From 169761ae0f3ddcb2f0fedc588aa11d9b9eca2900 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Robin Clark <r.clark@energytechnologycontrol.com>
Date: Tue, 10 May 2011 18:57:47 +0100
Subject: [PATCH] fucker

---
 noninvopamp/noninvopamp.tex | 25 ++++++++++++++++++++-----
 1 file changed, 20 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)

diff --git a/noninvopamp/noninvopamp.tex b/noninvopamp/noninvopamp.tex
index 0bc15da..1d7c7b1 100644
--- a/noninvopamp/noninvopamp.tex
+++ b/noninvopamp/noninvopamp.tex
@@ -542,10 +542,16 @@ to expand: Cuts sets and minimal cut sets.
 A design FMEA, or potential failure mode and effects analysis
 will typically require the designer to look at the possible effects
 of all the component failure modes in the system under investigation.
+
+
+FMEA uses the terms `potential causes' and `potential failure modes'.
+In an FMMD sense, the `potential causes' are component level failure modes
+and the `potential failure modes' are top-level symptoms.
+
 \ifthenelse {\boolean{paper}}
 {
 %FMEA - brief description for paper...
-Design FMEA is methodology for assessing potential reliability/dangerous condition  early
+Design FMEA is methodology for assessing potential reliability/dangerous conditions  early
 in the development cycle.
 FMEA is used to identify potential failure modes, 
 determine their effect on the operation of the product, 
@@ -553,6 +559,7 @@ and identify actions to mitigate the failures.
 FMEA relies anticipating what {\em might} go wrong with a product. 
 While anticipating every failure mode is not possible, a development team should
 collate as complete a list of potential failure modes as possible.
+
 With an FMMD sourced failure mode to symptom mapping, this
 list should be more complete. It will for instance include
 not only an entry every component failure mode, but has a formal
@@ -564,16 +571,19 @@ FMEA relies anticipating what {\em might} go wrong with a product.
 While anticipating every failure mode is not possible, a development team should
 collate as complete a list of potential failure modes as possible.
 With an FMMD sourced failure mode to symptom mapping, this
-list should be more complete. It will for instance include
+list should be more complete. 
+
+It will for instance include
 not only an entry every component failure mode, but has a formal
 reasoning process behind it, which leads to the symptom.
+
 }
 We have from the DAG model, a direct path from each component failure
-mode to potential symptoms. This allows us to partially fill in
+mode to top-level symptoms. This allows us to partially fill in
 the FMEA report. The detectability and severity of the symptom
 are subjective. Given component failure rates, the probability
-of the the potential cause occurring can be calculated, using the FMD-91~\cite{fmd91} and MIL1991~\cite{mil1991}
-component failure mode statistical references.
+of the the potential cause occurring can be calculated, given suitable 
+component failure mode statistical references (e.g. FMD-91~\cite{fmd91} and MIL1991~\cite{mil1991}).
 
 \begin{table}[ht]
 \caption{Non Inverting Amplifier: Failure Mode Effects Analysis: Single Faults} % title of Table
@@ -601,6 +611,11 @@ component failure mode statistical references.
 \label{ampfmea}
 \end{table}
 
+
+With the partially filled in table the FMEA report only now needs the severity/cost,
+probability/occurrence and detectability fields filled in to obtain the 
+$RPN$ numbers that define the order of importance of failure modes in FMEA.
+
 \subsection{Information missing in FMEA}
 
 to expand: Each FMEA looses the reasoning in the FMMD Hierarchy/DAG for linking