lunchtime edit (geddit)
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mybib.bib
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mybib.bib
@ -271,10 +271,12 @@ ISSN={Doi:10.1145/2330667.2330683},}
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@ARTICLE{fftoriginal,
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@ARTICLE{fftoriginal,
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title={An Algorithm for the Mechine Calculation of Complex Fourier Series},
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title={An Algorithm for the Machine Calculation of Complex Fourier Series},
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author={James W. Cooley and John W. Tukey},
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author={James W. Cooley and John W. Tukey},
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journal={Mathematics of Computation},
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journal={Mathematics of Computation},
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year={1965},
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year={1965},
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volume={19},
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volume={19},
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pages={297-301},
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pages={297-301},
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publisher={American Mathematical Society}
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publisher={American Mathematical Society}
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@ -483,6 +485,13 @@ Database
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YEAR = "1991"
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YEAR = "1991"
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}
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}
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@ARTICLE{fmeca,
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AUTHOR = "United States DOD",
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TITLE = "MIL-STD-1629A: Procedure for performing a failure mode, effects and criticality analysis",
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JOURNAL = "United States Department of Defence",
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YEAR = "1980"
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}
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% $Id: mybib.bib,v 1.3 2009/11/28 20:05:52 robin Exp $
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% $Id: mybib.bib,v 1.3 2009/11/28 20:05:52 robin Exp $
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@article{Clark200519,
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@article{Clark200519,
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title = "Failure Mode Modular De-Composition Using Spider Diagrams",
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title = "Failure Mode Modular De-Composition Using Spider Diagrams",
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@ -790,8 +799,8 @@ strength of materials, the causes of boiler explosions",
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@BOOK{mil1991,
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@BOOK{mil1991,
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AUTHOR = "United~States~DOD",
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AUTHOR = "United~States~DOD",
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TITLE = "Reliability Prediction of Electronic Equipment",
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TITLE = "MIL-1991: Reliability Prediction of Electronic Equipment",
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PUBLISHER = "DOD",
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PUBLISHER = "United States Department of Defence",
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YEAR = "1991"
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YEAR = "1991"
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}
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}
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BIN
related_papers_books/FMECA_Mil-Std-1629A.pdf
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BIN
related_papers_books/FMECA_Mil-Std-1629A.pdf
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@ -1154,20 +1154,26 @@ $ \Omega(C) = fm(C) \cup \{OK\} $).
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The $OK$ statistical case is the (usually) largest in probability, and is therefore
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The $OK$ statistical case is the (usually) largest in probability, and is therefore
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of interest when analysing systems from a statistical perspective.
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of interest when analysing systems from a statistical perspective.
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%
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For these examples, the OK state is not represented area proportionately, but is included
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For these examples, the OK state is not represented area proportionately, but is included
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in the diagrams.
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in the diagrams.
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%
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This type of diagram is germane to the application of conditional probability calculations
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This type of diagram is germane to the application of conditional probability calculations
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such as Bayes theorem~\cite{probstat}.
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such as Bayes theorem~\cite{probstat}.
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%
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The current failure modelling methodologies (FMEA, FMECA, FTA, FMEDA) all use Bayesian
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The current failure modelling methodologies
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statistics to justify their methodologies~\cite{nucfta}\cite{nasafta}.
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(FMECA~\cite{fmeca}, FTA~\cite{nucfta}\cite{nasafta}, FMEDA~\cite{en61508})
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use Bayesian
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statistics to justify their methodologies.
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%
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That is to say, a base component or a sub-system failure
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That is to say, a base component or a sub-system failure
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has a probability of causing given system level failures\footnote{FMECA has a $\beta$ value that directly corresponds
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has a probability of causing given system level failures\footnote{FMECA has a $\beta$ value that directly corresponds
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to the probability that a given part failure mode will cause a given system level failure/event.}.
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to the probability that a given part failure mode will cause a given system level failure/event.}.
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%
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Another way to view this is to consider the failure modes of a
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Another way to view this is to consider the failure modes of a
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component, with the $OK$ state, as a universal set $\Omega$, where
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component, with the $OK$ state, as a universal set $\Omega$, where
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all sets within $\Omega$ are partitioned.
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all sets within $\Omega$ are partitioned.
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%
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Figure \ref{fig:combco} shows a partitioned set representing
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Figure \ref{fig:combco} shows a partitioned set representing
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component failure modes $\{ B_1 ... B_3, OK \}$: partitioned sets
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component failure modes $\{ B_1 ... B_3, OK \}$: partitioned sets
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where the OK or empty set condition is included, obey unitary state conditions.
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where the OK or empty set condition is included, obey unitary state conditions.
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@ -1193,7 +1199,8 @@ This would make it seemingly impossible to model as `unitary state'.
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There are two ways in which we can deal with this.
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There are two ways in which we can deal with this.
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We could consider the component a composite
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We could consider the component a composite
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of two simpler components, and model their interaction to
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of two simpler components, and model their interaction to
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create a derived component (i.e. use FMMD on the simpler components).
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create a derived component (i.e. use FMMD).
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%
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The second way to do this would be to consider the combnations of non-mutually
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The second way to do this would be to consider the combnations of non-mutually
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exclusive {\fms} as new {\fms}: this approach is discussed below.
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exclusive {\fms} as new {\fms}: this approach is discussed below.
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