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fmmd_concept/fmmd_concept.tex
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@ -68,7 +68,18 @@ are held in a computer program, we can determine if the model is complete
%OK need to describe the need for it %OK need to describe the need for it
\section{The need for a new failure mode modelling methodology} \section{The need for a new failure mode modelling methodology}
In summary.
\paragraph{Ideal Static failure mode methodology}
An ideal Static failure mode methodology would build a failure mode model
from which the the other four could be derived.
It would address the short-comings in the other methodologies, and
would have a user friendly interface, with a visual (rather than mathematical/formal) syntax with icons
to represent the results of analysis phases.
There are four static analysis failure mode methodologies in common use.
Each has its advantages and drawbacks, and each is suited for
a different phase in the product life cycle.
These four methodologies are discussed briefly below.
\subsection { FTA } \subsection { FTA }
@ -90,19 +101,53 @@ system level outcomes.
\subsection { FMEA } \subsection { FMEA }
This places a burden of taking individual component failure modes This is an early static analysis methodology, and concentrates
and trying to determine what affects this will have at SYSTEM level. on SYSTEM level errors which have been investigated.
Justifications for this methodology are often statistical and Bayes Theorem \cite{probstat} The investigation will typically point to a particular failure
is often cited. of a component.
This lacks precision, or in other words, determinability prediction accuracy, The methodology is now applied to find the significance of the failure.
as often the component failure mode cannt be proven to cause a SYSTEM level failure, only to make it more likely. Its is based on a simple equation where $S$ ranks the severity (or cost \cite{fmea}) of the identified SYSTEM failure,
Also, it can miss combinations of failure modes that will cause SYSTEM level errors. $O$ its occurrance, and $D$ giving the failures detectability. Mulipliying these
together,
gives a risk probability number, i.e. $RPN = S \times O \times D$.
This gives in effect
a prioritised todo list, with higher the $RPN$ values being the most urgent.
\subsection{FMECA}
Failure mode, effects, and criticality analysis (FMECDA) extends FMEA.
This is a bottom up methodology, which takes component failure modes
and traces them to the SYSTEM level failures. The components
have reliability data and this can be used to predict the
failure statistics in the design stage \cite{mil1992}.
It can do this using probability \footnote{for a given component failure mode there will be a $\Beta$ value, the
probability that the component failure mode will cause a given SYSTEM failure}.
%
This lacks precision, or in other words, determinability prediction accuracy \cite{fafmea},
as often the component failure mode can't be proven to cause a SYSTEM level failure, but
assigned a probability $\Beta$ fator by the design engineer.
%Also, it can miss combinations of failure modes that will cause SYSTEM level errors.
%
The results, as with FMEA are an $RPN$ number determing the significance of the SYSTEM fault.
%%-WIKI- Failure mode, effects, and criticality analysis (FMECA) is an extension of failure mode and effects analysis (FMEA).
%%-WIKI- FMEA is a a bottom-up, inductive analytical method which may be performed at either the functional or
%%-WIKI- piece-part level. FMECA extends FMEA by including a criticality analysis, which is used to chart the
%%-WIKI- probability of failure modes against the severity of their consequences. The result highlights failure modes with relatively high probability
%%-WIKI- and severity of consequences, allowing remedial effort to be directed where it will produce the greatest value.
%%-WIKI- FMECA tends to be preferred over FMEA in space and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) military applications,
%%-WIKI- while various forms of FMEA predominate in other industries.
\subsection { FMEDA or Statistical Analyis } \subsection { FMEDA or Statistical Analyis }
This is a process that takes all the components in a system, This is a process that takes all the components in a system,
and from the failure modes of those components and from the failure modes of those components
tnote{for a given component failure mode there will be a $\Beta$ value, the
probability that the component failure mode will cause a given SYSTEM failure}.
calculates a risk factor for each. calculates a risk factor for each.
The risk factors of all the component failure modes are summed and The risk factors of all the component failure modes are summed and
give a value for the `safety level' for the equipment in a given environment. give a value for the `safety level' for the equipment in a given environment.
@ -140,11 +185,13 @@ This suffers from the same problems of
lack of determinability prediction accuracy, as FMEA above. lack of determinability prediction accuracy, as FMEA above.
