more polishing

This commit is contained in:
Robin Clark 2013-09-25 17:58:45 +01:00
parent 695e60257d
commit 365c790459
5 changed files with 33 additions and 30 deletions

View File

@ -89,7 +89,7 @@ language={English}
@INPROCEEDINGS{bayesfrequentist,
author={Lyons, Loius.},
booktitle={Contenporary Physics: Bayes and Frequentism, A paticle physicists perspective},
booktitle={Contemporary Physics: Bayes and Frequentism, A paticle physicists perspective},
year={2013},
month={Feb},
volume={2},
@ -388,8 +388,7 @@ ISSN={0149-144X},}
YEAR = "2008"
}
@MISC{theoremflower,
@incollection{theoremflower,
year={2004},
isbn={978-3-540-21268-3},
booktitle={Diagrammatic Representation and Inference},
@ -404,6 +403,8 @@ author={Flower, Jean and Masthoff, Judith and Stapleton, Gem},
pages={166-181}
}
% my bib file.
@INPROCEEDINGS{automatingFMEA1281774,
author={Papadopoulos, Y. and Parker, D. and Grante, C.},
@ -464,7 +465,7 @@ year={2001},
month={},
volume={7},
number={},
pages={vol.7},
pages={3458},
keywords={Analytical models;Design automation;Design engineering;Discrete event simulation;Failure analysis;Hybrid power systems;Performance analysis;Production;Propulsion;Steady-state;aerospace computing;aerospace simulation;discrete event simulation;engineering computing;failure analysis;production engineering computing;CONFIG hybrid discrete event simulator;EPOCH Simulation for Failure Analysis software;EPOCH algorithm;automated incremental design FMEA;automatic generation;design models;engineering product/operations cross-cutting hybrid simulation ;failure modes;failure modes/effects analysis;functional labels;propellant production plant;scenario scripts;scenario-based analyses;space systems;timestep modeling;},
doi={10.1109/AERO.2001.931423},
ISSN={}}

View File

@ -121,7 +121,7 @@ The primary motive for writing the Spider diagram editor was to provide an alter
to formal languages for software specification.
%
An added attraction for using spider diagrams was that they could be used in
proving logic~\cite{stapleton:atpieds} and theorems~\cite{theoremflower,Fish200553} in an intuitive way.
proving logic and theorems~\cite{theoremflower,Fish200553} in an intuitive way.
%
Because of the author's daily work exposure to FMEA,
%I started thinking

View File

@ -499,7 +499,8 @@ the failure modes for the new {\dc} are: %we state:
$$fm ( CMATV ) = \{ HIGH , LOW, V\_ERR \} .$$
%
%
\paragraph{software and hardware hybrid {\fg} --- RADC}
\paragraph{Software and hardware hybrid {\fg} --- RADC}
\label{sec:readadc}
\label{readADC}
The software function \cf{Read\_ADC} uses the ADC hardware analysed
as the {\dc} CMATV above.
@ -522,8 +523,10 @@ The reference voltage for the ADC has a 0.1\% accuracy requirement.
%
If the reference value is outside this, it is also a {\fm}
of this function,
which is termed $V\_REF$ (nb: this failure mode is detectable %observable
only if a test input is used to measure a high precision voltage reference).
which is termed $V\_REF$\footnote{The failure mode $V\_REF$ is detectable %observable
only if a test input is used to measure a high precision voltage reference.
This validates the supply voltage to the ADC.
This is common practise for safety critical readings when using an ADC.}.
%
Taken as a component for use in FMEA/FMMD the function has
two failure modes. Therefore it can be treated as a generic component, $Read\_ADC$,
@ -1019,9 +1022,9 @@ Identified Software Components:
\begin{itemize}
\item --- \cf{Monitor} (which calls PID algorithm and sets status LEDS),
\item --- \cf{PID} (which calls \cf{determine\_set\_point\_error} and \cf{output\_control}),
\item --- \cf{determine\_set\_point\_error} (which calls convert\_ADC\_to\_T),
\item --- \cf{convert\_ADC\_to\_T} (which calls read\_ADC which we can re-use from the last example),
\item --- \cf{read\_ADC},
\item --- \cf{determine\_set\_point\_error} (which calls \cf{convert\_ADC\_to\_T}),
\item --- \cf{convert\_ADC\_to\_T} (which calls \cf{read\_ADC}), % which has been analysed as the {\dc} read\_ADC which can be re-used.} % from the last example),
\item --- \cf{read\_ADC} (analysed in the previous section~\ref{sec:readadc}),
\item --- \cf{output\_control} (which sets the PWM hardware according to the PID demand value).
\end{itemize}
%
@ -1100,7 +1103,7 @@ Failure symptoms are collected and the {\dc} created with the following failure
%
%
$$fm(Get\_Temperature) = \{ Pt100\_out\_of\_range, temp\_incorrect \} . $$
\clearpage
%\clearpage
%
%
Following the afferent flow further, the function to determine the control error value is examined.

