diff --git a/submission_thesis/CH2_FMEA/copy.tex b/submission_thesis/CH2_FMEA/copy.tex
index ed45d8f..d018ed5 100644
--- a/submission_thesis/CH2_FMEA/copy.tex
+++ b/submission_thesis/CH2_FMEA/copy.tex
@@ -1195,8 +1195,7 @@ and require re-design of some systems.
 %
 \begin{table}[ht]
 \centering
-\caption{Table adapted from EN61508-1:2001 [7.6.2.9 p33], showing statistical tolerance of `dangerous~failures' to
-comply with a given SIL level} % title of Table
+
 %\centering % used for centering table
 \begin{tabular}{|| l | l | c | c | l ||} \hline
  \textbf{SIL} &   \textbf{Low Demand}     & \textbf{Continuous Demand}          \\ 
@@ -1208,6 +1207,8 @@ comply with a given SIL level} % title of Table
 
 \hline
 \end{tabular}
+\caption{Table adapted from EN61508-1:2001 [7.6.2.9 p33], showing statistical tolerance of `dangerous~failures' to
+comply with a given SIL level} % title of Table
 \label{tbl:sil_levels}
 \end{table}
 %
@@ -1225,7 +1226,7 @@ self checking features on safety, and provides detailed recommendations for comp
 FMEDA is the fundamental methodology of the  statistical (safety integrity level)
 type standards (EN61508/IOC5108).
 The end result of an EN61508 analysis is an % provides a statistical 
-overall `level~of~safety' known as a Safety Integrity level (SIL), for an installed system.
+overall `level~of~safety' known as a Safety Integrity level (SIL) assigned to  an installed system.
 %
 It has a simple final result, a Safety Integrity Level (SIL) from 1 to 4 (where 4 is safest).
 %
@@ -1233,8 +1234,8 @@ These SIL levels are broadly linked to the concept of an
 acceptance of given probabilities of dangerous 
 failures against time, as shown in table~\ref{tbl:sil_levels}.
 %
-The philosophy behind this is that is recognised that no system can have a perfect
-safety integrity, but risk and criticality can be matched to acceptable,
+The philosophy behind this is that it is recognised that no system can have a perfect
+safety integrity, but that risk and criticality can be matched to acceptable,
 or realistic levels of risk.
 %There are currently four SIL `levels', one to four, with four being the highest level. 
 %
diff --git a/submission_thesis/CH3_FMEA_criticism/copy.tex b/submission_thesis/CH3_FMEA_criticism/copy.tex
index d0b91a3..72291f2 100644
--- a/submission_thesis/CH3_FMEA_criticism/copy.tex
+++ b/submission_thesis/CH3_FMEA_criticism/copy.tex
@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ now software/hardware hybrids.
 %
 
 Even analogue electronics, with the advent of surface mount and miniature components,
-means that a modern electronic circuits are typically far more complex and have
+means that modern electronic circuits are typically far more complex and have
 far higher component counts, than those
 of the era when FMEA methodologies were invented.
 %
@@ -62,9 +62,9 @@ for an improved methodology.
 \subsection{FMEA: {\bc} {\fm} to system level failure modelling}
 FMEA traces it roots to the 1940s when it was used to identify the most costly
 failures arising from car mass-production~\cite{bfmea}.
-It was later modified slightly to include severity of the top level failure (FMECA~\cite{fmeca}).
+It was later modified slightly to identify/compare severity levels of the system level failures (FMECA~\cite{fmeca}).
 In the 1980s FMEA was extended again (FMEDA~\cite{fmeda}) to provide statistics
-for predicting failure rates.
+for predicting safety~levels/failure~rates.
 %
 However a typical entry in each of the above methodologies, starts with a 
 particular component failure mode and associates it with a system---or top level---failure symptom.