We have to decide how particular components failing will impact ot the SYSTEM or top level. We have to decide how particular components failing will impact ot the SYSTEM or top level.
This involves a `leap of faith'. For instance a resistor failing in a sensor cirrcuit This involves a `leap of faith'. For instance a resistor failing in a sensor cirrcuit
may be part of a critical montioring function. But the analyst is put in a position may be part of a critical montioring function.
The analyst is now put in a position
where he must assign a critical failure possibility to it. There is no analysis where he must assign a critical failure possibility to it. There is no analysis
of how that resistor would/could affect that circuit, but because of the circuitry of how that resistor would/could affect that circuit, but because of the circuitry
it is part of critical section it is linked to a critical system level fault. it is part of critical section it is linked to a critical system level fault.
There is no cause and effect analysis for the failure modes. Unintended side
effects that lead to failure can be missed.
By this we may have the MTTF of some critical component failure By this we may have the MTTF of some critical component failure
modes, but we can only guess, in most cases what the safety case outcome modes, but we can only guess, in most cases what the safety case outcome
@ -168,122 +215,144 @@ of the Safety Integrity Levels (SIL) of EN61508 \cite{en61508}.
\item It should have a formal basis, that is to say, it should be able to produce mathematical proofs \item It should have a formal basis, that is to say, it should be able to produce mathematical proofs
for its results. for its results.
\item It should be capable of producing reliability and danger evaluation statistics. \item It should be capable of producing reliability and danger evaluation statistics.
\item It should be easy to use. \item It should be easy to use, Ideally useing a graphical syntax (as oppossed to a formal mathematical one).
\item From the top down the failure mode model should follow a logical de-composition of the functionality
to smaller and smaller functional modules \cite{maikowski}.
\end{itemize} \end{itemize}
\section{building blocks of a safety critical systen} \section{Proposed Methodology}
This section looks at common features in a safety critical system and The proposed methodology will be bottom-up. to fulfill the logical de-composition requirement
then looks at the building blocks of these systems it must build {\fg}s from the bottom-up. These are minimal collections of components
and their characteristics. that work together to perform a simple function.
We can perform a failure mode effects analysis on each of the component failure
modes within the {\fg}. We can thus ensure that all component failure modes
are covered. We can then treat the {\fg} as a `black box' or component in its own right.
We can now look at how the {\fg} can fail. Many of the component failure modes will
cause the same failure symptoms in the {fg} fialure behaviour.
We can collect these failures as common symptoms.
When we have out set of symptoms, we can now create
a {\dc}. The {\dc} will have as its set of failures
modes, the collected symptoms of the {\fg}.
\subsection{what is a safety critical system?} Because we can now have a {\dc} we can use these to form
new {\fg}s and we can build a hierarchical model of the system failure modes.
DEFINITIONS GET REFS
TYPICALLY HAS MECHANICAL, ELECTRONIC and SOFTWARE
actuators control intelligence
\subsection{An example : industrial burner}
An industrial burner is a nice example of a safety critical system.
It has some lethal risks and some environmental.
It could, by igniting an explosive mixture, cause an explosion.
By burning incorrect proportions of fuel and air, it could be ineffecient and waste
resources, or worse could cause poisonous burning (typically carbon monoxide, but also
where flame temperature is very high, can produce NOX emmissions).
To prevent igniting an explosive mixture, air is pumped though the furnace
chamber on start-up, and this is verified with an air pressure switch.
NEED A DIAGRAM HERE
NEED A STATE CHART TOO
It is interesting here to compare how the different methodologies
would deal with a particular sub-system in the burner controller
and compare how they analyse it.
The Flame scanner is a good example for this.
We shall consider a simple infra red (IR) flame scanner.
This is in the form of an IR sensitive resistor.
The flame type we will be looking for will have a characteristic
flicker frequency of around 13Hz.
The circuit is then simply a resitor voltage divider connected to
a micro-controller reading the voltage.
The flame scanner is thus a two resistor voltage divider.
