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Edit into CH3 from AF and Chris Garrett:wq

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mybib.bib
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@ -927,6 +927,13 @@ ISSN={1530-2059},}
YEAR = "1995"
}
@BOOK{cbds,
AUTHOR = "Chris~Price",
TITLE = "Computer-Based Diagnostic Systems ISBN 3-540-76198-5",
PUBLISHER = "Springer Practitioner series",
YEAR = "1999"
}
@BOOK{sem,
AUTHOR = "J.~Woodcock,~Martin~Loomes",
TITLE = "Software Engineering Mathematics ISBN 0-273-02673-9",

141
submission_thesis/CH1_introduction/copy.tex
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@ -18,18 +18,26 @@ Static testing is at the theoretical, or design level, and involves
looking at failure scenarios and trying to predict how systems would react.
%
This thesis deals with one area of static testing, that of Failure Mode Effects Analysis (FMEA)~\cite{iec60812}, a commonly
used technique that is legally mandatory for a wide range of equipment certification.
used technique that is a legal requirement %mandatory
for a wide range of equipment certification.
The ability to assess the safety of man made equipment has been a concern
The ability to assess the safety of machinery %man made equipment
has been a concern
since the dawn of the industrial age~\cite{usefulinfoengineers,steamboilers}.
%
% The philosophy behind safety measures has progressed
% over time and by World War Two we began to see concepts such as `no single component failure should cause
% a dangerous system failure'~\cite{boffin} emerging~\cite{echoesofwar}[Ch.13].
The philosophy behind safety measures has progressed
with time and by World War Two we began to see concepts such as `no single component failure should cause
a dangerous system failure'~\cite{boffin} emerging~\cite{echoesofwar}[Ch.13].
over time and by World War Two concepts such as `no single component failure should cause
a dangerous system failure'~\cite{boffin} emerged~\cite{echoesofwar}[Ch.13].
%
Concepts such as these allow us to apply
objective criteria to safety assessment. We can extend the `no~single~failure' concept
to double or even multiple failures being unacceptable as the cause of dangerous states.
Concepts such as these allow
objective criteria of safety assessment.
%
The `no~single~failure' concept can be extended
to double or even multiple failures being
unacceptable as the cause of dangerous states.
%
The concept of a double failure causing a dangerous condition being forbidden
can be found in the legally binding European standard EN298\footnote{EN298:2003 became
@ -41,29 +49,31 @@ in 2006~\cite{en298}.
More sophisticated statistically based standards, i.e EN61508~\cite{en61508} and variants thereof,
are based on statistical thresholds for the frequency of dangerous failures.
%
We could state, for instance, that we can tolerate an `acceptable' maximum number of
dangerous failures per billion hours of operation.
For instance, acceptable maximum numbers of
dangerous failures per billion hours of operation could be stated.
%
We can then broadly categorise orders of failure rates into Safety Integrity Levels (SIL)~\cite{scsh}.
% We can then broadly categorise orders of failure rates into Safety Integrity Levels (SIL)~\cite{scsh}.
Orders of failure rates can then be broadly categorised into Safety Integrity Levels (SIL)~\cite{scsh}.
%
So for a maximum of 10 potentially dangerous failures per billion hours of operation we assign a SIL level of 4,
So for a maximum of 10 potentially dangerous failures per billion hours of operation a SIL level of 4 is assigned,
for 100 a SIL level of 3, and so on in powers of ten.
%
If we can determine a SIL rating,
we can match it against a risk.
If SIL ratings can be determined,
they can be matched against given risks.
%
The more dangerous the consequences of failure
the higher SIL rating we can demand for it.
the higher the SIL rating. % we can demand for it.
%
A band-saw with one operative may require a SIL rating of 1,
but something with higher potential for harm to a larger number of people,
such as a nuclear power-station or air-liner,
with far greater consequences on dangerous failure
may require a SIL rating of 4.
%but something with higher potential for harm to a larger number of people,
but systems
such as nuclear power-stations or air-liners,
with far greater consequences on dangerous failure,
may require a SIL ratings of 4.
%
That is while a low incidence of failure may be tolerable on a band-saw,
extremely low incidences of failure would be tolerable in a nuclear plant.
SIL ratings provide another objective yardstick for the measurement of system safety.
%That is while a low incidence of failure may be tolerable on a band-saw,
%extremely low incidences of failure would be tolerable in a nuclear plant.
%SIL ratings provide another objective yardstick for the measurement of system safety.
%governing failure conditions and determining risk levels associated with systems.
All of these risk assessment techniques are based on variations of %on the theme of
@ -94,13 +104,13 @@ firstly looking at a variety of common electronic circuits and then at electroni
}
\section{Motivation}
The motivation for this study came from two sources, one academic (my Software Engineering MSc project) and the other
practical (as a practising embedded software engineer working with FMEA on safety critical burner systems).
The motivation for this study came from two sources, one academic (the author's Software Engineering MSc project) and the other
practical (the author is a practising embedded software engineer working with FMEA on safety critical burner systems).
%
% AF does not think the paragraph below should be included 12JAN2013
\paragraph{MSc Project: Euler/Spider diagram Editor.}
I had recently completed an
MSc and my project was to create an Euler/Spider~Diagram~\cite{howse:spider} editor in Java.
The author had recently completed an
MSc and the project was to create an Euler/Spider~Diagram~\cite{howse:spider} editor in Java.
This editor allowed the user to draw Euler/Spider diagrams, and could then
represent these as abstract---i.e. mathematical---definitions.
%
@ -110,25 +120,28 @@ to formal languages for software specification.
An added attraction for using spider diagrams was that they could be used in
proving logic~\cite{stapleton:atpieds} and theorems~\cite{theoremflower,Fish200553} in an intuitive way.
%
Because of my daily work exposure to FMEA,
I started thinking of ways to apply formal languages and spider diagrams to
Because of the author's daily work exposure to FMEA,
%I started thinking
it was natural to think
of ways to apply formal languages and spider diagrams to
failure mode analysis.
%
%
\paragraph{European Safety Requirements increase in scope and complexity.}
At work---which consisted of designing, testing, building and writing embedded `C' and assembly language code for safety critical
industrial burners---we were faced with a new and daunting requirement.
industrial burners---the design team was faced with a new and daunting requirement.
Conformance to the latest European standard, EN298~\cite{en298}.
%
It appeared to ask for the impossible:
not only did it require the usual safety measures (self checking of ROM and RAM, watchdog processors with separate clock sources, EMC and the
not only did it require the usual safety measures (self-checking of ROM and RAM, watchdog processors with separate clock sources, EMC and the
triple fail safe control of valves), it had one new clause in it that had far reaching consequences.
