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@ -14,8 +14,8 @@ and then determining how that functional group can fail.
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%
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With this information, we can treat the functional group
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as a component in its own right.
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This new component is a derived component.
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For a top down technique this would correspond to a low~level sub-system.
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This new component is a derived from the functional~group.
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In the field of safety engineering this derived component correspond to a low~level sub-system.
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%The technique uses a graphical notation, based on Euler\cite{eulerviz} and Constraint diagrams\cite{constraint} to model failure modes and failure mode common symptom collection. The technique is designed for making building blocks for a hierarchical fault model.
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Once the failure modes have been determined for a sub-system/derived~component,
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@ -56,8 +56,8 @@ and then determining how that functional group can fail.
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%
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With this information, we can treat the functional group
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as a component in its own right.
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This new component is a derived component.
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For a top down technique this would correspond to a low~level sub-system.
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This new component is a derived from the functional~group.
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In the field of safety engineering this derived component correspond to a low~level sub-system.
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%The technique uses a graphical notation, based on Euler\cite{eulerviz} and Constraint diagrams\cite{constraint} to model failure modes and failure mode common symptom collection. The technique is designed for making building blocks for a hierarchical fault model.
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%
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Once the failure modes have been determined for a sub-system/derived~component,
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@ -90,6 +90,24 @@ This chapter focuses on the process of building the blocks, the symptom extracti
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\section{Fault Finding and Failure Mode Analysis}
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\subsection{Static Analysis}
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In the field of safety critical engineering; to comply with
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European Law a product must be certified under the approriate `EN' standard.
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Typically environmental stress, EMC, electrical stressing, endurance tests,
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software~inspections and project~management quality reviews are applied\cite{sccs}.
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Static testing is also applied. This is theoretical analysis of the design of the product from the safety
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perspective.
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Three main techniques are currently used,
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Statistical failure models, FMEA (Failure mode Effects Analysis) and FTA (Fault Tree Analysis).
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The FMMD technique is aimed primarily as design verification for
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safety critical systems.
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However, FMMD also provides the mathematical frame work
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to assist in the production of these three results of static analysis.
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From the model created by the FMMD technique, the three above failure mode
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descriptions can be derived.
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\subsection{Top Down or natural trouble shooting}
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It is interesting here to look at the `natural' trouble shooting process.
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Fault finding is intinctively performed from the top-down.
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@ -103,6 +121,7 @@ Specific measurements
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and checks will be made, and finally a component or a low level sub-system
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will be found to be faulty.
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A natural fault finding process is thus top~down.
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Top down fault isolation/finding techniques are described in \ref{NETWORKDECOMPOSITION}.
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\subsection{FMMD - Bottom~up Analysis}
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The FMMD technique does not follow the `natural fault finding' or top down approach,
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it instead works from the bottom up.
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@ -121,33 +140,18 @@ This also means that we can obtain statistical estimates based on the known reli
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of the components.
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%It also means that every component failure mode must at the very least be considered.
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\subsection{Static Analysis}
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In the field of safety critical engineering; to comply with
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European Law a product must be certified under the approriate `EN' standard.
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Typically environmental stress, EMC, electrical stressing, endurance tests,
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software~inspections and project~management quality reviews are applied\cite{sccs}.
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Static testing is also applied. This is theoretical analysis of the design of the product from the safety
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perspective.
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Three main techniques are currently used,
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Statistical failure models, FMEA (Failure mode Effects Analysis) and FTA (Fault Tree Analysis).
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The technique outlined here aims to provide a mathematical frame work
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to assist in the production of these three results of static analysis.
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From the model created by the FMMD technique, the three above failure mode
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descriptions can be derived.
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{
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The aims are
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\begin{itemize}
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\item To automate the process where possible
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\item To apply a documented trail for each analysis phase (determination of functional groups, and analysis of component failure modes on those groups)
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\item To use a modular approach so that analysed sub-systems can be re-used
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\item Automatically ensure no failure mode is unhandled
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\item To produce a data model from which FTA, FMEA and statistical failure models may be obtained automatically
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\end{itemize}
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}
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%{
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%The aims are
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%\begin{itemize}
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% \item To automate the process where possible
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% \item To apply a documented trail for each analysis phase (determination of functional groups, and analysis of component failure modes on those groups)
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% \item To use a modular approach so that analysed sub-systems can be re-used
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% \item Automatically ensure no failure mode is unhandled
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% \item To produce a data model from which FTA, FMEA and statistical failure models may be obtained automatically
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%\end{itemize}
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%}
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%
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\subsection{Systems, functional groups, sub-systems and failure modes}
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@ -168,7 +172,8 @@ A sub-system will be composed of components, which
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may themselves be sub-systems. However each `component'
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will have a fault/failure behaviour and it should
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always be possible to obtain a set of failure modes
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for each `component'. In FMMD terms a sub-system is a derived component.
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for each `component'.
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%In FMMD terms a sub-system is a derived component.
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If we look at the sound system example,
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the CD~player could fail in several distinct ways,
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@ -196,8 +201,13 @@ We can define a functional~group as a set of components that interact
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to perform a specific function.
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When we have analysed the fault behaviour of a functional group, we can treat it as a `black box'.
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We can now call our functional~group a sub-system or a derived~component.
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The goal here is to know how it will behave under fault conditions !
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The fault behaviour will consist of a set of `symptoms' caused by combinations
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of the component failure modes.
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We can make a new `component' derived from the functional~group.
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The symptoms are the failure modes of this new `derived component'.
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%We can now call our functional~group a sub-system or a derived~component.
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%The goal here is to know how it will behave under fault conditions !
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%Imagine buying one such `sub~system' from a very honest vendor.
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%One of those sir, yes but be warned it may fail in these distinct ways, here
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%in the honest data sheet the set of failure modes is listed!
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