\subsection{The Flame Scanner}
\subsubsection{Macro FTA perspective}
SHOW ALL TOP LEVEL FAULTS. EXPLOSION, POISONOUS BURNING CO, POISONOUS BURNING NOX, FAILS TO LIGHT etc
Follow the explosion tree down to flame scanner fails ON, and OFF
etc
\subsubsection{Macro FMEA/Statistical perspective}
Each of the resistors is considered critical, in the statistical case, and so the MTTF
is added inot the DANGEROUS section.
For FMEA the resistor failures add up to the SYSTEM level, show this is inappropriate
and makes several jumps in applied knowledge, thus Bayes theorem etc
\subsubsection{Micro FMMD perspective}
Here show how the flame scanner becomes a black box, or component in itself.
How it is now available to be integrated into higher level designs.
%and then an ignition position is checked.
%Initially a pilot flame is started and when this is stable, the main
%flame is fired.
%To check the stability of the flame, a flame scanner is required.
%To mix the fuel and air, motors to position valves are generally used.
%To prevent fuel leakage into the furnace, safety shut-off valves are used \footnote{These generally open slowly under power, and when power is removed `slam shut'. Thus
%in the event of a general power failure, the default to safe behaviour.}
%%- \section{building blocks of a safety critical systen}
Motors controlling air and fuel flow %%-
safety chain to power for shutdown valves %%- This section looks at common features in a safety critical system and
safety shutdown valves on fuel %%- then looks at the building blocks of these systems
flame sensor %%- and their characteristics.
air pressure sensor %%-
%%- \subsection{what is a safety critical system?}
%%-
\section{Base Level Components} %%- DEFINITIONS GET REFS
%%-
A common factor with all safety critical systems, is %%-
base level -or- bought in components. Be these %%- TYPICALLY HAS MECHANICAL, ELECTRONIC and SOFTWARE
electrical, mechanical or firmware, they should all %%- actuators control intelligence
have known failure modes. %%-
%%- \subsection{An example : industrial burner}
\subsection { Failure modes defining the component} %%-
We can consider each bought-in component as a base level component, %%- An industrial burner is a nice example of a safety critical system.
and it should have an associated set of failure modes. %%- It has some lethal risks and some environmental.
%%- It could, by igniting an explosive mixture, cause an explosion.
%%- By burning incorrect proportions of fuel and air, it could be ineffecient and waste
%%- resources, or worse could cause poisonous burning (typically carbon monoxide, but also
\subsection { Complication of multiple failure modes } %%- where flame temperature is very high, can produce NOX emmissions).
A very complicated component, like an integrated circuit or perhaps a servo motor, has %%-
a set of failure modes, where several things could go worng with it within the $\tau$ period. %%- To prevent igniting an explosive mixture, air is pumped though the furnace
This is a simultaneous failure, or more than one failure mode being active during the same time period. %%- chamber on start-up, and this is verified with an air pressure switch.
%%-
%%-
\section{FMMD Proposed Methology Outline} %%- NEED A DIAGRAM HERE
%%-
fire away, essentially the elevator pitch %%-
%%- NEED A STATE CHART TOO
\subsection{Treating a functional group as a component} %%-
\subsection{Using a derived component in designs} %%- It is interesting here to compare how the different methodologies
\section{Building a failure Mode model Hierarchy} %%- would deal with a particular sub-system in the burner controller
%%- and compare how they analyse it.
AND the hierarchy... %%- The Flame scanner is a good example for this.
%%- We shall consider a simple infra red (IR) flame scanner.
%%- This is in the form of an IR sensitive resistor.
Probab about 3 pages %%- The flame type we will be looking for will have a characteristic
%%- flicker frequency of around 13Hz.
%%- The circuit is then simply a resitor voltage divider connected to
%%- a micro-controller reading the voltage.
%%- The flame scanner is thus a two resistor voltage divider.
%%-
%%- \subsection{The Flame Scanner}
%%- \subsubsection{Macro FTA perspective}
%%-
%%- SHOW ALL TOP LEVEL FAULTS. EXPLOSION, POISONOUS BURNING CO, POISONOUS BURNING NOX, FAILS TO LIGHT etc
%%-
%%- Follow the explosion tree down to flame scanner fails ON, and OFF
%%-
%%- etc
%%- \subsubsection{Macro FMEA/Statistical perspective}
%%-
%%- Each of the resistors is considered critical, in the statistical case, and so the MTTF
%%- is added inot the DANGEROUS section.
