified by 184 this is 0.685V \adcten{140}.
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\vspace{10pt}
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The potential divider with the second resistor
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switched out is $\frac{820R}{2M2+820R}$ over 5V gives 1.86mV,
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amplified by 184 gives 0.342V \adcten{70}.
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This is a difference of \adcten{70} in the readings.
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So periodically, perhaps even as frequently as once every few seconds
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we can apply the checking resistor and look for a corresponding
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change in the reading.
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Lets us analyse this in more detail to prove that we are indeed checking for
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the failure of the safety resistor, and that we are not instroducing
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any new problems.
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First let us look at the new transistor and resistor and
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treat these as a functional group.
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In our analysis of the failure modes we have to consider
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both states of the transistor, ON and OFF.
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\begin{figure}[h]
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\centering
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\includegraphics[width=200pt,keepaspectratio=true]{./mv_opamp_circuit2.png}
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% mv_opamp_circuit2.png: 577x479 pixel, 72dpi, 20.35x16.90 cm, bb=0 0 577 479
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\caption{Amplifier with check circuit}
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\label{fig:mvamp2}
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\end{figure}
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\section{FMMD analysis of Safety Addition}
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\section{FMMD analysis of Safety Addition}
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BIN
fmmd_design_aide/mv_opamp_circuit2.png
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fmmd_design_aide/mv_opamp_circuit2.png
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@ -312,13 +312,14 @@ $$ atc(TC) = R $$
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\begin{algorithmic}[1]
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\begin{algorithmic}[1]
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\STATE { let r be a `test case result'}
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\STATE { let r be a `test case result'}
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\STATE { Let the function $Analyse : tc \rightarrow r $ } \COMMENT { This analysis is a human activity, examining the failure~modes in the test case and determining how the functional~group will fail under those conditions}
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\STATE { Let the function $Analyse : tc \rightarrow r $ } \COMMENT { This analysis is a human activity, examining the failure~modes in the test case and determining how the functional~group will fail under those conditions}
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\FORALL { Environmental and Specific Conditions }
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\STATE { $ R $ is a set of test case results $r_j \in R$ where the index $j$ corresponds to $tc_j \in TC$}
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\STATE { $ R $ is a set of test case results $r_j \in R$ where the index $j$ corresponds to $tc_j \in TC$}
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\FORALL { $tc_j \in TC$ }
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\FORALL { $tc_j \in TC$ }
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\STATE { $ rc_j = Analyse(tc_j) $} \COMMENT {this is Fault Mode Effects Analysis (FMEA) applied in the context of the functional group}
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\STATE { $ rc_j = Analyse(tc_j) $} \COMMENT {this is Fault Mode Effects Analysis (FMEA) applied in the context of the functional group}
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%\STATE { $ rc_j \in R $ } \COMMENT{Add $rc_j$ to the set R}
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%\STATE { $ rc_j \in R $ } \COMMENT{Add $rc_j$ to the set R}
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\STATE{ $ R := R \cup rc_j $ } \COMMENT{Add $rc_j$ to the set R}
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\STATE{ $ R := R \cup rc_j $ } \COMMENT{Add $rc_j$ to the set R}
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\ENDFOR
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\ENDFOR
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\ENDFOR
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\RETURN $R$
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\RETURN $R$
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%\hline
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%\hline
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@ -83,6 +83,8 @@ form `test cases'.
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\item Using the `test cases' as scenarios to examine the effects of component failures
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\item Using the `test cases' as scenarios to examine the effects of component failures
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we determine failure~mode behaviour of the functional group.
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we determine failure~mode behaviour of the functional group.
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This is a human process involving detailed analysis of the failure modes in the test case on the operation of the {\fg}.
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This is a human process involving detailed analysis of the failure modes in the test case on the operation of the {\fg}.
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Where spcific environment conditions, or applied states are germane to the {\fg} these must be examined
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for each test case.
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\item Collect common~symptoms by determining which test cases produce the same fault symptoms {\em from the perspective of the functional~group}.
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\item Collect common~symptoms by determining which test cases produce the same fault symptoms {\em from the perspective of the functional~group}.
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\item The common~symptoms are now the fault mode behaviour of the {\fg}. i.e. given the {\fg} as a `black box' the symptoms are the ways in which it can fail.
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\item The common~symptoms are now the fault mode behaviour of the {\fg}. i.e. given the {\fg} as a `black box' the symptoms are the ways in which it can fail.
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\item A new `derived component' can now be created where each common~symptom, or lone symptom is a failure~mode of this new component.
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\item A new `derived component' can now be created where each common~symptom, or lone symptom is a failure~mode of this new component.
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