diff --git a/submission_thesis/CH2_FMEA/copy.tex b/submission_thesis/CH2_FMEA/copy.tex
index 457ff4b..dc7bcc8 100644
--- a/submission_thesis/CH2_FMEA/copy.tex
+++ b/submission_thesis/CH2_FMEA/copy.tex
@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@
 \label{sec:chap2}
 
 The generic and statistical European Safety Standard, EN61508:6\cite{en61508}[B.6.6]
-describes FMEA as: 
+describes Failure Mode Effect Analysis (FMEA) as: 
 \begin{quotation}
 ``To analyse a system design, by examining all possible sources of failure
 of a system's components and determining the effects of these failures
@@ -262,8 +262,9 @@ is significantly reduced, enough for some standards to exclude it~\cite{en298}~\
 
 \paragraph{Resistor failure modes according to EN298.}
 
-EN298, the European gas burner safety standard, tends to 
-provide failure modes more directly usable for performing FMEA than FMD-91.
+EN298, the European gas burner safety standard, 
+tends to be give  failure modes more directly 
+usable for performing FMEA than FMD-91.
 %
 EN298 requires that a full FMEA be undertaken, examining all failure modes
 of all electronic components~\cite{en298}[11.2 5] as part of the certification process.
@@ -441,7 +442,7 @@ that we got from FMD-91, listed in equation~\ref{eqn:opampfms}.
   FS8: PIN 8 OPEN  &  &    (Vcc) disconnected   &  &   $NOOP_A$ and   $NOOP_B$              \\  \hline
                     &  &                        &  &          \\  
                       &  &                        &  &          \\  
-
+submission_thesis/CH2_FMEA/copy.tex submission_thesis/CH2_FMEA/copy.tex.03APR2012
                       &  &                        &  &          \\   \hline
 
        FS9: PIN 1 $\stackrel{short}{\longrightarrow}$  PIN 2   &  &  A -ve 100\% Feed back, low gain                               &  &  $LOW_A$             \\  \hline
diff --git a/submission_thesis/CH8_Conclusion/copy.tex b/submission_thesis/CH8_Conclusion/copy.tex
index 744a6d0..b601d63 100644
--- a/submission_thesis/CH8_Conclusion/copy.tex
+++ b/submission_thesis/CH8_Conclusion/copy.tex
@@ -347,3 +347,13 @@ we thus reveal design deficiencies.
 %in the hardware/software interface.
 In Safety Integrity Level (SIL)~\cite{en61508} terms, by identifying undetectable faults and fixing them, we raise 
 the safe failure fraction (SFF).
+
+
+
+\section{Conclusion}
+
+It is the authors belfief that the practise of FMEA would be imporoved by taking a modular approach
+and that it is necessary that software and hardware should be included n the same failure mode models.
+%
+The proposed methodology, FMMD, provides the means to do this, and it is the authors hope that this
+or a variant thereof is taken up and used to improve system safety.
\ No newline at end of file