%%-
%%- For FMEA the resistor failures add up to the SYSTEM level, show this is inappropriate
%%- and makes several jumps in applied knowledge, thus Bayes theorem etc
%%-
%%- \subsubsection{Micro FMMD perspective}
%%-
%%-
%%- Here show how the flame scanner becomes a black box, or component in itself.
%%- How it is now available to be integrated into higher level designs.
%%-
%%- %and then an ignition position is checked.
%%- %Initially a pilot flame is started and when this is stable, the main
%%- %flame is fired.
%%- %To check the stability of the flame, a flame scanner is required.
%%- %To mix the fuel and air, motors to position valves are generally used.
%%- %To prevent fuel leakage into the furnace, safety shut-off valves are used \footnote{These generally open slowly under power, and when power is removed `slam shut'. Thus
%%- %in the event of a general power failure, the default to safe behaviour.}
%%-
%%-
%%-
%%-
%%- Motors controlling air and fuel flow
%%- safety chain to power for shutdown valves
%%- safety shutdown valves on fuel
%%- flame sensor
%%- air pressure sensor
%%-
%%-
%%- \section{Base Level Components}
%%-
%%- A common factor with all safety critical systems, is
%%- base level -or- bought in components. Be these
%%- electrical, mechanical or firmware, they should all
%%- have known failure modes.
%%-
%%- \subsection { Failure modes defining the component}
%%- We can consider each bought-in component as a base level component,
%%- and it should have an associated set of failure modes.
%%-
%%-
%%-
%%- \subsection { Complication of multiple failure modes }
%%- A very complicated component, like an integrated circuit or perhaps a servo motor, has
%%- a set of failure modes, where several things could go worng with it within the $\tau$ period.
%%- This is a simultaneous failure, or more than one failure mode being active during the same time period.
%%-
%%-
%%- \section{FMMD Proposed Methology Outline}
%%-
%%- fire away, essentially the elevator pitch
%%-
%%- \subsection{Treating a functional group as a component}
%%- \subsection{Using a derived component in designs}
%%- \section{Building a failure Mode model Hierarchy}
%%-
%%- AND the hierarchy...
%%-
%%-
%%- Probab about 3 pages

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introduction/introduction.tex
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@ -320,17 +320,25 @@ common sense of a human pilot; and if fed the incorrect sensory information
can make horrendous mistakes. This means that simply reading sensors and applying control can make horrendous mistakes. This means that simply reading sensors and applying control
corrections cannot be enough. corrections cannot be enough.
Checking for error conditions must also be incorporated. Checking for error conditions must also be incorporated.
It could also develop an internal fault, and must be able to recognise and cope with this. Equipment can also develop an internal faults, and strategies
must be in-pcae to recognise and cope with them.
\begin{figure}[h] \begin{figure}[h]
\centering \centering
\includegraphics[width=300pt,bb=0 0 678 690,keepaspectratio=true]{introduction/mv_opamp_circuit.png} \includegraphics[width=300pt,keepaspectratio=true]{introduction/mv_opamp_circuit.png}
% mv_opamp_circuit.png: 678x690 pixel, 72dpi, 23.92x24.34 cm, bb=0 0 678 690 % mv_opamp_circuit.png: 577x479 pixel, 72dpi, 20.35x16.90 cm, bb=0 0 577 479
\caption{Milli-volt amplifier with added safety Resistor} \caption{Milli-Volt Amplifier with added Safety Resistor (R18)}
\label{fig:millivolt} \label{fig:millivolt}
\end{figure} \end{figure}
% \begin{figure}[h]
% \centering
% \includegraphics[width=300pt,bb=0 0 678 690,keepaspectratio=true]{introduction/mv_opamp_circuit.png}
% % mv_opamp_circuit.png: 678x690 pixel, 72dpi, 23.92x24.34 cm, bb=0 0 678 690
% \caption{Milli-volt amplifier with added safety Resistor}
% \label{fig:millivolt}
% \end{figure}
% %
% %5 % %5
% \begin{figure} % \begin{figure}
@ -343,10 +351,10 @@ It could also develop an internal fault, and must be able to recognise and cope
\paragraph{Component added to detect errors} \paragraph{Component added to detect errors}
The op-amp in the circuit in figure \ref{fig:millivolt}, supplies a gain of $\approx 180$ \footnote{ The op-amp in the circuit in figure \ref{fig:millivolt}, supplies a gain of $\approx 184$ \footnote{
applying formula for non-inverting op-amp gain\cite{aoe} $\frac{150 \times 10^3}{820}+ 1 = 183$ }. applying formula for non-inverting op-amp gain\cite{aoe} $\frac{150 \times 10^3}{820}+ 1 \approx 184$ }.