%
It stated that in the event of a failure, where the controller had gone into a `lockout~state'--- a state where the controller
applies all possible safety measures to stop fuel entering the burner---it was not permitted to % could not
become dangerous should another fault occur.
%
In short this meant we had to be able to deal with double failures.
In short this meant %we had to be able to
dealing with double failures.
%
Any of the components that could, in failing, create a dangerous state were already
documented and approved using failure mode effects analysis (FMEA).
@ -149,44 +162,66 @@ analysis of identical circuitry was performed many times.
%
\subsection{Modularising/De-Composing FMEA: Initial concepts.} % and augmenting this with concepts from Euler/Spider Diagrams.}
%
In the field of digital signal processing there is an algorithm that revolutionised
access to frequency analysis of digital samples called the Fast Fourier transform (FFT)~\cite{fftoriginal}.
This took the discrete Fourier transform (DFT), and applied de-composition to its
mesh of (often repeated) complex number calculations~\cite{fpodsadsp}[Ch.8].
%
By doing this it broke the computing order of complexity problem down from having a polynomial %n exponential
By doing this it broke the computing order of complexity down from having a polynomial %n exponential
%order
to logarithmic order~\cite{ctw}[pp.401-3].
I wondered if this thinking could be applied to the state explosion problems encountered in FMEA.
%
The author wondered if this thinking could be applied to the state explosion problems encountered in FMEA.
%
%Following the concept of de-composing a problem, and thus simplifying the state explosion---using the thinking behind
%the fast Fourier transform (FFT)~\cite{fpodsadsp}[Ch.8], which takes a complex intermeshed series of real and imaginary number calculations
%and by de-composing them, simplifies the problem.
My reasoning was that if we analysed %were we to analyse
the problem in small modules, from the bottom-up following the FFT example, we could apply
checking for all double failure scenarios.
%
Once these first modules were analysed---we now call them {\fgs}---we could determine the symptoms of failure for them.
Using the symptoms of failure, we could now treat these modules as components in their own right---or {\dcs}---and use them to build higher level
{\fgs}. Higher and higher levels of {\fgs} could be built until we had a hierarchy
representing a failure mode model for the system.
% My reasoning was that if we analysed %were we to analyse
% the problem in small modules, from the bottom-up following the FFT example, we could apply
% checking for all double failure scenarios.
The authors reasoning was that if %were we to analyse
the problem were analysed in small modules, from the bottom-up following the FFT example,
checking for all double failure scenarios could have been applied.
%
Because this is modular, %we can apply double simultaneous failure mode checking; and as %because
double simultaneous failure mode checking can be applied as
% Once these first modules were analysed---we now call them {\fgs}---we could determine the symptoms of failure for them.
% Using the symptoms of failure, we could now treat these modules as components in their own right---or {\dcs}---and use them to build higher level
% {\fgs}. Higher and higher levels of {\fgs} could be built until we had a hierarchy
% representing a failure mode model for the system.
Once these first modules were analysed---now called {\fgs}---the symptoms of failure could be determined for them.
%
Using the symptoms of failure, these modules could be treated as components in their own right---or {\dcs}---and used to build higher level
{\fgs}.
%
Higher and higher levels of {\fgs} could be built until a hierarchy
representing a failure mode model for the complete system had been created.
%
%Because this is modular, %we can apply double simultaneous failure mode checking; and as %because
Double simultaneous failure mode checking can be applied as
the number of components
in each {\fg} is typically small; we therefore avoid state explosion problems. % for the general case. % AF says `in the general case' here 12JAN2013
in each {\fg} is typically small; state explosion problems are thus avoided. % for the general case. % AF says `in the general case' here 12JAN2013
%
%
If we apply
double checking all the way up the hierarchy we can guarantee to have considered
every double simultaneous failure of all components in a system.
% If we apply
% double checking all the way up the hierarchy we can guarantee to have considered
% every double simultaneous failure of all components in a system.
If
double checking is applied all the way up the hierarchy,
%we can guarantee to have considered
all possible
double simultaneous failures in a system can be guaranteed to have been considered.
%
This means, as a fortunate by-product, that many multiple as well as double
failures would be analysed, but because failure modes are traceable from the base components to the top level---or system---failure modes,
these relationships can be held in a traversable data structure.
%
If held in a traversable data structure we can apply automated methods to search for all the combinations of multiple failure modes
within the model that had been analysed. Because of this, it will not always %it may not
% If held in a traversable data structure we can apply automated methods to search for all the combinations of multiple failure modes
% within the model that had been analysed.
If held in a traversable data structure automated methods can be applied to search for all the combinations of multiple failure modes
throughout the model being analysed.
%
Because of this, it will not always %it may not
be necessary to apply double checking
at all higher levels in the analysis hierarchy, to achieve complete double failure coverage.
%
@ -239,21 +274,23 @@ FMEA which solves the problems of:
To support this, worked examples using the new methodology were created and the work published and presented to
IET safety conferences. % in 2011~\cite{syssafe2011} and 2012~\cite{syssafe2012}.
%
The development of FMMD, starting with a critique of FMEA and a wish-list for a better methodology,
The development of FMMD, starting with a critique of FMEA and a ``wish-list'' for a better methodology,
was presented to the IET System safety conference in 2011,~\cite{syssafe2011}.
%
FMEA, currently cannot integrate software models into its hardware failure mode models~\cite{sfmea,modelsfmea,embedsfmea,sfmeainterface}.
FMEA, currently cannot integrate software models into its hardware failure mode models~\cite{sfmea,modelsfmea,embedsfmea,sfmeainterface}, but
%
FMMD can use the existing structure of functional software, in conjunction
with contract programming, to model software and this concept was presented to the IET System safety conference in 2012~\cite{syssafe2012}.
with contract programming to model software;
%and
this concept was presented to the IET System safety conference in 2012~\cite{syssafe2012}.
\paragraph{Overview---quick guide to contents of the thesis.}
\paragraph{Overview of the thesis.}
Chapter~\ref{sec:chap2} examines the current state of FMEA based methodologies, Chapter~\ref{sec:chap3}
examines the benefits and drawbacks of these methodologies
and proposes a detailed wish list for an ideal FMEA technique.
Chapter~\ref{sec:chap4} proposes Failure Mode Modular de-composition (FMMD)---a modularised variant
of FMEA designed to address the points in the detailed wish list.
Chapter~\ref{sec:chap5} provides worked examples using common electronic circuits.
Chapter~\ref{sec:chap5} provides worked examples using selected electronic circuits.
