diff --git a/submission_thesis/CH3_FMEA_criticism/copy.tex b/submission_thesis/CH3_FMEA_criticism/copy.tex
index 9f02153..bc95ba8 100644
--- a/submission_thesis/CH3_FMEA_criticism/copy.tex
+++ b/submission_thesis/CH3_FMEA_criticism/copy.tex
@@ -56,14 +56,14 @@ one failure can influence the programmatic behaviour and decisions made,
 complicating the analysis of additional failures.
 %
 Dual failure analysis is required by some recent European standards~\cite{en298,en230}
-and with increasing demands on safety, we are likely to see more multiple failure
-FMEA requirements.
+and with increasing demands on safety, additional multiple failure
+FMEA requirements are likely.
 
 Other problems such as the inability to easily re-use, and validate/audit (through
 traceable reasoning) FMEA models are presented.
 %
-Finally we conclude with a list of deficiencies in current FMEA methodologies and present a wish list
-for an improved methodology.
+Finally a list of deficiencies in current FMEA methodologies and a wish list
+for an improved methodology are presented.
 
 \section{Historical Origins of FMEA and the {\bc} {\fm} to system level failure/symptom paradigm}
 
@@ -76,7 +76,9 @@ for predicting safety~levels/failure~rates.
 %
 However a typical entry in each of the above methodologies, starts with a 
 particular component failure mode and associates it with a system---or top level---failure symptom.
-This means that we have one analysis case per component failure mode for all the components in the system under investigation.
+%
+This means that there is one analysis case per component failure mode for all the components in the system under investigation.
+%
 This analysis philosophy has not changed since FMEA was first used.
 
 
@@ -100,7 +102,8 @@ to the component base in a system, it is very difficult to
 determine which FMEA test scenarios must be re-worked.
 %
 It is common in safety critical systems to have repeated circuit topologies.
-For instance we may have several signal input and output
+%
+For instance there may be several signal input and output
 structures that are repeated.
 %
 The failure mode behaviour of these repeated structures will be the same.
@@ -291,7 +294,7 @@ analogue electronics only~\cite{smart_instruments_1514209}.
 %
 It is termed `smart' because it has some software, or intelligence incorporated into it.
 %
-For instance, an AVO-8 multi-meter circa 1970, uses only analogue electronics, and we can determine
+For instance, an AVO-8 multi-meter circa 1970, uses only analogue electronics,it can be determined
 using FMEA how component failures within it could affect readings.
 %
 A modern multi-meter will have a small dedicated micro-processor and sensing electronics, all on the same chip,
@@ -348,11 +351,14 @@ This adjustment could be direct, or could  be another CANbus message passed to a
 %
 In terms of FMEA, see figure~\ref{fig:distcon}, our reasoning path spans (at least) four interface layers of electronics to software.
 %
-Traditional FMEA does not cater for the software hardware interface, and here we have the additional complications
+Traditional FMEA does not cater for the software hardware interface, and this leads to the additional complications
 %with the additional complications
 of the communications protocol used to transmit data and the failure mode characteristics
-of the communications physical layer. This means the signal path will
+of the communications physical layer. 
+%
+This means the signal path will
 cross several hardware/software interfaces.
+%
 \fmmdglossSIGPATH
 %(figure~\ref{fig:distcon}
 The failure reasoning paths for a distributed real time system, % AF does not like this but I think its OK