The safety case here is that The safety case here is that
any amplified signal between 0.5 and 4 volts on the ADC will be considered in range. any amplified signal between a range say, of 0.5 and 4 volts on the ADC will be considered in range.
This means that between 3mV and 21mV on the input correctly amplified This means that between 3mV and 21mV on the input correctly amplified
can be measured.\footnote{this would be a typical thermocouple amplifier circuit where milli-volt signals can be measured.\footnote{this would be a typical thermocouple amplifier circuit where milli-volt signals
are produced by the Seebeck effect\cite{aoe}} are produced by the Seebeck effect\cite{aoe}}

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@ -5,6 +5,12 @@
% $Id: mybib.bib,v 1.3 2009/11/28 20:05:52 robin Exp $ % $Id: mybib.bib,v 1.3 2009/11/28 20:05:52 robin Exp $
@ARTICLE{fafmea,
AUTHOR = "Zigmund Bluvband, Pavel Grabov",
TITLE = "Failure Analysis of FMEA",
JOURNAL = "IEEE 1-4244-2509-9/09/",
YEAR = "2009"
}
@ARTICLE{fmeda, @ARTICLE{fmeda,
AUTHOR = "John C. Grebe Dr. William M. Goble", AUTHOR = "John C. Grebe Dr. William M. Goble",
TITLE = "FMEDA – Accurate Product Failure Metrics", TITLE = "FMEDA – Accurate Product Failure Metrics",
@ -357,6 +363,7 @@ OPTissn = {},
OPTabstracts = {}, OPTabstracts = {},
} }
@TechReport{eurothermtables, @TechReport{eurothermtables,
author = {Alan Brown}, author = {Alan Brown},
title = {Thermocouple Emf TABLES and PLATINUM 100 RESISTANCE THERMOMETER TABLES}, title = {Thermocouple Emf TABLES and PLATINUM 100 RESISTANCE THERMOMETER TABLES},

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@ -1,19 +1,21 @@
\relax \relax
\bibstyle{plain}
\bibdata{vmgbibliography,mybib}
\@writefile{toc}{\contentsline {section}{\numberline {1}Introduction}{1}} \@writefile{toc}{\contentsline {section}{\numberline {1}Introduction}{1}}
\@writefile{toc}{\contentsline {subsection}{\numberline {1.1}Product Life Cycle}{1}} \@writefile{toc}{\contentsline {subsection}{\numberline {1.1}Product Life Cycle}{1}}
\@writefile{toc}{\contentsline {section}{\numberline {2}European or `EN' Standards}{1}} \@writefile{lof}{\contentsline {figure}{\numberline {1}{\ignorespaces Product Life Cycle with Competent Body Approval and Surveillance}}{1}}
\@writefile{toc}{\contentsline {subsection}{\numberline {2.1}Scope}{1}} \newlabel{fig:prod_life}{{1}{1}}
\@writefile{toc}{\contentsline {subsection}{\numberline {2.2}Approval Process}{1}} \bibstyle{plain}
\@writefile{toc}{\contentsline {subsection}{\numberline {2.3}Legal Framework}{1}} \bibdata{vmgbibliography,mybib}
\@writefile{toc}{\contentsline {subsection}{\numberline {2.4}References}{1}} \@writefile{toc}{\contentsline {section}{\numberline {2}European or `EN' Standards}{2}}
\@writefile{toc}{\contentsline {section}{\numberline {3}North American Standards}{1}} \@writefile{toc}{\contentsline {subsection}{\numberline {2.1}Scope}{2}}
\@writefile{toc}{\contentsline {subsection}{\numberline {3.1}Scope}{1}} \@writefile{toc}{\contentsline {subsection}{\numberline {2.2}Approval Process}{2}}
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\@writefile{toc}{\contentsline {section}{\numberline {4}Cross Referencing}{1}} \@writefile{toc}{\contentsline {subsection}{\numberline {3.1}Scope}{2}}
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\@writefile{toc}{\contentsline {section}{\numberline {4}Cross Referencing}{2}}
\@writefile{toc}{\contentsline {section}{\numberline {5}Standard in detail: EN298}{2}} \@writefile{toc}{\contentsline {section}{\numberline {5}Standard in detail: EN298}{2}}