Chapter~\ref{sec:chap6} gives two examples of integrated software and electronic systems analysed using FMMD.
Metrics and evaluation, along with an example showing double simultaneous failure analysis,
are provided in Chapter~\ref{sec:chap7}, with a conclusion and further work in Chapter~\ref{sec:chap8}.

237
submission_thesis/CH2_FMEA/copy.tex
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@ -329,7 +329,8 @@ include the failure mode DRIFT. EN298 does not include this, mainly because it i
that effectively side step that problem.
%
For this study we will take the conservative view from EN298, and consider the failure
modes for a generic resistor to be both OPEN and SHORT.
modes for a generic resistor to be both OPEN and SHORT. We use the function $fm$
to return a set of failure modes,
i.e.
\label{ros}
$$ fm(R) = \{ OPEN, SHORT \} . $$
@ -519,7 +520,7 @@ $$ fm(OPAMP) = \{ LOW, HIGH, NOOP, LOW_{slew} \} $$
The EN298 pinouts failure mode technique cannot reveal failure modes due to internal failures,
and that is why is misses the $LOW_{slew}$.
and that is why it misses the $LOW_{slew}$.
%
The FMD-91 entries for op-amps are not directly usable as
component {\fms} in FMEA or FMMD and require interpretation.
@ -615,7 +616,8 @@ that reports its readings via RS-232.
\subsection{FMEA Example: Milli-volt reader}
Let us perform an FMEA and consider how one of its resistors failing could affect
it.
For the sake of example let us choose resistor R1 in the OP-AMP gain circuitry.
%For the sake of example
Let us choose resistor R1 in the OP-AMP gain circuitry.
% \begin{figure}
% \centering
% \includegraphics[width=175pt]{./mvamp.png}
@ -640,8 +642,8 @@ For the sake of example let us choose resistor R1 in the OP-AMP gain circuitry.
\fmeagloss
The analysis above has given us a result for one failure scenario i.e.
for one component failure mode.
The analysis above has given us a result for % one failure %scenario i.e.
one single component failure mode.
A complete FMEA report would have to contain an entry
for each failure mode of all the components in the system under investigation.
%
@ -716,11 +718,11 @@ we can hop from module to module eliminating working modules, until we find the
failure~\cite{maikowski}.
%
The rationale and work-culture of those tasked to
perform FMEA are generally personnel who have performed fault finding.
perform FMEA are generally personnel who have performed fault finding~\cite{cbds}[p.97].
%
FMEA is a theoretical discipline.
FMEA is a theoretical discipline. %AF does not like this!
%
It would be very unusual to build a circuit and then simulate
component failure modes.
@ -749,8 +751,11 @@ For a more complete analysis, we should perhaps examine each component {\fm} alo
forwards and backwards from the placement
of the component exhibiting the {\fm} under investigation.
%
Also, whether following the effects through the signal path {\em only} is acceptable, and instead
would looking at its effect on all other components in the system be necessary?
% Also, whether following the effects through the signal path {\em only} is acceptable, and instead
% would looking at its effect on all other components in the system be necessary?
Is following the effects of a {\fm} {\em only} through the components along the signal path acceptable?
This could easily ignore side effects; this leads onto the idea of
looking at a {\fm}'s effects on all other components in the system. % be necessary?
%is a matter for debate.
%
In practise, a compromise is made between the amount of time/money that can be spent
@ -930,14 +935,17 @@ statistical estimates of the equipment reliability.
\fmmdglossBS
A forward search starts with possible failure causes
and uses logic and reasoning to determine system level outcomes.
Forward search types of fault analysis is said to be `inductive'.
%
Forward search types of fault analysis are said to be `inductive'.
%
A backward search starts with (undesirable) system level events and
works back down to potential causes using de-composition
of the system and logic.
FMEA based methodologies are forward searches\cite{Lutz:1997:RAU:590564.590572} and top down
methodologies such as FTA~\cite{nucfta,nasafta} are backward searches.
Forward search types of fault analysis is said to be `deductive'.
%
Forward search types of fault analysis are said to be `deductive'.
%
Backward (or bottom-up) searches are said to be inductive (i.e. the results of failure are
induced).
@ -946,7 +954,7 @@ induced).
\paragraph{Reasoning distance.}
\label{reasoningdistance}
\fmmdglossRD
A reasoning distance is the number of stages of logic and reasoning used
A reasoning distance, is defined here, as the number of stages of logic and reasoning used
in {\fm} analysis to map a failure cause to its potential outcomes.
%
In our basic FMEA example in section~\ref{basicfmea}
@ -966,9 +974,16 @@ this would give us the maximum reasoning distance.
%
We term this the exhaustive FMEA case.
%does not
The exhaustive~reasoning~distance would be
the sum of the number of failure modes, against all other components
in that system.
% The exhaustive~reasoning~distance would be
% the sum of the number of failure modes, against all other components
% in that system.
The exhaustive~reasoning~distance for a particular component
would be to multiply
the number of failure modes it has by the number of remaining components
in the system.
%
The exhaustive reasoning~distance for a system would be the
the sum of these multiplications for all the components it contains.
%
If the milli-volt reader had say 100 components, with three failure modes each, this
would give an exhaustive reasoning distance---for single failure analysis---of 3 * 100 * 99.
@ -1007,12 +1022,12 @@ of a failure mode with all other components in a system). Or in other words,
---we would need to look at all possible failure scenarios.
%to do this completely (all failure modes against all components).
This is represented in the equation below, %~\ref{eqn:fmea_state_exp},
where $N$ is the total number of components in the system, and
where $N$ is the total number of components in the system, $RD_{single}$ is the reasoning~distance and
$f$ is the number of failure modes per component.
%
\begin{equation}
\label{eqn:fmea_single}
N.(N-1).f % \\
RD_{single} = N.(N-1).f % \\
%(N^2 - N).f
\end{equation}
%
@ -1029,10 +1044,10 @@ scenarios\footnote{Certain double failure scenarios are already legal
requirements---The European Gas burner standard (EN298:2003)---demands the checking of
double failure scenarios (for burner lock-out scenarios).}
(two components failing within a given time frame) and the order becomes $O(N^3)$.
Where $RD_{double}$ is the reasoning~distance for double failure scenarios:
\begin{equation}
\label{eqn:fmea_double}
N.(N-1).(N-2).f % \\
RD_{double} = N.(N-1).(N-2).f . % \\
%(N^2 - N).f
\end{equation}
@ -1096,12 +1111,15 @@ number for the germane component {\fm}.
%
Fixing problems with the highest RPN number
will return most cost benefit~\cite{bfmea}.