View File

@ -28,8 +28,8 @@ The reasoning distances obtained from the FMMD examples (see chapter~\ref{sec:ch
compared against {\XFMEA}.
\fmmdglossXFMEA
%
Following on from the formal definitions, `unitary state failure modes' are defined. In short these
ensure that component failure modes are mutually exclusive. % Using the unitary state failure mode definition
Following on from formal definitions, `unitary state failure modes' are defined, i.e.
ensuring that component failure modes are mutually exclusive. % Using the unitary state failure mode definition
%
Standard formulae for combinations are then used to develop the concept of
the cardinality constrained power-set.
@ -146,7 +146,7 @@ Using the language developed in the previous chapters,
a system for analysis is considered as a collection %{\fg}
of components.
%
This is a set of components $G$, and the number of components in it
This set of components is termed $G$, and the number of components in it by
$ | G | $. %,
%(an indexing and sub-scripting notation to identify particular {\fgs}
%within an FMMD hierarchy is given in section~\ref{sec:indexsub}).
@ -293,7 +293,7 @@ The comparison complexity function $CC$ is overloaded, to obtain the comparison
\fmmdglossRD
%\pagebreak[4]
The amplifier example from chapter~\ref{sec:chap4}, which has two
stages, the potential divider and then the amplifier is chosen as an example for comparison complexity.
stages, the potential divider and then the amplifier, is chosen as an example for comparison complexity.
%
The complexities are added from
both these stages to determine how many reasoning paths there were to perform FMMD analysis on the
@ -557,9 +557,10 @@ are presented in the following table~\ref{tbl:firstcc}.
%
%\usepackage{multirow}
\begin{table}
\label{tbl:firstcc}
% fucker \label{tbl:firstcc}
\begin{tabular}{ |c|l|l|c| }
\begin{tabular}{ |c|l|l|c| }
% ARRGGGGG\label{tbl:firstcc}
\hline
\textbf{Hierarchy} & \textbf{Derived} & \textbf{Complexity} & $|fm(c)|$: \textbf{number} \\
\textbf{Level} & \textbf{Component} & \textbf{Comparison} & \textbf{of derived} \\
@ -617,6 +618,7 @@ are presented in the following table~\ref{tbl:firstcc}.
\end{tabular}
\caption{Comparison Complexity figures for the first three examples in Chapter~\ref{sec:chap5}.}
\label{tbl:firstcc} %%% LABELS ONLY WORK AFTER THE CAPTION IN LATEX
\end{table}
% end table
The complexity comparison figures for the example circuits in chapter~\ref{sec:chap5} show
@ -637,11 +639,12 @@ It was also analysed twice, once by
{na\"{\i}vely} using the first {\fgs} identified, and secondly by de-composing
the circuit further.
%
These two analyses are used to compare the effect on comparison complexity % REF DOES NOT WORK (see table~\ref{tbl:bubbacc11})
These two analyses are used to compare the effect on comparison complexity % REF DOES NOT WORK
(see table~\ref{tbl:bubbacc11}) % put table labels after the caption.
with that of {\XFMEA}.
%
\begin{table}
\label{tbl:bubbacc11}
%
\begin{tabular}{ |c|l|l|c| }
@ -703,6 +706,7 @@ with that of {\XFMEA}.
\end{tabular}
%\label{tbl:bubbacc}
\caption{Complexity Comparison figures for the Bubba Oscillator FMMD example (see section~\ref{sec:bubba}).}
\label{tbl:bubbacc11}
\end{table}
%
The initial {na\"{\i}ve} FMMD analysis reduces the number of checks by around a third, the more de-composed analysis
@ -778,7 +782,7 @@ That is the signal path crosses from analogue to digital signalling and vice ver
\label{sec:unitarystate}
%\label{ch7:mutex}
\label{ch7:mutex}
\paragraph{Design Decision/Constraint}
\paragraph{Design Decision/Constraint.}
%
An important factor in defining a set of failure modes is that they
should represent the failure modes as simply and minimally as possible.
@ -898,7 +902,7 @@ for base~components this is usually the case.
Most simple components fail in one
clearly defined way and generally stay in that state.
%
Traditional FMEA has problems dealing with non unitary state failure modes.
Traditional FMEA also has problems dealing with non unitary state failure modes.
%
This is mainly because combinations of failure modes could cause
effects very difficult to predict (as they are in effect new failure modes of the component).
@ -922,9 +926,9 @@ inside the micro-controller package.
%
The micro-controller thus becomes a collection of smaller components
that can be analysed separately~\footnote{It is common for the signal paths
in a safety critical product to be traced, and when entering a complex
in a safety critical product to be traced, when examining a complex
component like a micro-controller, the process of heuristic de-compostion
is then applied to it.}.
is typically applied.}.
%
%\paragraph{Reason for FMMD unitary failure mode constraint.}
Were this constraint not to be applied,

View File

@ -20,12 +20,7 @@
}
@ARTICLE{stapleton:atpieds,
AUTHOR = "G.~Stapleton and J.~Masthoff and J.~Flower and A.~Fish and J.~Southern",
TITLE = "Automated Theorem Proving in {E}uler Diagrams Systems",
JOURNAL = "Accepted for Journal of Automated Reasoning",
YEAR = "to appear 2007"
}
@ARTICLE{stapleton:teacosdawc,
AUTHOR = "G. Stapleton and J. Taylor and J. Howse and S. Thompson",