\@writefile{toc}{\contentsline {section}{\numberline {6}Standard in detail: UL1998}{2}} \@writefile{toc}{\contentsline {section}{\numberline {6}Standard in detail: UL1998}{2}}
\@writefile{toc}{\contentsline {section}{\numberline {7}Standard in detail: EN230}{2}} \@writefile{toc}{\contentsline {section}{\numberline {7}Standard in detail: EN230}{2}}

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entering extended mode entering extended mode
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**paper.tex **paper.tex
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LaTeX2e <2005/12/01> LaTeX2e <2009/09/24>
Babel <v3.8h> and hyphenation patterns for english, usenglishmax, dumylang, noh Babel <v3.8l> and hyphenation patterns for english, usenglishmax, dumylang, noh
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@ -278,12 +279,12 @@ File: pgfmodulematrix.code.tex 2008/01/15 (rcs-revision 1.1)
hs.code.tex hs.code.tex
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7
standards/standards.tex
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@ -20,6 +20,13 @@ are reviewed.
\section{Introduction} \section{Introduction}
\subsection{Product Life Cycle} \subsection{Product Life Cycle}
\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=300pt,keepaspectratio=true]{./standards/prod_life.jpg}
% prod_life.jpg: 620x421 pixel, 72dpi, 21.87x14.85 cm, bb=0 0 620 421
\caption{Product Life Cycle with Competent Body Approval and Surveillance}
\label{fig:prod_life}
\end{figure}
difffernent areas difffernent areas
EN61508 REQ to SPEC to DESIGN EN61508 REQ to SPEC to DESIGN

25
standards/standards_paper.tex
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@ -4,29 +4,44 @@
\ifthenelse {\boolean{paper}} \ifthenelse {\boolean{paper}}
{ {
\begin{abstract} \begin{abstract}
This chapter describes the legal frameworks and standards organisations This paper describes the legal frameworks and standards organisations
that exist in Europe and North America. that exist in Europe and North America.
Some specific standards (that the author has experience with directly) Some specific standards (that the author has experience with directly)
are reviewed. are reviewed.
\end{abstract} \end{abstract}
} }
{} {
This chapter describes the legal frameworks and standards organisations
that exist in Europe and North America.
Some specific standards (that the author has experience with directly)
are reviewed.
}
\section{Introduction} \section{Introduction}
\subsection{Product Life Cycle} \subsection{Product Life Cycle}
i \begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=300pt,keepaspectratio=true]{./prod_life.jpg}
% prod_life.jpg: 620x421 pixel, 72dpi, 21.87x14.85 cm, bb=0 0 620 421
\caption{Product Life Cycle with Competent Body Approval and Surveillance}
\label{fig:prod_life}
\end{figure}
difffernent areas difffernent areas
EN61508 REQ to SPEC to DESIGN EN61508 REQ to SPEC to DESIGN
EN298 EN298
DESIGN TO PRODUCT DESIGN TO
TESTING (EMC PRODUCT
FM FM
PRODUCT VERIFICATION MONITORING PRODUCT VERIFICATION MONITORING
NEW A PRODUCT LIFE CYCLE IMAGE WITH AN EULER DIAGRMA FOR THE DIFFERENT STANDARDS
Different agencies - approval is testing of new product Different agencies - approval is testing of new product
and verification to standard - manufacturing overwatch / supervision and verification to standard - manufacturing overwatch / supervision
word on tip of tounge - word on tip of tounge -