%
An example PFMEA report is presented in table~\ref{tbl:pfmeareport}.
% benign example of PFMEA in CARS - make something up.
\subsection{PFMEA Example}
\begin{table}[ht]
\label{tbl:pfmeareport}
\caption{FMEA Calculations} % title of Table
%\centering % used for centering table
\centering % used for centering table
\begin{tabular}{|| l | l | c | c | l ||} \hline
\textbf{Failure Mode} & \textbf{P} & \textbf{Cost} & \textbf{Symptom} & \textbf{RPN} \\ \hline \hline
relay 1 n/c & $1*10^{-5}$ & 38.0 & indicators fail & 0.00038 \\ \hline
@ -1168,8 +1186,9 @@ a particular failure~mode occurring within a component~\cite{fmd91}.
\textbf{FMECA $\beta$ value.}
The second probability factor $\beta$, is the probability that the failure mode
will cause a given system failure.
This corresponds to `Bayesian' probability, given a particular
component failure mode, the probability of a given system level failure.
%
This corresponds to `Bayesian' probability, i.e. given a particular
component failure mode, the probability of a given system level failure~\cite{nucfta}[VI-19].
\textbf{FMECA `t' Value.}
The time that a system will be operating for, or the working life time of the product is
@ -1324,9 +1343,9 @@ and is normally expressed as a percentage~\cite{en61508}[2-Annex C].
%
$\Sigma\lambda_{DD}$ represents
the percentage of dangerous detected base component failure modes, and
$\Sigma\lambda_D$ the total number of dangerous base component failure modes.
$\Sigma\lambda_D$ the total number of dangerous base component failure modes,
%
$$ DiagnosticCoverage = \Sigma\lambda_{DD} / \Sigma\lambda_D $$
$$ DiagnosticCoverage = \Sigma\lambda_{DD} / \Sigma\lambda_D . $$
\fmmdglossFMEDA
%
%
@ -1337,7 +1356,7 @@ safe detected base component failure modes,
and $\Sigma\lambda_S$ the total number of safe base component failure modes,
is given as
%
$$ SF = \frac{\Sigma\lambda_{SD}}{\Sigma\lambda_S} $$
$$ SF = \frac{\Sigma\lambda_{SD}}{\Sigma\lambda_S} . $$
%
%
%
@ -1346,9 +1365,9 @@ $$ SF = \frac{\Sigma\lambda_{SD}}{\Sigma\lambda_S} $$
A key concept in FMEDA is Safe Failure Fraction (SFF).
This is the ratio of safe and dangerous detected failures
against all safe and dangerous failure probabilities.
Again this is usually expressed as a percentage.
Again this is usually expressed as a percentage,
%
$$ SFF = \big( \Sigma\lambda_S + \Sigma\lambda_{DD} \big) / \big( \Sigma\lambda_S + \Sigma\lambda_D \big) $$
$$ SFF = \big( \Sigma\lambda_S + \Sigma\lambda_{DD} \big) / \big( \Sigma\lambda_S + \Sigma\lambda_D \big) . $$
%
SFF determines how proportionately fail-safe a system is, not how reliable it is.
A weakness in this philosophy; adding extra safe failures (even unused ones) would improve the apparent SFF, this
@ -1389,7 +1408,7 @@ judged to be in critical sections of the product.
This could be considered as a design check method, deliberately
looking for weaknesses at a theoretical level.
%
\subsection{DESIGN FMEA: Safety Critical Approvals FMEA}
%\subsection{DESIGN FMEA: Safety Critical Approvals FMEA}
%
% \begin{figure}[h]
% \centering
@ -1402,7 +1421,7 @@ looking for weaknesses at a theoretical level.
\begin{itemize}
\item Impossible to look at all component failures let alone apply FMEA exhaustively/rigorously.
\item In practice, failure scenarios for critical sections are contested, and either justified or extra safety measures implemented.
\item Often Meeting notes or minutes only. Unusual for detailed technical arguments to be documented.
\item Often meeting notes or minutes only. Unusual for detailed technical arguments to be documented.
\end{itemize}
%
%
@ -1415,10 +1434,14 @@ looking for weaknesses at a theoretical level.
\label{fig:component_fm_rel_ana_subj_obj}
\end{figure}
%
Returning to the FMEA model, we now show that the data relationships shown in
Returning to the FMEA model, the data relationships shown in
figure~\ref{fig:component_fm_rel_ana} hold for the five variants of FMEA discussed.
We can however, extend this
with subjective failure mode symptoms (see figure~\ref{fig:component_fm_rel_ana_subj_obj}).
%
This could be extended, if it is considered that the system level symptoms have subjective
interpretations.
%
With the addition of subjective failure mode symptoms, the UML model for FMEA gains an attribute
(see figure~\ref{fig:component_fm_rel_ana_subj_obj}).
%
The UML data model reveals some undefined qualities of FMEA.
These raise questions and are discussed below.
@ -1426,29 +1449,36 @@ These raise questions and are discussed below.
\paragraph{Which, or how many components should we check for each {\fm} entry?}
For instance a given {\fm} will have its effect measured in relation
to some of the components in the system.
We could choose these components by stipulating several criteria,
relating this to the signal path or adjacency in the electronic circuit, among which are:
%
These components can be chosen by stipulating several criteria,
relating this to the signal path or adjacency in the electronic circuit,
potential strategies are listed below:
%
\begin{itemize}
\item look at all components electronically adjacent (i.e. connected to the affected component)
\item Look at all components connected (as above) and those one removed (those connected to those connected to the affected component)
\item Look at components forward of the {\fm} in the signal path.
\item Look at all components in the signal path.
\item Look at all components in the signal path including those one connection removed on.
\item Look at all components in the system.
\item look at all components electronically adjacent (i.e. connected to the affected component),
\item Look at all components connected (as above) and those one removed (those connected to those connected to the affected component),
\item Look at components forward of the {\fm} in the signal path,
\item Look at all components in the signal path,
\item Look at all components in the signal path including those one connection removed,
\item Look at all components in the system (i.e. XFMEA).
\end{itemize}
No current variant of FMEA gives any guidelines for which, or how many components to check for a given {\fm}.
\fmmdglossRD
\paragraph{FMEA gives us objective system level failures/symptoms, what do we do with subjective or contextual failures resulting from this?}
\paragraph{FMEA gives us objective system level failures/symptoms.} %, what do we do with subjective or contextual failures resulting from this?}
%
The two more modern variants of FMEA, FMECA and FMEDA start to address the problem of subjective/contextual
failure symptoms of a system.
%
FMEDA classifies them as dangerous or safe failures.
