Mum proof read of English

component_failure_modes_definition/paper.tex

@@ -20,7 +20,7 @@
                                               % numbers at outer edges
 \pagenumbering{arabic}                        % Arabic page numbers hereafter
 \author{R.P.Clark}
-\title{Definitions, Components, Functional Groups and Unitary State Failure Mode Sets}
+\title{Definitions, Components, Functional Groups \\ and Unitary State Failure Mode Sets}
 \maketitle 
 \input{component_failure_modes_definition_paper}
 

symptom_ex_process/algorithm.tex

@@ -37,7 +37,7 @@ will have an $\alpha$ value of 1.
 %of the highest assigned to any of its components.
 %
 %With a derived component $DC$  having an abstraction level 
-The attribute $\alpha$ we can be used to track the 
+The attribute $\alpha$ can be used to track the 
 level of fault abstraction  of components in an FMMD hierarchy. Because base and derived components
 are collected to form functional groups, a hierarchy is
 naturally formed with the abstraction levels increasing with each tier.
@@ -171,7 +171,7 @@ $$ DTC(F) = TC $$
    \COMMENT { This corresponds to checking that each possible double failure mode is considered  
               as a test case; more rigorous cardinality constraint
               checks may be required for some safety standards. Note if both failure modes
-              in the check are sourced from the same component $c$ the test case is impossible
+              in the check are sourced from the same component $c$, the test case is impossible
               under unitary state failure mode conditions}
    \ENDIF
 
@@ -240,7 +240,7 @@ the test case failure modes will cause.
 %
 In the case of a simple
 electronic circuit, we could calculate the effect on voltages
-within the circuit given certain component failure modes for instance.
+within the circuit given certain component failure modes, for instance.
 The affect of these unusual volatges would then be a failure
 mode of the functional group and become the result of the test case.
 When each test case has been analysed, we have a set of
@@ -334,7 +334,7 @@ component created in the next stage.
 }
 {
 Note ensuring that no result belongs to more than one symptom
-set enforces unitary state failure mode constraint for derived components.
+set enforces the `unitary state failure mode constraint' for derived components.
 }
 
 %% Interesting to draw a graph here.
@@ -440,7 +440,7 @@ Because the fault modes are determined from the bottom-up, the causes
 for all high level faults naturally form trees.
 These trees can be traversed to produce 
 minimal cut sets\cite{nasafta} or entire FTA trees\cite{nucfta}, and by
-analysing the statistical likelyhood of the component failures,
+analysing the statistical likelihood of the component failures,
 the MTTF and SIL\cite{en61508} levels can be automatically calculated.
 
 

symptom_ex_process/introduction.tex

@@ -1,20 +1,20 @@
 {
 \section{Introduction}
-This chapter describes a process for taking a functional group of components,
+This chapter describes a process for taking a {\fg} of components,
-applying FMEA analysis on all the component failure modes possible in that functional~group,
+applying FMEA analysis on all the component failure modes possible in that {\fg},
-and then determining how that functional group can fail.
+and then determining how that {\fg} can fail.
 %
 %
-With this information, we can treat the functional group
+With this information, we can treat the {\fg}
 as a component in its own right.
-This new component is a derived from the functional~group.
+This new component, is a derived from the {\fg}.
-In the field of safety engineering this derived component  correspond to a low~level sub-system.
+In the field of safety engineering this derived component  corresponds to a low~level sub-system.
 %The technique uses a graphical notation, based on Euler\cite{eulerviz} and Constraint diagrams\cite{constraint} to model failure modes and failure mode common symptom collection.  The technique is designed for making building blocks for a hierarchical fault model.
 %
-Once the failure modes have been determined for a sub-system/derived~component,
+Once the failure modes have been determined for a sub-system/{\dc},
-this derived component can be combined with others to form functional groups
+this {\dc} can be combined with others to form {\fgs} groups
 to model 
-higher level sub-systems/derived~components. 
+higher level sub-systems/{\dcs}. 
 %
 In this way a hierarchy to represent the fault behaviour
 of a system can be built from the bottom~up. This process can continue
@@ -24,7 +24,7 @@ behaviour of the entire system under analysis.
 Using the FMMD technique the hierarchy is built from the bottom up to ensure complete failure mode coverage.
 Because the process is bottom-up, syntax checking and tracking can ensure that
 no component failure mode can be overlooked.
-Once a hierarchy is in place it can be converted into a fault data model.
+Once a hierarchy is in place, it can be converted into a fault data model.
 %
 From the fault data model, automatic generation
 of FTA\cite{nasafta} (Fault Tree Analysis) and mimimal cuts sets\cite{nucfta} are possible. 

symptom_ex_process/process.tex

@@ -52,7 +52,9 @@ It is possible here for an automated system to flag unhandled failure modes.
 \ref{requirement at the start}
 
 
-\section{The Process : To analyse a base level Derived~Component/sub-system}
+\section{The Process}
+
+\paragraph{To analyse a base level Derived~Component/sub-system}
 
 To sumarise:
 
@@ -73,7 +75,7 @@ form `test cases'.
 
 
 
-\clearpage
+\pagebreak[1]
 \section{A theoretical `Derived Component' example}
 
 Consider a functional group $FG$ with components $C_1$, $C_2$ and $C_3$.
@@ -270,9 +272,9 @@ Where DC is a derived component, and FG is a functional group:
 %  \caption{Deriving a new diagram}
 
 
-This sub-system or derived~component $DC$ , with its three error modes, can now be treated as a component (although at a higher level of abstraction)
+This sub-system or {\dc} $DC$, with its three error modes, can now be treated as a component (although at a higher level of abstraction)
 with known failure modes. 
-This process can be repeated using derived~components to build a 
+This process can be repeated using {\dcs} to build a 
 hierarchical fault~mode model.
 
 

symptom_ex_process/topbot.tex

@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@
 \subsection{Static Analysis}
 
 In the field of safety critical engineering; to comply with 
-European Law a product must be certified under the approriate `EN' standard.
+European Law a product must be certified under the appropriate `EN' standard.
 Typically environmental stress, EMC, electrical stressing, endurance tests, 
 software~inspections and project~management quality reviews are applied\cite{sccs}.
 

thesis.tex

@@ -58,7 +58,7 @@
 \chapter{Safety Critical systems Analysis}
 \input{statistics/statistics}
 
-\chapter{Survey of Safety Critical Analysis Methodologies and Tools Available}
+\chapter{Survey of Safety Critical \\ Analysis Methodologies \\ and Tools Available}
 \input{survey/survey}
 
 
@@ -66,7 +66,7 @@
 \input{standards/standards}
 
 \typeout{ ---------------- Component Failure Modes Definition }
-\chapter { Component Failure Modes Definition}
+\chapter { Component Failure \\ Modes Definition}
 \input{component_failure_modes_definition/component_failure_modes_definition}