%
FMECA gives us a statistically biased criticality level.
In both of these methodologies however, there is no formal stage where we map from an objective to subjective
system failure, the processes are intertwined with the basic analysis itself.
%
In both of these methodologies however, there is no formal stage where objective to subjective
system failures are mapped, this processes seems to be intertwined with the basic analysis itself.
%
%
\paragraph{Re-use potential of an FMEA report.}
%
Each {\fm} entry in an FMEA report should have a reasoning or comments field.
This should provide a guide to someone re-examining, or trying to re-use results
on a similar project.
@ -1464,121 +1494,6 @@ Because FMEA is traditionally performed with one entry per component {\fm}, full
are rare.
This means that re-use, review and checking of traditional analysis must often be started from `cold'.
%
% MOVED TO CH3: 15MAR2013
%
% \section{Conclusions on current FMEA Methodologies}
%
% %% FOCUS
% The focus of this chapter %literature review
% is to establish the current practice and applications
% of FMEA.
% %, and to examine its strengths and weaknesses.
% %% GOAL
% Its
% goal is to identify central issues and to criticise and assess the current
% FMEA methodologies.
% %% PERSPECTIVE
% The perspective of the author, is as a practitioner of static failure mode analysis techniques
% concerning approval of product
% to European safety standards, both the prescriptive~\cite{en298,en230} and statistical~\cite{en61508}.
% A second perspective is that of a software engineer trained to use formal methods.
% Examining FMEA methodologies for mathematical properties, influenced by
% formal methods applied to software, should provide a perspective not traditionally considered.
% %% COVERAGE
% The literature reviewed, has been restricted to published books, European safety standards (as examples
% of current safety measures applied), and traditional research, from journal and conference papers.
% %% ORGANISATION
% The review is organised by concept, that is, FMEA can be applied to hardware, software, software~interfacing and
% to multiple failure scenarios etc. Methodologies related to FMEA are briefly covered for the sake of context.
% %% AUDIENCE
% % Well duh! PhD supervisors and examiners....
%
% % \subsection{Related Methodologies}
% % FTA --- HAZOP --- ALARP --- Event Tree Analysis --- bow tie concept
% % \subsection{Hardware FMEA (HFMEA)}
% % \subsection{Multiple Failure scenarios and FMEA}
% % \subsection{Software FMEA (SFMEA)}
%
% \paragraph{Current work on Software FMEA}
%
% SFMEA usually does not seek to integrate
% hardware and software models, but to perform
% FMEA on the software in isolation~\cite{procsfmea}.
% %
% Work has been performed using databases
% to track the relationships between variables
% and system failure modes~\cite{procsfmeadb}, to %work has been performed to
% introduce automation into the FMEA process~\cite{appswfmea} and to provide code analysis
% automation~\cite{modelsfmea}. Although the SFMEA and hardware FMEAs are performed separately,
% some schools of thought aim for Fault Tree Analysis (FTA)~\cite{nasafta,nucfta} (top down - deductive)
% and FMEA (bottom-up inductive)
% to be performed on the same system to provide insight into the
% software hardware/interface~\cite{embedsfmea}.
% %
% Although this
% would give a better picture of the failure mode behaviour, it
% is by no means a rigorous approach to tracing errors that may occur in hardware
% through to the top (and therefore ultimately controlling) layer of software.
%
% \paragraph{Current FMEA techniques are not suitable for software}
%
% The main FMEA methodologies are all based on the concept of taking
% base component {\fms}, and translating them into system level events/failures~\cite{sfmea,sfmeaa}.
% %
% In a complicated system, mapping a component failure mode to a system level failure
% will mean a long reasoning distance; that is to say the actions of the
% failed component will have to be traced through
% several sub-systems, gauging its effects with and on other components.
% %
% With software at the higher levels of these sub-systems,
% we have yet another layer of complication.
% %
% %In order to integrate software, %in a meaningful way
% %we need to re-think the
% %FMEA concept of simply mapping a base component failure to a system level event.
% %
% SFMEA regards, in place of hardware components, the variables used by the programs to be their equivalent~\cite{procsfmea}.
% The failure modes of these variables, are that they could become erroneously over-written,
% calculated incorrectly (due to a mistake by the programmer, or a fault in the micro-processor on which it is running), or
% external influences such as
% ionising radiation causing bits to be erroneously altered.
%
%
% \paragraph{FMEA and Modularity}
% From the 1940's onwards, software has evolved from a simple procedural languages (i.e. assembly language/Fortran~\cite{f77} call return)
% to structured programming ( C~\cite{DBLP:books/ph/KernighanR88}, pascal etc) and then to object oriented models (Java C++...).
% FMEA has undergone no such evolution.
% %
% In a world where sensor systems, often including embedded software components, are brought in to
% create complex systems, FMEA still follows a rigid {\bc} {\fm} to system level error model,
% that is only suitable for simple electro mechanical systems.
%
%
%
% %
%
% %
% % MAYBE MOVE THIS TO CH3, FMEA CRITICISM
% % 30JAN2013
% %
%
% \subsection{Where FMEA is now.}
% FMEA useful tool for basic safety --- provides statistics on safety where field data impractical ---
% very good with single failure modes linked to top level events.
% FMEA has become part of the safety critical and safety certification industries.
% %
% SFMEA is in its infancy, and there are corresponding gaps in
% certification for software, EN61508~\cite{en61508}, recommends hardware redundancy architectures in conjunction
% with FMEDA for hardware: for software it recommends language constraints and quality procedures
% but no inductive fault finding technique.
% %
% FMEA has adapted from a cost saving exercise for mass produced items~\cite{bfmea,generic_automotive_fmea_6034891}, to incorporating statistical techniques
% (FMECA) to allowing for self diagnostic mitigation (FMEDA).
% %
% However, it is still based on the concept of single component failures mapped to top~level/system~failures.
% All these FMEA based methodologies have the following short comings:
% \begin{itemize}
% \item Impossible to integrate Software and hardware models,
% \item State explosion problem exacerbated by increasing complexity due to density of modern electronics,
% \item Impossibility to consider all multiple component failure modes~\cite{FMEAmultiple653556}
% \end{itemize}
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%

135
submission_thesis/CH3_FMEA_criticism/copy.tex
View File

@ -9,20 +9,23 @@ critical light.
Chapter~\ref{sec:chap2} introduced concepts underlying FMEA, and this chapter seeks to
use these concepts to determine the drawbacks and advantages in its current usage.
%
Legally mandatory FMEA for a large proportion of safety critical systems
Legally mandatory FMEA, for a large proportion of safety critical systems
in Europe and the USA, at the very least means that experienced
engineers have to discuss a system at a level of detail starting
at {\bc} {\fms}.
\fmmdglossBC
\fmodegloss
%
This undoubtedly reveals dangers inherent in designs and makes
our lives safer. This chapter aims to look for the deficiencies in current FMEA processes, to probe for weaknesses
and look for ways in which it could be performed better and more efficiently.
A major problem is with the scope of examination---or required reasoning distance---to apply
for FMEA analysis.
A major problem is with the scope of
examination---i.e. which/how~many components should we check against a particular failure mode---to
apply for FMEA analysis.
%
Checking all combinations quickly leads to a state explosion problem:
limiting the number of components to check for against a given {\bc}
defining limits for the number of components to check for against a given {\bc}
{\fm} could address this.
%
The difficulties of integrating software
@ -30,6 +33,7 @@ and hardware in FMEA failure models mean that FMEA is showing its age: designed
in an era of simple electro-mechanical systems, the modern world with ubiquitous
cheap micro-controllers and processors mean that most of today’s systems are
now software/hardware hybrids.
\fmeagloss
%
Even analogue electronics, with the advent of surface mount and miniature components,
@ -40,12 +44,13 @@ of the era when FMEA methodologies were invented.
With FMEA it is very difficult to perform %impossibility of performing
meaningful
multiple failure analysis.
multiple failure analysis~\cite{FMEAmultiple653556,maikowski}.
The main reasons for this are that in electronics, each failure
can introduce a circuit topology change.
can introduce a circuit topology change and state explosion
means there can be extremely large numbers of double failures to check.
%
In software, in a similar vein,
one failure can influence the programmatic behaviour and decisions made
one failure can influence the programmatic behaviour and decisions made,
complicating the analysis of additional failures.
%
Dual failure analysis is required by some recent European standards~\cite{en298,en230}
@ -97,7 +102,8 @@ For instance we may have several signal input and output
structures that are repeated.
%
The failure mode behaviour of these repeated structures will be the same.
However with the {\bc} {\fm} to system level failure mode mapping
%
However with the {\bc} {\fm} to system level failure mode mapping paradigm of FMEA
work is likely to be repeated.
\subsection{FMEA does not support modularity.}
@ -146,8 +152,8 @@ precision of analysis, and for by-products of
the process such as developing diagnostic fault trees from
FMEA analyses.
\section{Reasoning Distance used to measure Comparison Complexity}
\section{Comparison Complexity}
%\section{Reasoning Distance used to measure Comparison Complexity}
\label{sec:reasoningdistance}
Traditional FMEA cannot ensure that each failure mode of all its
components are checked against any other components in the system which
@ -161,29 +167,58 @@ which components to check the effect of a component failure mode. % on.
%
Typically FMEA will be performed by following the signal path
of the component failure mode to its system level effect,
echoing fault finding reasoning.
echoing fault finding/diagnostic techniques~\cite{garrett}. % reasoning.
\fmmdglossSIGPATH
%
This is less than ideal
and it can easily miss interactions with adjacent components, that could cause
other system level symptoms.
%
Were we to compare the reasoning distance with the theoretical maximum, the sum of all failure
modes in a system, multiplied by the number of components in it, we could arrive at a maximum
reasoning distance, which we can use as a comparison complexity figure.
% Were we to compare the reasoning distance with the theoretical maximum, the sum of all failure
% modes in a system, multiplied by the number of components in it, we could arrive at a maximum
% reasoning distance, which we can use as a comparison complexity figure.
If the reasoning distance is compared with the theoretical maximum, i.e.
as defined in equation~\ref{eqn:fmea_single}, this can be used as a comparison complexity figure.
%
This figure would mean we could compare the maximum number of checks (i.e. exhaustive %rigorous
analysis) with the number actually performed.
% This figure would mean we could compare the maximum number of checks (i.e. exhaustive %rigorous
% analysis) with the number actually performed.
This figure would mean this maximum number of checks (i.e. exhaustive %rigorous
analysis) could be compared to the number actually performed.
%
In effect a yard~stick for the efficiency, in terms of work,
for a particular analysis technique.
\paragraph{The ideal of exhaustive FMEA (XFMEA).}
%
Obviously, exhaustively checking every component failure mode in a system,
against all other components is the ideal for finding all possible system level failures.
While this is impossible for all but trivial systems, we note that it should be possible
%
While this is impossible for all but trivial systems, it should be possible
for small groups of components that work together to provide a well defined function.
We could term such a group a `{\fg}'. Potentially here we have a way of de-composing
%
A small group of components performing a well defined function
is termed a `{\fg}'.
%
Potentially, using {\fgs}, is a way of de-composing
the problem and reducing the $O(N^2)$ state explosion effect
associated with XFMEA. An order $N^2$ could be seen as desirable in an automated process such as a search algorithm, but here
it is a time consuming manual process which demands experienced and highly qualified personnel.
associated with XFMEA.
%
That is if the analysis problem can be broken into smaller steps, involving
small groups of components, XFMEA could be applied within those, without
causing a debilitating state explosion effect.
%
This property is examined in section~\ref{sec:theoreticalperfmodel}.
%
% Thus there would are many smaller reasoning distances, where
% $n_i$ are small {\fgs} of the components in a system $S$
% which has a number of components $N$.
% The reasoning distance $n_i^2$
%
A comparison complexity order, or reasoning distance, of $O(N^2)$
could be seen as desirable in an automated process such as a search algorithm,
but here it is a time consuming manual process which
demands experienced and highly qualified personnel.
%
It is therefore desirable to reduce this order further.
@ -315,7 +350,8 @@ of the communications physical layer. This means the signal path will
cross several hardware/software interfaces.
\fmmdglossSIGPATH
%(figure~\ref{fig:distcon}
The failure reasoning paths for a distributed real time system, with its multiple passes of the hardware/software
The failure reasoning paths for a distributed real time system, % AF does not like this but I think its OK
with its multiple passes of the hardware/software
interface, mean traditional FMEA, for these systems,
is impossible to perform.
%
@ -339,22 +375,24 @@ utterly anachronistic in the distributed real time system environment.
\section{FMEA ---- general criticism --- conclusion}
%\subsection{FMEA - General Criticism}
A summary of deficiencies in current FMEA methodologies is listed below:
\begin{itemize}
\item FMEA type methodologies were designed for simple electro-mechanical systems of the 1940's to 1960's.
\item Reasoning Distance - component failure to system level symptom process is undefined in regard
to the components to check against each given component {\fm}.
\item State explosion - impossible to perform FMEA exhaustively. %rigorously
\item Difficult to re-use previous analysis work.
\item Very difficult to model simultaneous failures.
\item Software and hardware models are separate (if the software is modelled at all).
%\item FMEA type methodologies were designed for simple electro-mechanical systems of the 1940's to 1960's,
\item State explosion - impossible to perform FMEA exhaustively, %rigorously
\item Difficult to re-use previous analysis work,
\item Very difficult to model simultaneous/multiple failures,
\item Software and hardware models are separate (if the software is modelled at all) meaning the software interface may not be correctly modelled,
%\item reasoning distance -- component failure to system level symptom process is undefined in regard
%to the components to check against each given component {\fm},
\item FMEA methodologies are undefined in regard to which components to check against given failure modes,
%
\item Distributed real time systems are very difficult to analyse with FMEA because they typically involve many hardware/software interfaces.
\end{itemize}
Traditional forms of FMEA are no longer % fit for purpose!
of meaningful use for modern systems incorporating programmatic elements.
of meaningful use for complex modern systems especially those incorporating programmatic elements.
They were designed to analyse simple electro-mechanical systems
and even the commonplace large integrated analogue circuits (that are physically small), are
and even common place large analogue circuits (that are usually physically small), are
getting too complicated for meaningful analysis using FMEA.
%
%
@ -461,30 +499,29 @@ FMEA has become part of the safety critical and safety certification industries.
%
SFMEA is in its infancy, and there are corresponding gaps in
certification for software, EN61508~\cite{en61508} a modern standard based
on a modern variant of FMEA, recommends hardware redundancy architectures in conjunction
with FMEDA for hardware: for software it recommends language constraints and quality procedures
on a modern variant of FMEA, FMEDA, recommends hardware redundancy architectures in conjunction
with FMEDA for hardware: for software it recommends language constraints, software life cycle control, testing regimes and quality procedures
but no inductive fault finding technique.
%
FMEA has adapted from a cost saving exercise for mass produced
items~\cite{bfmea,generic_automotive_fmea_6034891}, to incorporating statistical techniques
(FMECA) to allowing for self diagnostic mitigation (FMEDA).
%
However, it is still based on the concept of single component failures mapped to top~level/system~failures.
All these FMEA based methodologies have the following short comings:
\begin{itemize}
\item Impossible to integrate Software and hardware models,
\item State explosion problem exacerbated by increasing complexity due to density of modern electronics,
\item Impossible to consider all multiple component failure modes~\cite{FMEAmultiple653556}
\end{itemize}
However, it is still based on the concept of single component failures mapped to top~level/system~failures,
with a one step analysis stage.
% All these FMEA based methodologies have the following short comings:
% \begin{itemize}
% \item Impossible to integrate Software and hardware models,
% \item State explosion problem exacerbated by increasing complexity due to density of modern electronics,
% \item Impossible to consider all multiple component failure modes~\cite{FMEAmultiple653556}
% \end{itemize}
%
%\subsection{FMEA - Better Methodology - Wish List}
%
%
\subsection{FMEA - Better Methodology - Wish List}
We now form a wish list, stating the features that we would want
%
A wish list is presented, stating the features that should exist
in an improved FMEA methodology,
\begin{itemize}
\item Must be able to analyse hybrid software/hardware systems,
@ -497,8 +534,10 @@ in an improved FMEA methodology,
\item modular --- i.e. usable in a distributed system.
% \item
\end{itemize}
%
%FMEDA is a modern extension of FMEA, in that it will allow for
%self checking features, and provides detailed recommendations for computer/software architecture,
%but
%
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%

6
submission_thesis/CH4_FMMD/copy.tex
View File

@ -1599,10 +1599,10 @@ We may now use the {\em INVAMP} {\dc} in even higher level {\fgs}.
An analysis report is generated for each stage in the FMMD % {\fg} to {\dc}
process. %\footnote
%
The UML model in figure~\ref{fig:cfg} describes a hierarchical structure similar to that of a file system with directories,
but instead of directory and file nodes, there are closely linked {\fgs} and {\dcs} pairs, that perform a similar structural functions.
The UML model in figure~\ref{fig:cfg} describes a hierarchical structure analogous to that of a file system with directories,
but instead of directory and file nodes, there are closely linked {\fg} and {\dc} pairs, that perform a similar structural function.
%
The NONINVAMP example is shown as an instance
To demonstrate the hierarchical nature of the UML model for FMMD, the NONINVAMP example is presented as an instance
diagram below (see figure~\ref{fig:instanceNONINVAMP}).
%
By tracing the component failure modes to symptoms

2
submission_thesis/CH8_Conclusion/copy.tex
View File

@ -496,7 +496,7 @@ are added to UML diagram in figure \ref{fig:cfg} are represented in figure \ref
\centering
\includegraphics[width=400pt,keepaspectratio=true]{./CH8_Conclusion/master_uml_further_work.png}
% cfg2.png: 702x464 pixel, 72dpi, 24.76x16.37 cm, bb=0 0 702 464
\caption{FMMD UML diagram, incorporating Environmental, Operational State and Inhibit gates}
\caption{FMMD UML diagram extended for potential compatibility with FTA: incorporating Environmental, Operational State and Inhibit gates}
\label{fig:cfg2}
\end{figure}

220
submission_thesis/colophon/copy.tex
View File

@ -1,114 +1,118 @@
%\renewcommand{\baselinestretch}{1.15}
\chapter*{Colophon}
% In short ``Thanks every body''!
% %
% \\
% \\
% %
% Completing my PhD %degree
% is the most intellectually challenging %% FUCK OFF ZERNIKE POLYNOMIALS WERE MORE DIFFICULT --- and actually useful unlike set theory
% activity of my first 52 years of my life! %% SET THEORY IS A LOAD OF BOLLOCKS
% %
% The best and worst moments of this journey
% have been shared with many people.
% %
% It has been a great privilege to spend several years
% visiting the Mathematics and Engineering departments of
% the University of Brighton, pushing me forward in clarity of self-expression,
% precision through mathematics, critical assessment and carefully crafted English:
% its members will always remain dear to me, and a strong influence.
% %
% %%%% IS THIS BIT A BIT MAD???? YES! 27AUG2013
% % % % Like an army recruits training Sergeant Major I found them
% % % % hard task masters at first, and then, as with realising the rationale behind training and
% % % % {\em even} parade drill, respected and grew to like them.
% % % % %
% %
% My first debt of gratitude must go to my supervisors,
% Dr. A. Fish,
% Dr. C Garret and %% TOP BLOKE
% %Dr. C Garret, %% TOP BLOKE
% Professor J. Howse. %% JAVALA LAT HUND
% %Dr. A. Fish. %% JAVALA LAT HUND
% %
% They patiently provided the guidance,
% encouragement and advice necessary for me to proceed through the
% research, consolidation and write-up phases of the PhD program,
% to prepare and present three papers to conferences~\cite{syssafe2011,syssafe2012,Clark_fastzone}
% and to complete and submit this thesis.
% \\
% \\
% %
% %
% I owe a debt of thanks to Dr J. flower, my MSc project supervisor,
% who explained that the chapter in my project documentation postulating a modular form of
% FMEA---which had %obvious
% potential for making the process %FMEA
% more efficient---was a concept worthy of being developed for a PhD and assisting me
% to present the chapter as %submit this as
% a conference paper~\cite{Clark200519}.
% %
% Further I thank her for encouraging me to apply for the PhD. %% PITY SHE DID NOT STAY ON AS MY PHD SUPERVISOR
% %
% \\
% \\
% %
% I am deeply thankful to the directors of {\etc} not only for
% funding this course, but providing training and work experience in the
% field of safety critical engineering, and giving me Friday
% afternoons to pursue my studies.
% %
% At Energy~Technology~Control, the following people gave encouragement, and
% validated the concepts for the `modular~FMEA' that I was developing, Martin~Thirsk, Colin~Talmay,
% Darren~Legge and Hazel~Anderson.
% %
% These Engineers, whose whole careers
% have been focused on the safety critical electronic/computing area,
% gave valuable time to look at and comment on my FMMD proposals.
% %
% Their comments gave me confidence that the methodology I was developing had
% %was not only an academic exercise but had
% potential practical
% applications and benefits.
% %
% The environment and context of the work at {\etc}
% was very useful for clarifying concepts relating to FMEA and
% safety; at least once a week there is a new practical case study arising
% and being discussed, be it, say, the observability of the effect of failures in an
% traditional amplifier configuration,
% or how a particular sensor could fail.
% %
% The field of industrial burner control, is highly regulated and
% is rich with practical examples of safety measures built into
% hybrid digital/electronic systems.
% %
% This has given me many opportunities to % has been % be
% apply the new methodology against `real~world' problems.
% %
% %and thus its
% %theoretical aspects have been often
% %sounded out against `real~world' problems.
% %
% These real~world failure scenarios and their proposed solutions, were often detailed in
% requirements and design documentation, submitted in support of
% safety accreditation.
% %
% I was glad to be tasked to produce many of these documents.
% %
% Again I thank {\etc}, for giving me
% these parallel tasks, which aided my studies.
% \\
% \\
% %
% %
% I wish to thank my parents, Jennifer and Richard Clark.
% % MY MUM for proof reading alot!
% I hope that this work makes you proud.
% %
% \\
% \\
In short ``Thanks every body''!
%
\\
\\
%
Completing my PhD %degree
is the most intellectually challenging %% FUCK OFF ZERNIKE POLYNOMIALS WERE MORE DIFFICULT --- and actually useful unlike set theory
activity of my first 52 years of my life! %% SET THEORY IS A LOAD OF BOLLOCKS
%
%The best and worst moments of this journey
%have been shared with many people.
%
It has been a great privilege to spend several years
visiting the Mathematics and Engineering departments of
the University of Brighton, pushing me forward in clarity of self-expression,
precision through mathematics, critical assessment and carefully crafted English:
its members will always remain dear to me. %, and I am sure, a strong influence
%on work I produce after this.
%
%%%% IS THIS BIT A BIT MAD???? YES! 27AUG2013
% % % Like an army recruits training Sergeant Major I found them
% % % hard task masters at first, and then, as with realising the rationale behind training and
% % % {\em even} parade drill, respected and grew to like them.
% % % %
%
My first debt of gratitude must go to my supervisors,
Dr. A. Fish,
Dr. C Garret and %% TOP BLOKE
%Dr. C Garret, %% TOP BLOKE
Professor J. Howse. %% LAT HUND
%Dr. A. Fish. %% JAVALA LAT HUND
%
They patiently provided the guidance,
encouragement and advice necessary for me to proceed through the
research, consolidation and write-up phases of the PhD program,
to prepare and present three papers to conferences~\cite{syssafe2011,syssafe2012,Clark_fastzone}
and to complete and submit this thesis.
\\
\\
%
%
I owe a debt of thanks to Dr J. flower, my MSc project supervisor,
who explained that the chapter in my project documentation postulating a modular form of
FMEA---which had %obvious
potential for making the process %FMEA
more efficient---was a concept worthy of being developed for a PhD and assisting me
to present the chapter as %submit this as
a conference paper~\cite{Clark200519}.
%
Further I thank her for encouraging me to apply for the PhD. %% PITY SHE DID NOT STAY ON AS MY PHD SUPERVISOR
%
\\
\\
%
I am deeply thankful to the directors of {\etc} not only for
funding this course, but providing training and work experience in the
field of safety critical engineering, and giving me Friday
afternoons to pursue my studies.
%
At Energy~Technology~Control, the following people gave encouragement, and
validated the concepts for the `modular~FMEA' that I was developing,
Martin~Thirsk,
Colin~Talmay,
Darren~Legge and
Hazel~Anderson.
%
These Engineers, whose whole careers
have been focused on the safety critical electronic/computing area,
gave valuable time to look at and comment on my FMMD proposals.
%
Their comments gave me confidence that the methodology I was developing had
%was not only an academic exercise but had
potential practical
applications and benefits.
%
The environment and context of the work at {\etc}
was very useful for clarifying concepts relating to FMEA and
safety; at least once a week there is a new practical case study arising
and being discussed, be it, say, the observability of the effect of failures in an
traditional amplifier configuration,
or how a particular sensor could fail.
%
The field of industrial burner control, is highly regulated and
is rich with practical examples of safety measures built into
hybrid digital/electronic systems.
%
This has given me many opportunities to % has been % be
apply the new methodology against `real~world' problems.
%
%and thus its
%theoretical aspects have been often
%sounded out against `real~world' problems.
%
These real~world failure scenarios and their proposed solutions, were often detailed in
requirements and design documentation, submitted in support of
safety accreditation.
%
I was glad to be tasked to produce many of these documents.
%
Again I thank {\etc}, for giving me
these parallel tasks, which aided my studies.
\\
\\
%
%
I wish to thank my parents, Jennifer and Richard Clark.
% MY MUM for proof reading alot!
I hope that this work makes you proud.
%
\\
\\
%\vspace{3cm}
\vspace{3cm}
Typeset in \LaTeX \today.
\renewcommand{\baselinestretch}{1.5}